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Abstract
In Chapter 1, we propose a theory to explain the poor performance of Jamaica rela-
tive to the other former British West Indian sugar colonies in the post-emancipation
period (post 1834). Using empirical data from the colonial Blue Books, Parliamentary
Papers and other sources, we perform an interrupted time series analysis and show that
the intervention in 1866, which saw the abolishing of the Planters’ Assembly, and its re-
placement with Crown Colony rule, led to significantly higher levels of public investment
on the island. Using sugar’s share of exports as a proxy for the strength/presence of the
plantation economy, we identify and quantify the role of the plantation interest in ma-
nipulating public investment and show that this was motivated by a desire to influence
wages.
In Chapter 2, we propose an institutional and colonial origins approach to explaining the
social and economic divergence among the former British West Indian sugar colonies.
Specifically, we focus on the contrasting economic development among the five main
sugar colonies, Antigua, Barbados, Saint Kitts, Guyana and Jamaica. We hypothesise
that where colonial population density was high, labour supply was plentiful and West
Indian planters received adequate labour for their plantations without the need for highly
repressive institutions. This led to better institutions, lower levels of conflict, and a
higher level of social cohesion which, we argue, facilitated better economic performance.
In Chapter 3 we survey the literature concerning government intervention in the African
peasant sector, paying special attention to policies concerned with labour supply during
the colonial period. The survey covers several African colonies and works by various
scholars.
The analysis in Chpater 4 uses colonial population density, labour institutions flexibility
(the average (2008-2016) ‘Flexibility’ score from the Global Competitiveness Index),
and a measure of labour conflict (per capita number of days lost due to strikes and
lockouts, averaged over the first twenty years of each country’s independence) to test
the relationship between historical labour availability, labour conflict and the quality
of labour institutions today. We find a persistent and significant positive relationship
between the quality of labour institutions and colonial labour availability, and a negative
relationship between conflict and the quality of institutions in 53 former tropical colonies.
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Introduction
Research in the area of development economics have very often cited the historical factors
that underpin development today. For developing economies these historical factors
seem to be especially relevant, given the renewed focus on the role and persistence of
institutions in affecting economic development. Among the set of developing countries,
those that share a history of European colonialism are heterogenous in many dimensions,
but a large number of them have in common the fact that they inherited institutional
forms left over by their former colonisers. Recent papers, such as Acemoglu et al.
(2001), have pointed to the importance of these colonial institutions for the economic
(under)development of these states today. Colonial institutions, the authors argue, act
as the catalyst for much of the variation in economic development observed among
many developing countries today. The prevailing definition is by North (1991, p.97)
who describes institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political,
economic, and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions,
taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws,
property rights).”
By identifying both the informal and formal characteristics of institutions, North’s
definition is particularly useful for understanding the nature of institutions. First, the
idea that informal relationships are part of the structure of institutions implies that
the historical experiences which inform customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are
crucially important to how institutions function. Second, the formal rules of institutional
frameworks, as identified by North, are often the product of institutions of government,
and so, the exercise of these rules depends largely on the quality of governance. Yet,
the subtler differences in institutions of governance between countries have yet to be
fully exploited in the elucidation of their role in economic development. Rothstein and
Teorell (2008, p.165) have helped address this problem, offering a concise definition of
the quality of governance as the “impartiality of institutions that exercise government
authority.” This definition suggests that the outcomes from institutions of governance
may not necessarily reflect a preference for fair and just distribution of government
resources. This begs the question of whose interests might institutions of government
reflect? The answer to this question lies in an examination of both the history of a
country’s institutional framework and the motives of those wielding political and policy
making power.
In the chapters that follow, we delve into the histories of post-colonial states to
12
INTRODUCTION 13
uncover the origins of economic and institutional divergences and link them to the in-
teractions between economic and political actors who, in their actions throughout the
history of these countries, have shaped the institutional environment in which economic
policy is conducted. The focus of this thesis is on the colonial era. This is motivated
by the undoubted relevance of that period to economic and institutional development
across a broad cross-section of countries. Moreover, the immense diversity in colonial
policy allows us to study the economic consequences of different policies and institutions
on a broad scale. These four essays treat the recent histories of these former colonies as
being crucial for how they developed.
Chapter 1 takes a close look at the motives underlying the elites’ choice of institu-
tions. It examines the consequences for institutions of governance — and the policies
that emerge out of these institutions — when the governing class is also part of the set
of entrepreneurial elite. This feature is particularly apropos to the set of post-colonial
countries. It represented the reality of colonial life for these former colonies throughout
the colonial period and, in some cases, even today. The chapter conducts this exam-
ination by carrying out a comparative analysis of public investment policy under two
different forms of government in colonial Jamaica. Chapter 1 takes a close look at Ja-
maica’s underdevelopment by examining the implications for public investment under
two different types (and thus two differently motivated forms) of government. The find-
ings in the chapter indicate that the underperformance of Jamaica may be due to the
fact that the planter-dominated government which governed the island from the late
seventeenth century (when it was acquired from Spain) to 1865 (when power was se-
ceded to the Crown in Britain, and the island became a Crown Colony) systematically
underinvested in growth-enhancing public goods. Importantly, the analysis pins down
the influence of the private production motives of the planter government and argues
that this significant and persistent underinvestment was part of a deliberate attempt
to manipulate wage rates by underfunding human and infrastructural development and
redirecting revenues towards coercive ends.
Chapter 2 endeavours to explain the puzzling economic divergence between former
sugar colonies in the British West Indies. We begin by studying the history literature
from both contemporaneous and recent sources to identify the responses (and the mo-
tivations underpinning them) of the governing elite to the first significant institutional
change in British West Indian society, the Emancipation Act of 1833. The information
gathered from these sources suggests that that moment commenced a period of institu-
tional divergence among the British West Indian colonies as the plantation owners used
their political influence to remedy the central problem of the time, the (free) labour prob-
lem that resulted from the act. The chapter, with the aid of works by Augier (1993),
Green (1991), and Bolland (1981), among others, and contemporary sources such as
parliamentary papers and commission reports, argues that the institutional responses of
the politically affluent planters varied with the magnitude of the labour problem they
faced. Where the labour problem was particularly severe, like in the sparsely populated
territories of Jamaica and Guyana, the planters responded with aggressively coercive
institutions that ultimately caused these societies to develop into ones littered with con-
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flict and marred by political and social instability. The rest of the chapter connects
these colonial factors to current economic development by using empirical data to link
the colonial labour problem to present day institutional quality. The results suggest
that the institutional consequences of the responses to the colonial labour problem have
persisted. In former colonies where scarce labour motivated more coercive action by the
planter-dominated government during the colonial period, worse economic, social and
political institutions and economic outcomes are observed today. The findings offer in-
sight into how deeply entrenched are the institutional deficiencies that hinder economic
development.
In Chapter 3 we conduct a survey of the literature beyond the West Indies. We
explore similar instances of interventions by governments to cheapen the supply of labour
in other colonies. Specifically, we survey the scholarly works concerning African economic
history. While each colony had its own unique features, several commonalities have been
identified by work in this area. By exploring some of the most prominent works, we
present various scholarly points of view which serves to inform our understanding of
the wider context of colonial history and its impact on peasants and broader economic
development. Counter-balancing arguments from the Arrighi (1970) and Mosley (1983)
are presented to offer a more complete picture of the economic history of post-colonial
states. The chapter covers several African colonies including both the settler and export-
oriented colonies. We present a review of Wilson (1972) which explores the case of labour
in the South African gold mines, followed by Van Onselen (1976) which looks at mine
labour in Southern Rhodesia. Bates (1981) and Bates (1987), which examine various
colonies, round-up the chapter.
Chapter 4 builds on the survey from Chapter 3 to broaden the sample of countries
considered while narrowing the outcome of interest. Using a contest success function,
we analyse the theoretical implications of the historical conflict between stakeholders in
the labour market of post-colonial states. More specifically, this chapter explores three
questions. The first is whether former colonies in the tropical region, where labour-
intensive large-scale agriculture dominated economic life, have worse labour institutions
than the rest of the world today. The second question considers whether the differences
in the quality of labour institutions in these tropical former colonies are a consequence
of the labour problems faced during the colonial period. The final question examines
whether the relationship between colonial labour availability and the quality of labour
institutions today, should it exist, is unique to tropical colonies where cheap agricultural
labour availability was paramount to the economic viability of the colonial systems set
up in these countries. The significance of these questions to the broader research agenda
of this thesis lies in the answers to these questions. Should a link exist between colonial
agricultural labour availability and the quality of labour institutions in the tropical
former colonies today, and if that relationship is unique to this set of colonies, then the
results, quite significantly, highlight the role and persistence of the historic relationships
between political and economic agents in determining the institutional outcomes we
observe today. We use a wide variety of data to answer these questions. Data on the
quality of labour institutions flexibility from the Global Competitiveness Index (average
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score 2008-2016), as well as colonial population density (our measure of colonial labour
availabitly) data from McEvedy et al. (1978) and Acemoglu et al. (2001), and post-
colonial labour conflict data from van der Velden (2016) were all used to test these
relationships. The results show that colonial labour availability uniquely mattered as a
determinant of present day labour institutions for former tropical colonies. Furthermore,
among these former tropical colonies, lower labour supply was associated with more
labour conflict and worse labour institutions.

Chapter 1
Sweet Sugar, Sour Government:
The Under-development of
Jamaica in the
Post-Emancipation Era
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we exploit differences in the motives of the governing elite between time
periods and across countries to show that while two countries may have similar de jure
institutions, their de facto institutions — driven by the desires of the governing class
— may differ significantly, leading to divergent economic outcomes. More specifically,
we show that while Jamaica inherited identical constitutional frameworks to the other
British West Indies sugar colonies, the policy choices of the local planter elite charged
with governance of the island were driven by their interest as entrepreneurial agricultur-
ists facing a dire labour problem. The central difference between Jamaica and the other
main sugar colonies was the state of labour supply. While the other colonies, such as
Barbados and Antigua, enjoyed an excess supply of labour, the Jamaican planters faced
a chronic labour shortage and high wages, which they sought to remedy by exercising
their governmental powers.
The government in Jamaica during the early post-emancipation period (1838-1865)
was monopolised by an elite group of white sugar planters who maintained private in-
terests in the outcomes of public policy decisions, especially those that concerned the
dominant agricultural sector on the island. Key among those interests was the significant
labour shortage affecting the plantations once slave labour was abolished. Inevitably,
the governing planter elite pursued policies that suppressed public investment in activ-
ities that would improve the lives of the masses and generate productive opportunities
outside the plantation economy, as this would limit their already scarce labour supply
and increase wages. As a result, Jamaica suffered from comparatively bad government
16
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which sought to exploit the labour force and under-funded public investment in the
island, while diverting significant resources to their coercive efforts in the immediate
post-emancipation period. We show this by first comparing the public investment of
the island under a government dominated by plantation owners (planters) to that under
Crown Colony government and find that the provision of public goods to the masses was
significantly lower before the constitutional change which changed the policy-making
authority. Second, we compare public investment of Jamaica to that of Antigua, dur-
ing and after planter rule of these islands, to show that, while maintaining identical
constitutions (and thus declarative institutions1), the differing motives of the decision
making authority (the planters) compelled very different governing priorities (procedu-
ral institutions) and reaped significantly different consequences for public investment,
a key determinant of subsequent economic development. The suggestion here is that
although Jamaica was constrained by the same legal framework before and after 1865,
and an identical institutional framework to that of other West Indian sugar colonies, the
island’s planter government, facing a significantly more constrained labour supply, chose
a significantly more repressive and coercive set of policies.
Among the existing literature on colonial spending, Frankema (2011) develops a
framework for comparing taxation policy and colonial spending in the former British
colonies of Africa. We incorporate and extend this framework by analysing the impact
of the planters’ efforts to manipulate wages — in a labour-scarce environment — on
public investment. In short, we present empirical evidence that explicitly shows that
this wage manipulation motives drove decisions on public investment and repression. In
this sense, our work shares similarities with that of Dippel et al. (2015) who examined
the effect of a declining British West Indies sugar industry on wages and found that
declining terms of trade led to reduced coercion and higher wages in the West Indian
colonies where sugar declined. Whereas Dippel et al. (2015) focus on the effect of terms
of trade on repression and wages, this chapter concentrates on the provision of public
goods. Furthermore, the analysis implies that the Jamaican planter government did
not conduct impartial public policy, but instead was corrupted by the private interests
of planters. In so doing, this chapter directly relates the plantation economy to the
quality of governance in Jamaica. Also, by conducting a comparative analysis of public
investment before and after the constitutional change, and between islands, the present
work offers a comprehensive examination of Jamaica’s post-emancipation struggles.
Carrying out the study in this way allows us to look into the underlying causes
of Jamaica’s stagnation since emancipation. Formerly one of the richest nations (per
capita) in the western hemisphere, the island’s economic development has stagnated,
even relative to other sugar colonies of the West Indies (Bohls, 2014; Burnard et al.,
2017). In this chapter, we present empirical insight into the factors that led to the island’s
poor performance, particularly the role of government in Jamaica’s underdevelopment.
While the historical literature has proposed explanations for Jamaica’s plight, there have
scarcely been any that shows explicit empirical evidence on the link between the motives
1Patterson (2013) explores the implications of the difference between declarative (de jure) and pro-
cedural (de facto) institutions in the context of the West Indies.
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of the plantation elite (stemming from conditions in the labour market) and the public
investment decisions coming out of the institution of government. Since the seminal work
of Acemoglu et al. (2001), increased focus has been placed on colonial institutions and
West Indian institutional and economic underdevelopment has been examined in some
recent economic literature (see Henry and Miller, 2009; DaCosta, 2007). These papers,
however, have largely relied on stylized facts and assumed associations in arguing either
for or against the significance of institutions and governance, and do not present evidence
of a systematic relationship between the two and economic outcomes.
Using an interrupted time series analysis, we show that differently motivated gov-
ernments allocated expenditures in a manner that best suited their private desires. In
fact, we find that the planter-dominated government of 1838-1865 allocated significantly
smaller shares of total expenditure (7 percent of expenditure on average) to the provi-
sion of public goods, whereas, following a change in constitution in 1866 which saw the
planters lose their power, public investment share was significantly higher (increasing by
11.5 percentage points) and grew significantly each year thereafter. In addition, a 1 per-
centage point increase in sugar’s share of exports during planter-rule is associated with
a 0.10 percentage point decrease in the public investment share of government expendi-
ture. The analysis attributes this to the labour market conditions which motivated the
planters to manipulate wages. Specifically, a 1 percent increase in the ratio of policing
expenditure relative to human expenditure led to a 0.097 percent decrease in the wages
of predial workers on the island. The research design and unique dataset allow us to
tease out a plausible explanation for these observations. We are able to show that pub-
lic spending decisions were chiefly motivated by the planters’ incentives as agriculturist
competing for scarce labour, aiming to manipulate wages.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 looks at the political,
economic and social history of Jamaica to provide insight in how colonial spending was
organised between periods and the motivations behind its allocation. Section 1.3 re-
purposes the model developed by Acemoglu (2006) to provide a theoretical framework
for our analysis. Section 1.4 takes a summary look at the data we collected from various
sources, to provide the empirical context for our analysis. In Section 1.5, we detail
our empirical strategy and conduct a quantitative analysis of our theory. Section 1.6
summarises and discusses some of the implications of our findings.
1.2 Historical Background
To provide the relevant historical context for our analysis, in this section, we describe
the political structure of the island government before and after 1865, contrast the
fiscal policy of the government in the two periods, and examine the differing social and
economic outcomes between the two regimes.
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1.2.1 The Old Representative System: Founding to 1865
Jamaica was formally acquired by the United Kingdom from the Spanish through a 1670
treaty during Britain’s first wave of territorial acquisition in the West Indies. Like the
rest of the British West Indies, the island was a slave society engaged in the production of
agricultural plantation produce for export to the European market. As such, plantation
oligarchs dominated economic life and retained control of government throughout all of
the main sugar colonies — which included Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua, and Saint Kitts
— for the duration of slavery and into the post-emancipation period.
The Structure of Government
This old representative system, as it has been termed, featured a Governor, appointed by
the Crown in Great Britain, whose de jure powers afforded him responsibility for defence
of the colony and the enforcement of imperial orders. He was assisted by The Council
which he nominated as his advisers to serve as a second chamber for the legislature, but
they had no power to initiate money bills for the administration of the colony. Under
the old representative system, this was the right of The Assembly who voted annually
on the expenditures and revenue generating initiatives for the colony. This branch of
government comprised the elected members who represented the interest of freeholders.
In the context of an early post-emancipation society such as Jamaica’s, the make-up of
this Assembly amounted to the propertied white planters, former slave-holders engaged
in the plantation production of sugar cane.
This Assembly through its control of revenue and expenditures of the local gov-
ernment, wielded substantial power which they leveraged to, further still, usurp the
functions of the governor and his Council. The success of the planters’ Assembly in
curbing and assuming the Council’s power is well documented by the most notable of
Caribbean historians. (Augier, 1993, p.177) speaking of the planter Assembly describes
a group which“vehemently defended the political jurisdiction they had gained and even
sought to encroach upon what the crown had marked out for itself.” Gocking (1960,
p.116-117) writes that “early in the eighteenth century, too, the Crown lost all right to
initiate legislation. The Governor was limited to communicating with the legislature by
speech or message.” The planters’ Assembly, he continues, “considered itself the local
House of Commons and gradually won a large measure of recognition for its claim.”
This was echoed in the words of Secretary of State Newcastle, quoted in Gocking (1960,
p.116), who lamented that, the Assembly;
“under the system which has acquired the force of law in Jamaica the same
body, sometimes under the name of a legislative assembly, sometimes under
that of a Board of Accounts, and at other times (in conjunction with the
Council) under that of a Board of Works takes upon itself all the executive
as well as all the legislative functions connected with the colonial finances.
It imposes the taxes, superintends their collection, votes the appropriations,
expends the money voted, and audits the accounts.”
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These de facto powers, along with the constitutional right guaranteed to the plantation
elite to introduce money bills exercising control of the public accounts, amounted to
realization of the political planter class as, according to Augier (1993), local oligarchs
who had successfully reduced the governorship to creatures of their bidding.
Fiscal Policy 1839-1865
Perhaps the criticism of the planter-dominated legislature’s fiscal policy would have been
withheld had the oligarch disbursed expenditures proportionately. History accounts that
this was not the case. Augier (1993, p.174) contends that “the services, notably educa-
tion and health which the society needed after emancipation, were scarcely provided for
out of local funds.” Figures from Eisner (1961) show that while government expenditure
as a share of GDP did not fall with a decline in economic activity up to 1850, the upturn
in the economy from 1850 to 1865 was not accompanied by increases in share of govern-
ment expenditure. Of specific interest to us is expenditure on services from which the
mass of the population derives particular benefit: health, infrastructure, and education.
Health expenditure was relatively low compared to plantation-friendly expenditure on
policing. The share of total expenditure which accrued to health remained between 4 and
5 percent from 1840-1865, while the policing share of expenditure, already substantial at
13 percent in 1839, climbed to 23 percent in 1845, before reducing slightly to 21.5 percent
in 1854 and, by 1865, accounting for 17 percent of expenditures. Assessing spending on
infrastructure is more difficult. While expenditure on public works remained still only a
fraction spent on policing, with infrastructure’s share of expenditure averaging approxi-
mately 3 percent between 1838-1865, even this share must be discounted for the fact that
the planter dominated legislature largely favoured projects that were specifically geared
towards aiding their plantations. Writing at the time, Underhill (1865, p.89) reported
that “vast sums are spent on the main roads, and on those which lead to estates, or
pens, or to gentlemen’s country mansions, whilst those which lead to the villages and
freeholds of the people are sadly neglected.”
Augier (1993, p.178) also noted this wide disparity in expenditure, commenting that,
in terms of government expenditure, “pittance [was] spent on some things and the large
sums spent on others, between 1838 and 1865”; drawing a comparison between the large
sums spent on immigration and the neglect of education. The Jamaican Blue Book of
18402 reports that there was no expenditure on education from the central government in
that year, and this was the case again in 1842. There were small grants for educational
purposes in 1843 and 1844 but those amount to less than 0.2 percent of government
expenditure. A decade later, in 1854, education’s share of total expenditure was still
only 0.3 percent and averaged just 1 percent between 1860 and 1865, the eve of the
abolition of the planter oligarch government. The conclusion by Augier (1993, p.178) is
that the neglect of education by the planter government is explained by “the belief of
the planters that widespread education was against their interest since it would quickly
reduce the numbers of those willing to labour on estates.”
2Reference available in the Primary Sources appendix.
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The evidence on spending would seem to confirm the fear that Secretary of State
Newcastle, quoted in Gocking (1960, p.117), raised at the time:
such a combination of legislative and executive functions is opposed not only
to the practice of this country, but to all received principles and to the
practice of every country in which the science of government is understood.
It involves an utter absence of responsibility on the part of those who are
charged with the levying and disbursement of public money and it must
involve, as there is no doubt that it has hitherto involved, extreme unfairness,
looseness and partiality in public expenditure.
1.2.2 Crown Colony 1866-1962
When the persistent abuses of the planter government led to the Morant Bay Rebellion
in 1865, the old representative system was abolished, and control of the island was ceded
to the crown in England, represented on the island by a Governor General. The Governor
would serve as the chief legislator of the island, assisted by a Council of ex-officio and
nominated members. In 1884, a modified version of crown colony saw the introduction
of a representative element to the legislature, but this elected group’s power over money
bills was more apparent than real, as the Governor simply carried out his duties with
the aid of his Council and ensured that money bills could be introduced only by him or
with his approval (Sires, 1955). This effectively ended the planters’ Assembly’s de jure
powers over taxation and spending of the island.3
In terms of policy under the new government, Eisner (1961) observes that the consti-
tutional change meant that under crown rule, the new administration, in contrast to the
old, was interested in maintaining impartiality in the provision of basic public services
such as education, infrastructure and health. The author’s figures, corroborated by our
data from the Jamaica Blue Books (1836-1945), provide evidence of a persistent increase
in government expenditure on public services, so that in 1875, ten years after the abo-
lition of the planters’ Assembly, infrastructure spending amounted to 12.7 percent of
expenditure, education’s share was 3.5 percent, health 6.6 percent and policing expen-
diture had fallen back to (and even below) its pre-emancipation levels at 12.8 percent.4
By 1930, social services had dramatically increased, accounting for 52.5 percent of total
expenditure. This represented an eightfold increase in public works, a twenty-four times
increase in education and a sevenfold increase in health expenditure between the 1860s
and 1930. Evidence of the higher level of provision of public goods was also noted by
Augier (1993) who describes accomplishments such as the laying of public roads, which
connected isolated communities and gave peasants access to markets, the increase in
health outcomes from the increased provision of public health services and introduction
of the elementary public-school system under crown colony government.
3This is not to say that they did not retain some de facto power through lobbying and economic
influence.
4See the list of primary sources in the appendix for full Blue Book reference.
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While a substantial increase in public services under this form of government is
reported across the historical literature, it was not free from some criticism. Observations
from Augier (1993) and an analysis by Eisner (1961) both point to the fact that, though
public expenditure on education and health increased markedly, the figure was never
consistently above 10 percent. Nevertheless, abolishing the planter government led to
significant improvements in the fairness of expenditure and represented to the masses,
a neutral form of government that could protect them from the planter elite (Augier,
1993).
1.3 Theory
This chapter sets out to explain the under-performance of Jamaica after the abolishment
of slavery. The central thesis of this work is that in the post-emancipation Jamaica, the
entrepreneurial elite maintained a near monopoly on political power during the formative
years of a free society on the island. As such, their interests as agricultural estate owners
who competed with peasants for production inputs in a colony where there was excess
demand for labour, undermined any impetus towards public investment. The planter
class, therefore, used their political power to perpetuate a repressive state which under
invested in human resources, as revenues were redirected towards the repression and
exploitation of the peasant and labouring class. This exploitation was motivated by at
least two considerations; the desire for direct revenue extraction from the rest of society,
and the desire to manipulate the wage rate during this period.
In this section, we outline the theoretical case for our hypothesis. Conveniently, Ace-
moglu (2006) offers an excellent blueprint for a theoretical model investigating such a
hypothesis. We, therefore, use a modified and simplified version of his model to illustrate
the theoretical motivations for our argument. Our work is different to that of Acemoglu
(2006) in two important ways. First, while Acemoglu (2006) focuses on predatory tax-
ation, our interest here is in assessing the implications of the entrepreneurial elites’
political power on the provision of public goods. Secondly, in the proceeding sections,
we test the implications of the model with empirical data for Jamaica. More specifically,
our analysis focuses on the role of the magnitude of labour problems in stimulating
incentives for the governing entrepreneurial elite to adopt policies which sought to re-
press the wages of the former slave society by under investing in human and economic
development.
1.3.1 The Political Economic Environment
Consider an economy like that of the West Indian islands after full emancipation in 1838.
As in Acemoglu (2006), the island is populated by a continuum ϑe +ϑm + 1 individuals.
These individuals belong to three distinct groups; the planter elite (ϑe), small scale
farmers who we will refer to as peasants (ϑm), and workers of mass 1. To replicate
the economic and political environment of the West Indies, we make some assumptions
describing characteristics of these groups.
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The first group, plantation elites, engage in the mass (plantation) production of an
agricultural crop (the price of which is normalised to 1) and governance of the island in its
legislative assembly which has the power to decide on public investment. Furthermore,
in addition to profits from production, this group derives utility from appropriating a
fixed fraction (σ) of the output of the producers in other groups. The second group
(ϑm), the set of small scale peasant farmers, primarily former slaves or their descendants
who have acquired some land, are involved in production, either for themselves or for
commerce, of this agricultural crop.5 The final class of individuals, the workers, supply
their labour to the former groups, inelastically. Using m and e to denote either group or
individuals within that group, each member of the elite has access to the elite specific
production technology (f(ke, le)) to produce output ye. Thus;
ye =
1
1− βA
β
e k
1−β
e l
β
e (1.1)
where ye is the output of the planter elite, 0 < β < 1 is the elasticity of output with
respect to labour, A is the state of technology, ke is the capital demand of the planter
elite, and le is labour demand. The production function of the peasant farmer is of
similar form to that of the elite except that their capacity for production depends on
the level of investments by the government in human development and infrastructure in
the following way, ym = qf(km, lm), where q ∈ [0, 1] so that the production function is
given by
ym = q
1
1− βA
β
mk
1−β
m l
β
m (1.2)
We can think of q here as the quality of human development (or infrastructure) on the
island corresponding to the level of investment in public goods, which the governing
elite unilaterally decides. Additionally, to keep this illustration simple, we assume that
there is no cost to q. Following Acemoglu (2006), we assume that each firm within each
group has a maximum scale λj ≥ lj so that the most productive individuals cannot
employ the entire labour force and also, that no one group can generate excess demand
for labour on their own (ϑjλj ≤ 1). These restrictions on firm capacity imply that no
firm or group is big enough to employ the entire labour force and is in line with the
economic environment of the post-emancipation West Indies which we are interested in
studying. The present work departs from Acemoglu (2006) with the implementation
of three key assumptions regarding production, specific to the post-emancipation West
Indian society: Assumption (i): the technology of the elite is superior to that of the
small-scale farmer (Ae > Am), Assumption (ii): agricultural production is labour-
intensive (β > 1/2). Assumption (iii): The elite as a group has more extensive hiring
capacity than the group of peasants so that ϑeλe > ϑmλm.
The labour market clearing condition is given by Equation (4) from Acemoglu (2006)∫
j∈Se∪Sm
ljdj ≤ 1 (1.3)
5For simplicity we represent all the different crops as one final agricultural good.
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where Sj identifies the group to which individual j belongs. The total demand for labour
is, therefore, given by the sum of labour demand for the two groups: ϑmlm +ϑele. Since
lj ≤ λj , there is an excess supply of labour when
ϑmλm + ϑeλe ≤ 1 (1.4)
The timing of events in this economy is as follows; the governing planter elite decides on
the level on investment in human development (by choosing q). Producers then make
investments in production by choosing labour and capital to maximise profits, taking q
as given.
1.3.2 The Planter’s Problem
We are now ready to solve the problem of the planter elite in this society. Recall that the
planter generates utility from profits from their own production and by appropriating
some of the peasant farmers’ production. Let σ ∈ [0, 1] represent the exogenous fraction
of the small farmers’ production that the planters have the capacity to appropriate, we
can write the utility of the planters as
Ue =
1
1− βA
β
e k
1−β
e l
β
e − wle − ke + Ω (1.5)
where Ω = σymϑm. Following Acemoglu (2006), we work backwards, solving first the
economic equilibrium. Members of each group (planter elite and peasants) maximise
their profits from production so that the objective of each producer j ∈ Se ∪ Sm is
max
kj ,lj
yj − wlj − kj (1.6)
From the first order conditions for this problem, the optimal choice of capital and labour,
respectively, for a producer from the either of the group of elites or peasants is
kj = q
1
βAjlj (1.7)
lj =

0 if w > q
1
β β
1−βAj
∈ [0, λj ] if w = q
1
β β
1−βAj
λj if w < q
1
β β
1−βAj
(1.8)
where q = 1 if j ∈ Se.
In this economy, the prevailing wage rate depends on whether the labour market is
in a state of excess demand or excess supply of labour. If Equation (1.4) holds, then
there is excess supply of labour and members from each of the two groups can hire up to
their maximum capacity, λj , by paying the lowest possible wage- which we will call the
subsistence wage rate, s.6 The situation is starkly different when Equation (1.4) does
not hold.
6Here, we are assuming that the wage in case of excess labour supply there is some minimum fixed
positive subsistent wage, s, to rule out slavery. This has no bearing on the result either way.
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With the two groups competing for labour, in an economy experiencing excess de-
mand for labour (when equation (1.4) does not hold), the equilibrium wage rate will be
determined by the smaller of the marginal product of labour of the two groups. Recall
from assumption (i) that the Ae > Am; it follows from the fact that q ∈ [0, 1] that
β
1−βAe > q
1
β β
1−βAm. That is, the marginal product of labour for the elite producer is
higher than that of the peasants.7 With excess demand for labour, the elite can hire
up to their maximum capacity, λe workers, by paying a wage equal to the net marginal
productivity of the peasants. Offering a higher wage will result in smaller profits for this
group. The peasants, on the other hand, are unable to offer a wage higher than this as
this would result in negative profits. Moreover, given excess demand for labour, a lower
wage would not form an equilibrium.
With the solution to the economic equilibrium outlined, we turn to the effect of this
economy on policy in a political economy setting. We will study the implications for
public policy under two states of the economy: (i) an economy in excess labour demand
and (ii) excess labour supply.
1.3.3 Excess Labour Supply
In this economy Equation (1.4) holds. Labour supply exceeds demand and producers can
pay the lowest possible wage, s, and hire up to their maximum capacity. The objective
of elite is to maximise their utility given by Equation (1.5). The maximisation problem
of each member of the planter elite becomes
max
q
[
β
1− βAe − s
]
λe +
1
ϑe
[
σ
1− β q
1−β
β Amλmϑm
]
(1.9)
Proposition 1.1 immediately follows.
Proposition 1.1. When an economy described by Section 1.3.1 is experiencing excess
labour supply, the level of public investment is qes ≡ q∗ = 1. This level of q corresponds
to that under a decision maker concerned with maximising aggregate output.
It is clear that in this state of the economy, the elite derive maximum utility by
setting q as high as possible, that is qes = 1. This makes intuitive sense. The elite derive
utility from appropriation and their own production. With excess supply of labour, their
profits from production (the terms before the addition sign) are unaffected by the value
of q. Meanwhile, it is in their best interest to ensure that the peasants are as productive
as possible so that the utility derived from appropriating their resources (the terms after
the addition sign) is as high as possible. We therefore have qes = 1 in an excess labour
supply economy; investment in human development is as high as is feasible. This level
corresponds to that which maximises economy wide output Y = ye + ym.
7This was certainly the case in the West Indies in the post-emancipation era as the sugar planters
were in possession of significantly better agricultural technology and more productive land.
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1.3.4 Excess Labour Demand
In this state of the economy, Equation (1.4) does not hold. Labour demand is above the
supply. By assumption (i), the marginal product of labour supplied to the elite is higher
than that of the peasants, and so, the equilibrium wage rate is given by the smaller;
w = q
1
β β
1−βAm. The planter elite can, therefore, hire up to their capacity (λe), leaving
the peasants to hire what’s left of the workforce: ϑmλm = 1−ϑeλe, amongst themselves.
The elites’ objective function can be written from Equation (1.5) as
max
q
[
β
1− βAe − q
1
β
β
1− βAm
]
λe +
1
ϑe
[
σ
1− β q
1−β
β Am(1− ϑeλe)
]
(1.10)
Solving the first order condition for this problem yields
q∗ = σ
[(1− ϑeλe
ϑeλe
)(1− β
β
)]
(1.11)
which, by the fact that β, ϑeλe > 1/2, is < 1. We summarize this result in proposition
1.2.
Proposition 1.2. When an economy described by Section 1.3.1 is experiencing excess
labour demand, the level of public investment is given by qed ≡ q∗ = f(σ, ϑe, λe, β) < 1 =
qes.
The implication of this result is that in an economy described by Section 1.3.1, ex-
periencing excess demand for labour, public investment is lower than of a state in which
there is excess supply of labour, such as the one described in Sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.3. The
feature of note here is the role of wages in this result. Now that the planter elite and peas-
ants are in direct competition for scarce labour, the equilibrium wage rate is determined
by what the maximum the peasants are willing and able to pay (their marginal product
from hiring labour). q therefore enters directly into the elites’ production profit maximi-
sation objective as well as in the revenues derived from appropriation. While the planter
seeks to increase revenues by increasing q, they wish to minimize their wage costs as
entrepreneurs, which requires reducing q. This wage manipulation motive manifest in a
lower level of public/human investment and aggregate output as Y (q∗ < 1) < Y (q∗ = 1).
1.3.5 Planter Presence and Public Investment
It is interesting to note the effect of the scale of the plantation economy in the labour
market on public investment. We have defined ϑe as the number of planter elite members
in our society, while λe represents their hiring capacity or maximum scale. The presence
of the planter elite, as a group, in the labour market is, therefore, equivalent to the
product of these two terms. We can define the scale of the plantation economy, therefore,
as x ≡ ϑeλe. Then from Equation (1.11) we have
q∗(x) = σ
[(1− x
x
)(1− β
β
)]
(1.12)
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Using this equation, we can examine the effect of the scale or presence of the plantation
economy on public investment. Differentiating Equation (1.12) with respect to x and
simplifying yields
∂q∗(x)
∂x
= −σ(1− β)
x2β
(1.13)
This brings us to proposition 1.3.
Proposition 1.3. In an economy described by Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.4, the equilibrium
level of public investment, q∗, is decreasing in the presence of the plantation interest
(defined as x = ϑeλe) in the labour market.
The intuition behind this result is as follows; in an economy such as described, with
excess demand for labour, when the presence of the plantation interest in the labour
market increases, this intensifies competition for already scarce labour, and so, the wage
manipulation motive becomes relatively more important, putting downward pressure on
the level of public investment.
1.3.6 The Theoretical Model in Context
The theoretical model presented above reflects the economic and political reality of
the British West Indies sugar colonies after emancipation. Jamaica, being a sparsely
populated island with large tracts of plantation land for peasant agriculture, saw the
plantations suffer from a want of labour in the sugar sector. In the face of this ex-
cess labour demand, the governing planter assembly directed public resources towards
manipulating the wage rate, whether it be by redirecting resources to fund repressive
policing or by under investing in public infrastructure, education, and health, so as to
repress the development of markets outside the sugar plantations. As the model shows,
the presence of this wage manipulation motive resulted in a lower public investment and
an economy-wide output level below that which is attainable in a society where govern-
ing officials are not motivated by private entrepreneurial interests which conflict public
interests.
The model detailed above highlights two catalysts to plantation elite’s manipulative
efforts. First, their position as the legislative assembly which afforded the power to decide
on public expenditure, thereby determining q, and allow them to legally appropriate from
the rest of society (captured by σ).8 Second, the overwhelming capacity of the plantation
economy relative to other small scale economic activities, with which it competed for
labour, stimulated labour demand in a labour-scarce environment, and motivated a
political correction to the resulting high wage problem. In what follows, we test each
of the propositions produced by our theoretical model. Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 are
tested, first, indirectly using an interrupted time series regression, and then directly by
an econometric framework which compares Jamaica and Antigua. That is, a state with
8One example of this is a tax used to finance immigration of indentured labourers onto the plantation,
with this burden falling on the peasants.
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excess demand for labour and one with excess supply, respectively. Proposition 1.3 is
tested using an econometric model of public investment in Equation (1.15).
1.4 The Data
1.4.1 Description of the Data
To test the implications of the model highlighted in section 1.3, we have collected data
on a wide range of variables from the yearly Colonial Blue Books of the Caribbean
colonies (CBB) and other sources from 1836-1945. The CBB, available in print form at
the Cambridge University Library and digitally at the British Online Archives, serve as
a contemporaneous source of primary information on a multitude of statistics requested
by Britain and gathered by the administrative branch of the colonial government. These
books contained hand written (and for a time, typed) entries on taxes, revenues and
expenditure of the central and parochial government, legislation, political franchise, local
prices, and imports and exports for the post emancipation period, beginning in the 1830s
to the 1940s, the eve of the post-independence period.9 Analysis of this demanded the
capture of thousands of photographs and weeks of digitizing the numerous variables we
are interested in measuring. For our analysis, we are interested in the post-emancipation
time period, during which sugar was still a relevant industry in Jamaica. That is from
1838 (the year of full emancipation) to 1915 (which bookend a period of unmitigated
decline in the sugar industry). The data is measured annually except for 1849 where
data on some aspects of expenditure were unavailable, and two years for which we were
unable to confirm sugar export data. We present a summary of the relevant variables in
Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 1838-1915
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. Mean 1838-66 Mean 1867-1915 Source
Sugar share of exports 75 0.323 0.210 0.021 0.793 0.55 0.198 CBB & others
Pub. works share of expenditure 76 0.072 0.043 0.004 0.163 0.026 0.097 CBB
Health share of expenditure 77 0.055 0.015 0.016 0.092 0.040 0.063 CBB
Educ. share of expenditure 77 0.035 0.026 0 0.091 0.006 0.052 CBB
Policing share of expenditure 76 0.135 0.047 0.062 0.26 0.185 0.106 CBB
Log daily wage 77 -2.73 0.223 -3.06 -2.24 -2.62 -2.97 CBB & others
Log price sugar 77 2.87 0.447 1.98 3.87 3.27 2.64 Eisner (1961)
Notes: The tables gives summary statistics for the island of Jamaica for the period 1838-1915. The sources and nature of the
data are detailed in the Primary Sources and Data Appendix sections in the appendices.
9The primary sources appendix gives details of the Blue Book references.
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The Plantation Economy
To measure the state of the plantation economy of the island, we collect data on three
main variables from various sources. Export and wage data for the sugar and agricultural
industry were recorded in the colonial Blue Books for the years 1838-1939.10 Where the
Blue Book for a particular year was not available, we supplemented this data with
records from Parliamentary Papers and Reports to the House of Commons sent to the
United Kingdom occasionally.11 Where possible, we cross-referenced data from these two
sources with that available in the existing literature from history texts including, Hall
(1959), Underhill (1895) and others. Price data for sugar cane on the world market is not
available in the Jamaican Blue Books (JBB), and so, we retrieved price data from Eisner
(1961) which reports the shilling (s) price per c.w.t. for sugar in London. Since most of
the sugar, and indeed plantation produce cultivated in the West Indies was exported to
Britain during this period, London prices of sugar cane effectively represented the world
price. We corroborated this information with data from Deerr (1949) for overlapping
years. We plot sugar share of export and world market price in Figure 1.1, for our sample
period.
Figure 1.1: The Sugar Economy of Jamaica
Source: Colonial Blue Books of Jamaica (1839-1915) and Eisner (1961).
There exists, evidently, a very close relationship between the price of sugar on the
world market and sugar’s export share. The plantation economy of Jamaica declined
steadily after 1838, falling from 79 percent of total exports in that year to just 40 percent
by 1869. By 1915, sugar’s share of exports was just 11 percent. This was largely due
to the reduced demand for cane sugar in Europe, the passing of the Sugar Duties Act
10Wage data is reported in colonial pounds per eight-hour work day.
11See appendix for details of such primary sources including references.
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of 1846, and the persistent fall in the price of sugar on the world market. In 1840, the
price of cane sugar in London was reported at 48 shillings (s.) per c.w.t. but had halved
to 24 shillings by 1869. The rate of decline slowed but continued during the pre-war
period falling as low as 8.5 shillings in 1906 before recovering to a still dismal 14.5s. in
1915. These figures highlight the plight of the plantation elite during this period and
do much to explain their desire for alternative means to maintain profitability of an
enterprise in which they had sunk investments. Agricultural wages in Jamaica should be
viewed in comparison to that of other territories in the West Indies. Wages in Jamaica
were relatively high compared to that of the more densely populated islands of the
British West Indies. The average wage on the island was 17d. for the period 1838-
1915, compared to that of the densely populated Antigua (9d.), Saint Kitts (9d.) and
Barbados (10d.), reflecting the relative shortage of labour for plantation work.12
Public Accounts
The Colonial Blue Books provide explicit details of the various components of expendi-
ture conducted by the island governments of the various countries. Using this data, we
are able to construct a data set for several key expenditure categories from 1838 to 1915
for Jamaica. Government expenditure during the colonial period is categorised into five
broad headings: (i) administration, (ii) education, (iii) health care, (iv) security, and
(v) public works. For Jamaica, over the period, these categories accounted for over 80
percent of all government expenditure. Our key expenditure categories include those
that fall under human expenditure (education and health), infrastructure, and policing
expenditure. Education expenditure consisted of grants to the board of education and,
for some years, expenditure on specific schools or programmes. Health expenditure, on
the other hand, encompasses grants to the board of health, expenditure on the individual
hospitals and other sanitation expenditures. Expenditure on infrastructure comprises
of spending on roads, bridges and various public infrastructure. These three heads of
expenditures capture the total investment in human (health and education) and phys-
ical (infrastructure) capital over the sample period (q from the model in Section 1.3),
while spending on policing was viewed, by Caribbean historians (Augier (1993); Bol-
land (1981); among others), as investments by the planter elite to control the black
population.
The shares of these expenditure categories in total expenditure varied significantly
over the period. Figure 1.2 tracks these variables over the sample period. Under planter
rule (1838-1865), health and education expenditure averaged 4.1 percent and 0.067 per-
cent respectively, while expenditure on infrastructure as a share of total expenditure
was 2.5 percent, much of this reflected expenditure on roads, bridges and structures
that supported sugar plantations. Policing expenditure, the aggregate of expenditure
spent on prison and the police, averaged an overwhelming 19 percent of total expen-
diture. The composition of public expenditure changed dramatically after 1865. With
12Data from the Wages and Prices section of the Antigua Blue Books (1838-1915), Barbados Blue
Books(1839-1915), and Saint Kitts Blue Books (1838-1886, thereafter the Leeward Islands Blue Books
(1889-1915)
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the planter oligarch abolished, the share of human expenditure increased to 11.5 percent
of total expenditure; education’s share at 5.2 percent and the health share amounted
to 6.3 percent. The share of total expenditure accruing to infrastructure spending also
rose dramatically to 10 percent during the period 1866-1915. In contrast, expenditure
on policing as a share of total expenditure nearly halved, averaging 10 percent in this
period. To arrive at total public investment, we aggregate expenditure in the three pro-
ductive areas; education, health care, and public works. To ensure comparability across
years, we divide the sum of these by total expenditure to derive the share of public
investment in total expenditure.
Figure 1.2: Expenditure Shares 1838-1915
(a) Education Share of Exp. (b) Health Share of Exp.
(c) Infrastructure Share of Exp. (d) Policing Share of Exp.
Source: Colonial Blue Books of Jamaica (1839-1915).
We collect data on other controls which include revenue, climatic variables such as
hurricane occurrences, and use this to control for spikes in public spending caused by
damage from natural disasters. Hurricanes occurred in 6 of the years in our sample
period. We also collect data on government revenue and public debt over the period as
we expect these to be determinative of government expenditure. We collect population
data from Bulmer-Thomas (2012) which we then used to convert these two variables in
to per capita terms. A summary of these variables is also included in Table 1.1, while
the sources for all data are listed in the data appendix attached to this thesis.
1.5 Empirical Analysis
Empirical support of the theoretical arguments presented in the previous section re-
quires presentation of evidence that the governing elite in Jamaica used their power to:
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(i) redirect public expenditures to repressive enterprise and under-invested in human
development in an effort to (ii) manipulate factor prices (in this case, wage rates).
1.5.1 Planter Rule and Public Investment
Our first priority is to compare public investment during planter oligarch rule and the
period following the constitutional change of 1866. The introduction of the new con-
stitution in 1866 allows us to compare the fiscal policy of the oligarchical institution of
government which the planter elite maintained, and that of the more neutral form of
government that followed. In this section, we present evidence on the differential level
of public investment during and after rule of the planter class, and the role of planter
influence over the economy.
An Interrupted Time Series Analysis
We start the discussion with a quasi-experimental approach; performing an interrupted
time series analysis (ITSA). The constitutional change of 1866, which saw the ruling
planter elite lose its political authority to the crown, offers us an opportunity to compare
public investment levels and trends under the two regimes. Using the constitutional
change of 1866 as the ‘intervention’, the ITSA compares the pre and post (intervention)
levels and trend in public investment in the following way:
Public Investmentt = β0 + β1Tt + β2Postt + β3PosttTt + ut (1.14)
where t denotes the unit of time in years, T is a time trend measured as the number
of years since 1838, Post is a dummy variable equal to 0 in the pre-intervention period
(1 otherwise); and is thus an indicator of whether the regime is planter oligarch or
not. PostT is an interaction term, the product of Post and T . β0 is the intercept, β1
is the slope of public investment over time, during the period under planter oligarch
rule, β2 captures the change in the level of public investment after the intervention (or
abolishing of the planter oligarch). Furthermore, β3 represents the difference between
the trajectory (slope) of public investment during and post planter rule. Recall from
our theoretical model that propositions 1.1 and 1.2, taken together, imply that when
the government, in setting the level of public investment, is not motivated by labour
problems that its members face as private entrepreneurs, the level of public investment is
higher. The estimation results of Equation 1.14 can therefore be thought of as equivalent
to a test of these propositions. More specifically, the intervention in 1866, which saw
that planter government lose direct control, can be thought of as the replacement of a
government motivated in their decisions on public expenditure by the labour problem,
with a government without this motive. Effectively, the new government after 1865,
without the wage manipulation motive, is identical to the government that faces excess
labour supply under the model in that it is not concerned with the private problem of
excess labour demand. As such, comparisons of public investment in the two periods
(before and after 1865) is indirectly an analysis of public investment when members of
the government is concerned about their own excess demand for labour versus when they
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are not. We therefore expect, in accordance with propositions 1.1 and 1.2, significantly
higher public investment after 1865 versus before.
Figure 1.3 offers a pictorial illustration of this relationship for the data between 1838
and 1915, with the abolition of the planters’ Assembly government occurring in 1866.
Figure 1.3: Jamaica: Share of Public Investment
We observe that in the period during the planter regime, public investment as per-
centage of total expenditure seemed to average around 7 percent (in this period, average
public investment was 5739 pounds). Furthermore, during this pre-intervention period,
there appears no discernible trend in the level of public investment, as evidenced by the
relative flat slope of the public investment curve. Immediately following the abolishing
of the planters’ Assembly, Jamaica saw a noticeable rise in public investment in 1866.
For the period 1867-1915, public investment hovered (on average) well above 20 percent
of total expenditure (average public investment was reported at 57291 pounds compared
to the 5739 during planter rule). This represented a magnitudinous shift from the level
observed under planter rule . Moreover, unlike in the pre-intervention period (before
the constitutional change), Figure 1.3 shows a clear upward trend in the share of public
investment. This suggests that after the abolition of the planter government, public in-
vestment grew persistently.13 To assess the statistical significance of these observations,
we proceed with the ITS regression detailed in Equation (1.14) and present the results
13Interestingly, this increase in public expenditure after the intervention, though significant, still saw
Jamaica lagging behind the labour-rich colonies. See Figure A1 in the appendix. We explore this further
in 2.
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in the panel (a) of Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Public Investment and Planter Rule
Pub. Invest. Share [Confidence Interval]
Panel (a)
T -0.000369 -0.0013662 0 .0006286
(-0.74)
Post 0.115∗∗∗ 0.0739817 0.1550567
(5.63)
PostT 0.00159∗∗ 0.0000537 0.0031167
(2.06)
Constant 0.0768∗∗∗ 0.0583146 0.0953641
(8.27)
Panel (b): Post 1866
LinearTrend 0.0012 0.0000 0.0024
(2.0351)
Notes: Analysis conducted as an interrupted time series regression for Jamaica data
between 1838 and 1915. The number of observations is 76. The sources and nature of
the data are detailed in the Data Appendix and Primary Sources sections. ∗ p < .10,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
These results confirm what we observe from the Figure 1.3. Controlling for the post-
intervention trend, the average level of public investment share of total expenditure
during planter rule, as reported by the intercept β0, is 7.7 percent. The coefficient on
the trend variable, T , is close to 0 in magnitude, at 0.00037, and is indeed insignificant
at all conventional levels. This suggest that the level of public investment under the
planter regime did not significantly change over the years leading up to Crown Colony
intervention in 1866. However, immediately following the abolition of planter rule, public
investment share of total expenditure exceeded that under planter rule by 11.5 percentage
points (the coefficient on Post, β2). This increase is significant at the 1-percent level.
Furthermore, the positive coefficient on the interaction term PostT represents a reversal
in the direction of the rate of change in public investment share of total expenditure and a
statistically significant (at the 5-percent level) increase in the year on year rate of change
in public investment share of 0.16 percentage points (the coefficient on PostT , β3) once
planter rule was abolished. The implication here is that under the new constitution, the
government’s attitude was significantly more positive to public investments than before.
In panel (b), we test the significance of the post intervention trend independently and
find that this increase is sustained throughout the period, as indicated by the significant
and positive coefficient (0.12) of the post-1866 trend in panel (b). Thus, after the
abolishing of planter rule, public investment increased (on average) by 0.12percent each
year, whereas, the investment share was stagnant, and at best decreasing yearly (on
average) under planter rule. This suggests that the Crown Colony government, unlike
its predecessor, made continuous efforts to improve public goods provision on the island
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over the years. We may think of the period after 1865 as a proxy for the absence of
planter motivations around excess demand for labour. This results, therefore, accords
with propositions 1.1 and 1.2 which suggest that public investment would be lower
when the choice of the level of public investment is motivated by excess labour demand
versus when it is not. To see this, recall that the new government is not populated by
planters with private entrepreneurial interests and so their labour demand is effectively
zero whereas the previous government had excess demand for labour. As our theory
suggests, public investment is thus lower under planter rule (before 1866) and higher
under the new form of government (post 1865). A more direct test of these propositions
is carried out in a later section when we compare the excess labour demand territory of
Jamaica to an excess supply territory, Antigua.
Public Investment and the Plantation Economy
Thus far, we have provided evidence that shows significantly lower levels and rates of
change in public investment as a share of total expenditure under the planter oligarch
regime. While those difference are significant and consequential, it is not obvious that the
planter oligarch, or indeed the presence of the plantation interest in the labour market,
is instigating the under-investment in public goods. Recall from our theoretical model
that proposition 1.3 implied that the greater the presence of the plantation interest, the
lower the level of public expenditure.14 The next set of results deal with testing this
proposition.
To more conclusively test the implications of proposition 1.3, we propose an econo-
metric model which includes a continuous measure of the presence of the planter oligarch
or the strength of the plantation economy and use this to investigate the effect of the
plantation economy on public investment. This mechanism is directly suggested from our
theoretical model (ϑeλe in Equation (1.11)). To measure the presence of the planter elite
during the two regimes, we sought a variable that, with the elite being entrepreneurial
sugar planters, captures their presence in the labour market and influence over economic
activity. The plantation economy monopolised all aspects of economic life in the West
Indies for much of the colonial period. Figures from the Jamaica Blue Books (1838-1866)
indicate that plantation exports were responsible for over 80 percent (on average) of all
exports from the major islands for most of the colonial period. Sugar, more than any
other crop, came to dominate the main plantation economies of the region to the extent
that the plantation oligarch’s power, while not easily quantifiable, was intimately linked
to the dominance of sugar. We, therefore, use the share of sugar in total exports to
capture the presence of the planter elite (the scale of plantation economy) and use it to
test proposition 1.3.
The specific regression equation is of the form:
Public Investmentt = α0 + α1Postt + α2Sugshrt + α3PostSugshrt + α4Xt + νt
(1.15)
14Remember from our theoretical framework that ϑe is the number of planter elite members in our
society, while λe represents their hiring capacity or maximum scale.
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where α0 is a constant which captures the average public investment during planter
rule, X is a vector of controls, Sugshr is sugar’s share of total exports of Jamaica (and
serves as a measure of the strength of the plantation economy) and PostSugshr is an
interaction term formed of the product of Post (as previously defined) and Sugshr and
ν is an error term.
While Equation (1.14) allowed us to show that: (i) public investment was lower
under the planter oligarch regime (i.e. α2 > 0) and (ii) the trend in public investment
was significantly different (positively) in the period following the abolition of planter
oligarch rule; Equation (1.15) goes further as it allows us to pin down the role of the
planter oligarch in public expenditure in two ways. (i) Sugshr variable enables us to
determine the effect of planter influence on public investment; (ii) the inclusion of the
interaction term, PostSugshr, allows us to compare the effect of this influence between
the two regimes. In so doing, we are able to determine whether the combination of
exclusive political authority and economic production, which the planter elite enjoyed
simultaneously prior to 1866, resulted in worse public investment outcomes for Jamaica.
We present the results of several versions of this regression in Table 1.3.
In all regressions, we include a lagged dependent variable to control for possible serial
correlation as government expenditure tends to be highly persistent over time. In addi-
tion, we calculate t-statistics using Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
robust standard errors. R-squares are not reported with Newey-West estimations, but
we do provide the F-statistic of overall significance of the model. In the first column,
(1), we regress the public investment share of total expenditure on a lag of itself, a time
trend and a dummy variable Post.15 The time trend and our Post dummy are both
positive and significant.16 This simply reiterates what we have already observed, that
public investment grew significantly over time and was, therefore, much higher in the
period following the abolition of planter oligarch rule.
In column (2), we introduce our measure of plantation economy or the presence of
the planter elite in economic activity, Sugshr. This captures the effect of the plantation
economy on public investment throughout the sample period. The coefficient is negative
(−0.025) and significant only at the 10-percent level. This implies that increases in the
strength of the plantation economy is associated with a decline in public investment share
of government expenditure. Specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in sugar’s share of
total exports is associated with a 0.025 percentage point decrease in the share of public
investment between 1838 and 1915. Though this result is informative about the influence
of plantation oligarchs on public investment, our hypothesis posits that the significantly
different role of the planters after the constitutional change of 1866 may be suppressing
the coefficient on Sugshr. That is, a stronger plantation economy particularly depressed
public investment during the planter oligarch rule. The differential effect of sugar share
of exports on public investment share as we move from the planter oligarch regime
15In our estimation of Equation (1.15), our dummy variable, Post, is equal to 1 for year after 1869 and
0 otherwise, to allow for the lagged effect of the change in constitution on the make-up of expenditure.
16We also run regressions with a separate Post trend (Postt). The results were no different and are,
therefore, not reported here.
CHAPTER 1. SWEET SUGAR, SOUR GOVERNMENT 37
Table 1.3: Public Investment and the Plantation Economy
D.V. is Public Investment
Share of Total Expenditure (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag Pub. Inv. 0.627∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗
(7.09) (14.44) (19.80) (16.02) (11.80) (12.09)
Post 0.0403∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗ -0.0264 -0.0119 -0.0189 -0.0192
(2.95) (3.98) (-1.50) (-0.88) (-1.23) (-1.20)
Time Trend 0.000213∗∗∗ 0.0000940 0.000333 -0.0000574 0.000961∗∗∗ 0.000915∗∗∗
(3.66) (0.60) (1.54) (-0.19) (5.17) (5.05)
Sugshr -0.0249∗ -0.0994∗∗∗ -0.0898∗∗∗ -0.0950∗∗∗ -0.0968∗∗∗
(-1.95) (-2.81) (-2.74) (-3.63) (-3.61)
PostSugshr 0.120∗∗∗ 0.0911∗∗∗ 0.0830∗∗ 0.0796∗∗
(3.79) (3.85) (2.40) (2.23)
Real Revenue 0.0214∗∗∗
(3.13)
Public Debt -0.606∗∗∗ -0.614∗∗∗
(-8.38) (-9.13)
Hurricane 0.00831∗∗
(2.33)
Constant 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0701∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.0750∗∗∗ 0.0766∗∗∗
(4.99) (3.83) (3.34) (3.68) (5.24) (5.14)
Observations 74 71 71 71 67 67
F-statistic 1540.51 1047.97 2938.07 3496.97 1646.47 1702.11
Notes: The dependent variable is public investment share of total expenditure. All regressions are Lagged Dependent Variable OLS
time series regressions for Jamaica using data from 1838 to 1915. The number of observations for each regression is listed in the
bottom panel. Post is a dummy variable indicating time periods after 1866. Sugshr is sugar share of export calculated as the value
of raw sugar exports divided by total exports. The sources of the data and nature of the data are detailed in the Data Appendix and
Primary Sources sections. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. t-statistics in parentheses.
to a more neutral form of government will serve to provide evidence that when the
plantation elites held political authority, they used their economic influence to repress
the population, transferring resources from the masses to themselves, by under-investing
in public goods.
To see this, we run our main regression (column (3)), introducing an interaction
term (between Post and Sugshr), PostSugshr. The coefficient on Sugshr now mea-
sures the effect of plantation economy on public investment during planter oligarch rule,
while PostSugshr captures the differential effect of plantation economy on public invest-
ment between regimes (during and post planter rule). The estimation including these
two variables is very interesting. The coefficient on Sugshr is still negative but now
significantly larger, in absolute terms; at −0.10, as oppose to the −0.025 we observed
previously. This suggest that during planter oligarch rule, a strengthening of the plan-
tation economy resulted in a significant reduction in public investment as a share of
total expenditure. In fact, a one percentage point increase in sugar’s share of exports is
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associated with a 0.10 percentage point decrease in public investment share of govern-
ment expenditure. This is equivalent to a fall of approximately 1.35 percent relative to
the average public investment share during planter rule, and 0.61 percent to the aver-
age from 1838-1915. Thus, during planter rule, a 1 percentage point increase in sugar’s
share of export reduced public investment’s share of total expenditure by 1.35 percent
relative to the average level of public investment in that period. This statistic is both
large and highly significant. Turning to the coefficient on PostSugshr, the result is
quite remarkable. After the abolition of planter oligarch rule in 1866, a one percentage
point increase in sugar’s share of exports was associated with a 0.12 percentage points
higher level of public investment share than under planter rule. This differential impact
is large and highly significant. Resoundingly, the negative relationship between scale of
the plantation economy and public investment observed during planter rule is completely
reversed. The sum of the two coefficients (−0.10 + 0.12 = 0.02) is positive, and so, after
the abolishing of planter oligarch rule, contrary to the time period under planter rule,
strengthening of the plantation economy was no longer negatively associated with public
investment share. Furthermore, we calculate the t-statistic (0.65) for (α2 +α3) using the
variance/covariance of the estimates and find the role of the plantation economy in af-
fecting public investment share in the post planter rule period is insignificant. Therefore,
post 1866, when the planters lost their political authority, they lost the ability to act
on their incentive to redirect public revenues to their own ends, in contrast to the prior
period. Curiously, the coefficient on our dummy variable Post is no longer significant,
suggesting that the difference in public investment share levels between the two regimes
is largely explained by the role of the strength (scale) of the plantation economy, offering
strong support for proposition 1.3 which highlights the negative relationship between the
scale of the plantation economy (ϑeλe) and public investment.
Alternative Explanations
It is useful to consider alternative factors potentially driving the differential effect of
strength of the plantation economy on public investment’s share of total expenditure. In
the regressions that follow, (4)-(6), we repeat the main regression with some additional
controls.
We first consider that the amount of government revenue available may vary over
the years, and so, one regime may have been forced into more fiscally conservative
policy, which may prioritise cuts to public investment over other essential services. To
control for this, we add the natural log of per capita real revenue in regression (4). The
coefficient is positive (0.021) and significant. While our estimates of α2 and α3 fell,
this reduction was slight and both coefficients remain highly significant and maintain
their signs. Revenue levels, therefore, does not explain the significantly different public
investment shares between regimes.
Similarly, varying levels of debt across the years may determine the make-up of
public expenditure. Governments may use debt to finance public investment and so may
be able to prioritise certain components of public expenditure over others at different
times. Alternatively, when public debt is high, the government may be more reluctant
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to spend on certain components and so higher debt levels may result in lower shares of
expenditure in certain categories. In either of these cases, this approach to fiscal policy
may coincide with contractions or expansions in the strength of the plantation economy
and as such may be driving our results. We, therefore, include per capita public debt
to the right-hand side of the regression in column (5). Here again we find that though
public debt is significant in explaining some of the variation in the public investment
share, our coefficients on Sugshr and PostSugshr (our measures of the scale of the
plantation economy) remain largely unchanged (at −0.095 and 0.083, respectively) and
significant.
Additionally, the West Indies are particularly prone to hurricanes during the wet
months running from June to November. These hurricanes can cause major damage to
infrastructure and, therefore, are usually followed by increases in public expenditures,
particularly for infrastructure repair. Coincidentally, the sugar crop is particularly vul-
nerable to devastation from these hurricanes which may entirely destroy a year’s yield
and cause a drastic reduction in sugar exports if they deadly enough. Thus, changes
in public expenditures on infrastructure may be spuriously correlated with changes in
sugar’s share of exports if these expenditure changes are brought about by instances of
hurricanes. To rule out this problem, we include a dummy variable coded 1 if a major
hurricane occurred during the year and 0 otherwise.17 For this specification, we find that
our results change little. The coefficient of the hurricane dummy is significant at the
5-percent level, with the expected positive sign. The coefficient on Sugshr is, however,
still roughly −0.10 and highly significant, while that of PostSugshr is 0.08 and is still
significantly different from the effect of a larger plantation economy on public investment
during planter rule. These results point to a very robust estimation of the impact of the
plantation economy on public investment’s share of total expenditure. We consistently
see that as the planter elite’s strength grew, the expenditure shares allocated to public
investment fell when the aforementioned class of person held political authority over
fiscal policy. This is substantially different from the situation when they lost exclusive
political authority after 1866. During the period after 1866, we observe that their pres-
ence, indicated by the share of the economy’s exports which they control, played no role
in the composition of public expenditure, as far as public investments in infrastructure,
education and health are concerned.
1.5.2 Wage Manipulation
Wage Manipulation and Public Investment
Not only did our theoretical framework imply that public investment would be lower
in the presence of excess labour demand, it also specifies a mechanism through which
this operates. The planters manipulate wages through q in the second term of Equation
(1.10). In this section, we show that the empirical evidence supports this notion and
17We ran this regression also with a lag of the hurricane dummy as hurricanes often occur later in the
year and are accounted for by the following year’s expenditures. This produce identical results to that
presented in Table 1.3.
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that one of the key motivations of the planter class in Jamaica, which saw them direct
fiscal policy to the detriment of the populace, was the desire to manipulate wages. In
the post-emancipation era, Jamaican planters, faced with a low labour to land ratio
and high wages, relied heavily on the state apparatus to coerce labour from the former
slaves. The police force and prison system were, therefore, crucial in enforcing predatory
policies of the planter government. Financing the police to enforce the plantation order
thus required substantial resources. Consequently, generating these resources meant
cuts to other essential services. To examine this, we construct an order-resource ratio
which expresses total spending on policing (prisons and police force) as a fraction of
resource spend on human capital (education and health expenditure). Using this ratio,
we are able to gain some insight into how the composition of government expenditure
was manipulated to affect wages during planter oligarch rule. This endeavour motivates
the following regression, estimated for the years under planter oligarch rule:
LnWaget = δ0 + δ1ORRatiot + δ2Zt + t (1.16)
where LnWage is the natural log of the predial wage rate, ORRatio is the order-resource
ratio (similar to that of Frankema (2011)) calculated by dividing policing expenditure
by the sum of education and health expenditure, Z is a vector of controls, and  is
an error term. ORRatio captures the multi-pronged strategy of the planter elite to
manipulate wages: first, by increasing policing expenditure to enforce laws that marshal
the former slaves back on to the plantations and repress rebellions and riots; second,
reducing expenditure on human health and education in an effort to finance policing
expenditure; and third, keep the population in a state of human capital destitution to
reduce their outside options. We present the regression results of equation (1.16) in
Table 1.4.
In Column (1), as a first step, we regress the natural log of the agricultural wage
rate, on a lag of itself and the natural log of the price of sugar on the world market.
The result echoes that found by Dippel et al. (2015) and is immediately economically
counter-intuitive. If left to market forces, an improvement in the price of a commodity
on the world market should drive up labour demand in that sector. This should in turn
lead to higher wages. However, contrary to standard economic theory, the coefficient
on the price of cane sugar, which captures the effect of an increase in sugar prices on
the world market during planter oligarch rule of Jamaica, is negative and insignificant.
This suggests that during planter rule, improvements in the performance of sugar on the
world market did not pass through to better wages for the labouring class. If anything,
workers on the island experienced a reduction in their wages.
As we move to Column (2) of Table 1.4, we introduce our order-resource ratio which
measures the trade-off between policing and human resource expenditures. Interestingly,
with the inclusion of the ORRatio, the results change significantly. Quite remarkably,
the coefficient on the price of sugar on the world market has changed signs and is now
positive (0.08) and significant at the 1-percent level. Controlling for the previous year’s
wage rate and the composition of public expenditure, a 1 percent increase in the price
of sugar on the world market is associated with a 0.08 percent increase in agricultural
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Table 1.4: Public Expenditure and Wage manipulation
D.V. is Log of the Predial
Wage Rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Wage 0.754∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗
(8.78) (9.28) (9.58) (4.25)
Ln Price -0.0168 0.0807∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗
(-0.49) (3.21) (3.13) (2.15)
Ln ORRatio -0.0969∗∗
(-2.15)
Ln Public Invest. Shr. 0.177∗∗
(2.53)
Ln Police Shr. -0.243∗
(-2.04)
Constant -0.590∗∗ -0.923∗∗∗ -0.590∗∗ -2.112∗∗
(-2.33) (-4.02) (-2.27) (-2.54)
Observations 31 31 31 31
Notes: All regressions are OLS time series with a lag of the dependent variable (log daily
wage rate). Ln Price is the natural log of the price of sugar on the London Market.
Expenditure shares are as previously defined. Data is for Jamaica, 1836-1866. Data
sources are detailed in the Data Appendix and Primary Sources sections. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗
p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. t-statistics in parentheses.
workers’ wages. Furthermore, as we hypothesised, the coefficient on the ORRatio is
negative and significant at the 5-percent level. Specifically, controlling for the other
regressors in the equation, a 1 percent increase in the ratio of policing expenditure to
human expenditure is associated with a 0.097 percent decrease in the wages of predial
workers on the island. These latest regression result suggests an interesting tug-of-war
between market forces and the political economy of the plantation society. We borrow
and modify the Dippel et al. (2015) illustration and depict this relationship in Figure
1.4.
Figure 1.4: Public Expenditures and Wage Manipulation
↑ Price
↑Wage
↑ SugShr ↑ ORR ↓Wage
market forces
political economy
The implication here is that changes in the price of sugar on the world market
affects the prevailing wage rate through two channels. For a price increase, market
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forces, characterised by a want of producers to increase sugar cane supply, drives up
labour demand and so bids the wage rate in the industry up. This channel is in line
with standard economic theory. There is, however, a second channel in operation. This
price increase makes sugar production more attractive, and so, increases the share sugar
in total exports. The result is a stronger plantation presence which heavily relies on
coerced labour and so, policing expenditure grows relative to human expenditure and
the order-resource ratio increase, driving down wages. In regression (1) of Table 1.4,
these two directionally opposed forces cancelled each other out and we observed a 0
coefficient on the price variable. Unlocking both channels by controlling for the political
economy effect in regression (2) has now revealed the expected sign and relationship
between commodity price and wage, predicted by market forces. Meanwhile the political
economy channel provides, clear evidence of the planters’ motivations for under-investing
in resources that benefit the wider public: that is, wage manipulation as suggested by
our theory in Section 1.3.
In columns (3) and (4) we disaggregate the order-resource ratio to examine the
specific effect of expenditure on public investment and policing, respectively, on wages.
The results lend further support to our wage manipulation theory. In column (3) the
coefficient on public investment share is positive and significant at the 5-percent level,
which suggests that a 1 percent increase in public investment lead to an 0.18 percent
increase in wages, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, in column (4), the coefficient on
the share of expenditure spent on the police force is negative and significant at the 5-
percent level. This again is in accordance with our theory that financing of policing was
used to coerce labour and depress wages. Specifically, the result suggests that, all other
things being equal, a 1 percent increase in the share of expenditure allocated towards
policing led to a 0.24 percent decrease in wages. Furthermore, these two regressions
indicate that the results gathered from the regression using our ORRatio is driven by
both the numerator and the denominator. We should also observe that the magnitude
of the coefficient on policing is greater than that on public investment, which points to
financing of repressive policing as the more effective means of wage manipulation
1.5.3 A Comparative Approach
In this section, we subject our hypothesis to deeper analytical study by not just compar-
ing the relationship between the strength of the plantation economy and public invest-
ment in Jamaica before and after the constitutional change of 1866, but instead we adopt
a comparative approach, using Antigua as a benchmark case for the excess state (and
the absence of the wage manipulation motive) against which we can compare Jamaica
in the two time periods. By comparing a territory which enjoyed excess labour supply
to Jamaica, which experienced excess labour demand, we directly test propositions 1.1
and 1.2. What is attractive about using Antigua is the near identical political and eco-
nomic history that it shares with Jamaica. Before the Emancipation Act of 1833, both
islands were slaves societies in the West Indies, steeped in the production of sugar cane.
After emancipation, they inherited identical political structures with powerful Legisla-
tive Assemblies populated by planters. The major difference between these two islands
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during this period is what uniquely qualifies this comparison to validate our hypothesis.
The land to labour ratio in Jamaica was extremely high compared to that of Antigua,
resulting in severe labour shortages for Jamaica, while Antigua producers enjoyed excess
supply. Data from Higman (1986, p.608) shows that in 1834, the population density of
Antigua was 100.5 person per sq. km., while that of Jamaica was 27. This was reflected
in a significant difference in average wages during planter governance. Figures calculated
using data from the Jamaica Blue Books (1838-1865) and Antigua Blue Books (1838-
1865) indicate an average predial wage during planter rule of 16d. for Jamaica and just
812d. for Antigua.
After 1866, both islands became Crown Colonies, abolishing their powerful planters’
Assemblies, putting the ultimate decision-making power in the hands of the Crown’s
representatives. These remarkably similar histories meant that these two islands share
the required similarities and precisely the differences that we need for a valid comparison.
That is, during planter rule, the only major difference between the two colonies was that
Antigua enjoyed excess labour supply while Jamaica suffered excess labour demand, so
the wage manipulation motive was present in Jamaica but largely absent in Antigua.
This allows us to compare the fiscal behaviour of a planters’ Assembly with the wage
manipulation motive (that of Jamaica) to one without (like that of Antigua).18 Quite
conveniently, the fact that both islands abolished their planters’ Assemblies in the late
1860s, allows us to compare the same behaviour when the wage manipulation motive is
absent from the two governments to see whether there are any differential repercussions
for fiscal policy, in order to verify that this was indeed what was driving any observed
difference during planter rule. We expect that there is no differential effect during the
post-planter rule period.
Using this approach, we can compare the difference in the pre-constitutional change
relationship between plantation presence and public investment between the two coun-
tries to the post-constitutional change difference in relationship between the same. In
so doing, we are comparing the effect, on public investment, of plantation presence in
Jamaica (where we have argued that the government had the wage manipulation motive)
during planter rule, to Antigua (where we have argued this motive was absent). This
comparison is made for and between both time periods, during and after planter rule,
using a (quasi) difference in difference method. In Equations (1.17) to (1.19), we detail
this approach.
PIt = µ0 + µ1Sugshrt + µ2Jam+ µ3JamSugshrt + ψt (1.17)
PIt = µ′0 + µ′1Sugshrt + µ′2Jam+ µ′3JamSugshrt + ψ′t (1.18)
PIt = µ′′0 + µ′′1Sugshrt + µ′′2Jam+ µ′′3JamSugshrt + µ′′4Post+
µ′′5PostSugshrt + µ′′6JamPost+ µ′′7JamPostSugsgrt + ψ′′t
(1.19)
18What we are relying on here is not the complete absence of the wage manipulation motive in Antigua,
but merely the fact that this was a largely insignificant motive in Antigua, if it existed at all. One merely
needs to observe the actions of this two Assemblies to verify the massive sums spent on effort to increase
labour supply in Jamaica (like through immigration), while no such efforts existed in Antigua.
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For years under planter rule we run regression (1.17), while for years post planter rule
we run equation (1.18), and finally, we run regression (1.19) for the entire sample period
(pre and post) using pooled-OLS.
In the first of these equations, (1.17), we regress public investment (PI) on the scale of
the plantation economy (Sugshr), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is Jamaica
(0 otherwise), and an interaction term between Sugshr and Jam. ψ is an error term.
This regression is designed to estimate the differential relationship between the presence
of the plantation economy and public investment between Jamaica under planter oligarch
rule (and, therefore, in the presence of the wage manipulation motive) and Antigua,
where, we have argued, the wage manipulation motive is absent. Specifically, we test
µ3 < 0: that increases in the strength of the plantation economy in Jamaica had a worse
impact on public investment than the control country in accordance with proposition
1.3.
The second regression equation, (1.18), is identical to (1.17), except that it is esti-
mated for the years after the constitutional change and, thus, in the absence of the sugar
sector wage manipulation motive of the government. As such, our hypothesis for this
regression is that strength of the plantation economy has no significantly different effect
on public investment between the two countries: that is, µ′3 = 0.
In the last of the three equation, (1.19), we pool the previous two equations using
the dummy variable Post, which we defined earlier, and interact it with Sugshr and
the Jamaica dummy. In the appendix to this chapter, we show that this specification
effectively enables us to test the difference in the differential effects. These equations are
estimated with a time trend and lag of the dependent variable to control for potential
serial correlation. We turn to the results in Table 1.5.19
In column (1) of Table 1.5, we estimate Equation (1.17) using data for years during
which the planter oligarch governed the island (1838-1865). The coefficient on Sugshr is
positive and significant, which implies that in Antigua, during this period, increases in
the strength of the plantation economy was positively associated with public investment
share. In fact, a 1 percentage point increase in sugar’s share of exports led to 0.15
percentage point increase in public investment as a share of total expenditure. From the
coefficient on the interaction term JamSugshr, we see that this was completely different
to what was on going in Jamaica. The differential effect of the plantation economy on
public investment share, as we move from Antigua to Jamaica, during planter rule of
Jamaica, is −0.22. The magnitude and sign of this coefficient confirm that not only was
(as posited in proposition1.3) the plantation economy less conducive to public investment
in Jamaica, but that, in fact, it was wholly unfavourable to public investment during
the period when the planters’ Assembly presided over the island. Furthermore, the
coefficient on our dummy variable for Jamaica (Jam), is insignificant, suggesting that
the difference in public investment share between Antigua and Jamaica during planter
19We initially ran simple linear regression for the time period under planter government with the Jam
dummy as the only independent variable. The coefficient on the dummy was −0.122 with a t-statistics
was −11.04 indicating that Jamaica had significantly lower levels of public investment during the planter
governance.
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Table 1.5: Wage Manipulation, Public Investment and the Plantation Economy
D.V. is Public Investment (1) (2) (3)
Sugshr 0.153∗∗∗ -0.096 0.153∗∗∗
(3.19) (-1.29) (5.59)
JamSugshr -0.221∗∗∗ 0.065 -0.221∗∗∗
(-3.72) (0.85) (-6.50)
Jam -0.102 -0.122 -0.102∗∗
(-1.20) (-1.34) (-2.13)
PostSugshr -0.248∗∗∗
(-2.83)
JamPostSugshr 0.286∗∗∗
(3.08)
Post 0.069
(0.62)
JamPost -0.020
(-0.17)
Constant 0.142 0.212∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(1.68) (2.36) (2.97)
Lag D.V Yes Yes Yes
Time trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 57 89 146
Notes: All regressions are OLS time series with a lag of the dependent vari-
able (Public Investment Share of Total Expenditure) and a time trend. Ex-
penditure shares are as previously defined. Data is for Jamaica and Antigua.
1838-1915. Data sources are detailed in the Data Appendix and Primary
Sources sections. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. t-statistics in parenthe-
ses. Standard errors are Newey-West HAC s.e.
oligarch rule, is largely explained by the effect of the scale of the plantation economy.20
The results could not be more different as we turn to the time period after the
abolishing planter oligarch rule in Jamaica (column (2)). The coefficient on Sugshr,
our measure of the strength of the plantation economy for Antigua (µ′1), is insignificant,
20The Jam dummy is no longer significant as it was in the simple regression described in the previous
footnote. This suggests that the difference in public investment shares between Jamaica and Antigua
is explained by the scale of the plantation economy. That is, the presence of Jamaican planters in the
economy adversely affected public investment relative to that of Antigua.
CHAPTER 1. SWEET SUGAR, SOUR GOVERNMENT 46
indicating no relationship between public investment share of the plantation economy
during this period. More importantly, µ′3, our measure of the differential effect of the
strength of the plantation economy in Jamaica, from that of Antigua, is 0.065, positive
and highly insignificant. This indicates that now that the planters’ Assembly is abolished
on the island, the sugar economy ceased to have a negative effect on public investment
share. In fact, the effect of the plantation economy on public investment was now similar
to that of a society where the wage manipulation motive was absent, that of Antigua.
In column (3), we test the statistical significance of the difference between regressions
(1) and (2) from Table 1.5. Our coefficient of interest is µ′′7, which we have shown to
measure the difference in the differential impact of the plantation economy on public
investment between the two countries, between the two periods. The point estimate,
0.29, is positive and significant at the 1-percent level, thus, confirming that the differen-
tial effect of the plantation economy is significantly more positive after the abolishing of
planter oligarch rule. This result points to the affirmation of our theory that when the
planter oligarch resigned from government in 1866, the surrender of power to the Crown
stopped the entrepreneurial elite from dictating the government, allowing the Jamaican
society and economy to behave more like one without the wage manipulation motive,
like that of Antigua. Eradication of the incentive to manipulate wages thereby removed
the need to under-fund human capital development and divert government revenue to re-
pressive policing. As such, the government carried out public spending more in line with
what we see from islands where this motivation never existed because of the prevailing
subsistence level of wages.
In Table 1.6, we look for evidence that while wage manipulation was on-going in
Jamaica during planter rule (as evidenced by the results in Table 1.4), the planter
oligarch in Antigua were not so keen to use public investment to manipulate wages. To
see this, we repeat the regression in Table 1.4 as a two-country panel regression. The idea
here is to use the island of Antigua as counter-factual state. We have already seen that
the two islands were nearly identical economically, socially, and politically throughout
much of the 19th century. Both islands in 1838, when full emancipation was won,
predominantly exported sugar, which made up at least 80 percent of all exports, both
were governed by powerful Assemblies dominated exclusively by plantation oligarchs, and
both had a population composed of 90 percent formerly enslaved Africans, who had just
gained economic freedom. The one difference between the two islands was concerned with
the land to labour ratio. Jamaica, being a bigger land mass, was significantly less densely
populated. As a result, the island experienced chronic labour shortages and comparable
higher wage rates. Thus, while the dense population of Antigua, holding no outside
economic options, drove the wage rate to near subsistence level, wages in Jamaica were
particularly problematic for the plantation class. For these reasons, Antigua provides
the perfect benchmark against which we can compare the role of the order-resource ratio
in the presence versus the absence of political economy wage manipulation motivation.
The coefficients of interest here are those on the log of ORRatio and the interaction
between the Jamaica dummy and the log ORRatio. These estimate the relationship
between the order resource-ratio and the wage rate in Antigua, and the differential
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Table 1.6: Jamaica and Antigua; Public Expenditure and Wage Manipulation
Dep. Variable Lag Wage Ln Price Ln ORRatio Jamaica x ORRatio Jamaica Constant Obs.
Log Daily Wage 0.552∗∗∗ 0.343∗ 0.0365 -0.244∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ -2.542∗∗∗ 62
(5.40) (2.00) (1.50) (-2.69) (3.45) (-3.04)
Notes: N = 62. The regression is estimate as OLS time series with a lag of the dependent variable (log daily wage rate). Ln Price is
the natural log of the price of sugar on the London Market. Data is for Jamaica and Antigua, 1836-1866. Data sources are detailed
in the Data Appendix and Primary Sources sections. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. t-statistics in parentheses.
relationship of the same between Antigua and Jamaica, respectively. The result is as we
expected. For Antigua, where, we argue, the wage manipulation motivation was absent,
there is no relationship between the order-resource ratio and the wage rate, as indicated
by the positive and insignificant coefficient (0.0365) on Ln ORRatio. The relationship
is markedly different for Jamaica. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative
and significantly larger (in absolutely terms) than that of Antigua, indicating that there
existed a systematically different relationship between wages and the composition of
public expenditure between the two islands. Whereas the composition of expenditure
played no role in wage outcomes in Antigua, for Jamaica, increases in the order-resources
(policing expenditure to human expenditure) resulted in a persistent reduction in the
wages of sugar cane workers on the island. Such is the difference between an excess
labour supply economy (Antigua), and an excess labour demand economy (Jamaica).
The wage manipulation motive is clearly present in the latter while absent in the former.
We discuss the implications of these results in the next section.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a theory to explain the poor performance of Jamaica rel-
ative to the other former British West Indian sugar colonies in the post emancipation
period. Our theory suggests that Jamaica’s under-development was the result of repres-
sive public policy from a repressive government in the formative years of a free society
on the island. The theoretical framework identified the post-emancipation labour prob-
lems facing the planter government of the island as a key motive driving their public
spending decisions in favour of repressive expenditure. We proposed that this motive
led to persistent underinvestment in public goods on the island for much of the post
emancipation period. Using empirical data from the colonial Blue Books, Parliamentary
Papers and other sources, we performed an interrupted time series analysis and showed
that the intervention of 1866, which saw the abolishing of the planters’ Assembly, and its
replacement with Crown Colony rule, led to significantly higher levels of public invest-
ment on the island. Furthermore, the analysis showed that, following the constitutional
change, investment grew significantly year on year, whereas, under planter rule, it had
remained stagnant.
Using ordinary least square regression, we explicitly show that the planters’ moti-
vations as entrepreneurial agriculturist played a crucial role in the meagre spending on
public goods. We find that increases in the scale of the plantation economy were associ-
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ated with significant reductions in the share of public investment in total public spending
during planter rule, whereas no such relations exist after crown colony rule was initiated.
We compared the results for Jamaica to that of Antigua using a pooled-OLS regression,
to determine whether there are any significant differences between Jamaica and a nearly
identical country where the wage manipulation motive was absent. We found statistically
and magnitudinously significant differences. While the Jamaican planters’ Assembly re-
duced public investment share as the plantation economy (scale) increased, the Antigua
planters’ Assembly did not, and in fact may have increased public investment. When we
compare the two islands in the period after the planters’ Assembly was abolished, we find
no significant effect of the plantation economy on public investment share for Jamaica,
and that this relationship was no longer significantly different to that of Antigua. The
proposed theory, along with the historical literature, suggests two compounding effects
of the scale of the plantation economy which might have led to the negative relationship
with public investment in Jamaica during the era of planter governance. First, increases
in the scale of the plantation economy, according to our theory, created a greater pres-
ence of the plantation interest in the labour market, and thus made labour competition
and, therefore, wage manipulation more intense. This stimulated an incentive to shift
government spending from public goods to repressive activities such as heavy policing, in
an effort to drive down wages. Secondly, the historical literature suggests that a stronger
plantation economy made the plantation elites more powerful and, therefore, more ca-
pable of lobbying for reduce public spending on services that benefited the population
by improving their employment prospects.
The implications of these results should be discussed in the context of the on-going
institutions, governance and economic development debate. Jamaica’s early experience
with crony planter government no doubt lingered and has created a culture of bad
government which has persisted today. The island has some of the poorest governance
quality scores for the Caribbean region, a feature which has been seen to be tightly
negatively related to growth and development.21 These observations also show that, in
measuring the effect of institutions on growth, what may be most important is not the
de jure framework but also the de facto nature of these institutions. By legislation and
constitution, the legal framework of Jamaica has been near identical to that of its regional
neighbours, yet, the operational institutions were virtually incomparable. It would seem
that its history of bad governance has been manifested in a culture of government as
a predatory and often repressive institution. We will more fully explore this theme
in Chapter 2 were we compare institutions of governance and their relationship to the
history of the sugar colonies. In light of the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence
presented above, small developing states such as that of Jamaica should pay careful
attention to the role of governing elites as invested entrepreneurs and interrogate the
relationship between their private private interests and government policy.
21World Bank Governance Indicators: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi.
Chapter 2
Land and Labour Endowments,
Colonial Institutions and
Economic Performance in the
West Indies
2.1 Introduction
Why have the economies of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and Saint Kitts and Nevis
consistently and increasingly outperformed those of Guyana and Jamaica since indepen-
dence, in spite of the fact that Guyana and Jamaica, with far superior resources, seemed
much better positioned to prosper on the eve of independence? This chapter proposes
an institutional and colonial origins approach to explaining the social and economic di-
vergence among the former British West Indian sugar colonies. Specifically, we focus on
the contrasting growth among the five main sugar colonies, Antigua, Barbados, Saint
Kitts, Guyana, and Jamaica. What makes this sample of islands interesting is their
seemingly high degree of historical, social and economic homogeneity. That these five
countries were all former British West Indian colonies with a monocrop (sugar) economy
populated by forced labour, and were almost completely export-oriented, presents an
ideal case study of post-independence economic divergence. The novel contribution of
this research is the exposition of a new mechanism to explain the divergence among the
West Indies.
In Chapter 1, we focused on Jamaica’s underinvestment in public goods during the
post-emancipation period (primarily 1838-1915) and related this underinvestment to the
labour market conditions faced by the planter elite. In this chapter, we expand our
focus and timeline to draw connections not just within the post-emancipation period,
but also between the post-emancipation and post-colonial era (1960s to present). In
so doing, we show that across the five sugar colonies of the British West Indies labour
availability prompted various policy interventions which were met with conflict and
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rebellions, causing a persistent erosion of the quality of institutions from the colonial to
the post-emancipation period.
We argue the colonial origins case by delving into the history of the territories,
examining the differential impact that the Abolition Act of 1833 had on the former slave
territories as the source of the first major divergence in institutional development. Our
analysis effectively divides the history of these territories into three periods. The first is
The Slavery Era (1619 - 1834): during this period, the countries were export oriented
colonial possessions of Great Britain. They were developed as industrial monocrop
plantations worked by the forced labour of Africans under the whip of absentee European
planters. Slavery was a total institution. It encompassed all aspects of the lives of the
labour force which made up, on average, over 90 percent of the population. This peculiar
institution was employed with unvarying similarity throughout the five colonies. In the
second period, The Post-Emancipation Epoch (1834 - 1960s): still part of the colonial
era, the territories remained the colonial possessions of Great Britain during this period.
However, the class of plantation-owning (planter) elite that developed during the years of
slavery, was no longer legally able to force labour from their now ex-slaves. We identify
this period as the critical point of institutional divergence. It is during this period
that the colonies developed various forms of institutions as planters sought new ways
of legally responding to the labour question. On the eve of emancipation, Jamaica and
Guyana, with their abundance of land and other natural resources, appeared primed to
develop into economic leaders in the region. On the other hand, the overly populated
and comparatively natural resource poor colonies of Barbados, Antigua and Saint Kitts
seemed to be destined for economic and social difficulties. Yet, the reverse occurred. By
the third period, The Post-Colonial Period (1960s - Present): A wave of decolonization
began with independence of Jamaica (1962), Barbados (1966), Guyana (1966) Antigua
and Barbuda (1981) and Saint Kitts and Nevis (1983). During this period, the islands
of Barbados, Antigua and Saint Kitts diverged remarkably from Jamaica and Guyana.
Historical accounts suggest that among the colonies, Jamaica was by far the wealth-
iest British possession by the late 18th century and up until the eve of emancipation
in 1834 (Sheridan, 1965). However, by the end of the colonial period, the other sugar
colonies had caught up to Jamaica substantially. As it stood at the end of the colo-
nial period, data from Angus (2003) shows that the colonies had similar levels of in-
come in 1950. GDP per capita (in 1990 international $) for Jamaica was 1, 352, for
Guyana 1, 089, Antigua 1, 782, Saint Kitts 1, 386 and Barbados 2, 123 (Angus, 2003).
Starting from these broadly similar levels of income, with independence in the 1960s,
economic development in these territories followed starkly different paths. Figure 2.1
tracks the economic progress of the islands from the 1960s onwards. A casual look at
the graph illustrates the dramatic differences in the economic progress of the colonies.
While income levels were similar in the 1950s, by 2008 the densely populated former
colonies (Barbados, Antigua and Saint Kitts) enjoyed income levels of over US$14, 000,
while the sparsely populated former colonies (Jamaica and Guyana) languished at under
US$6, 000. The difference in per capita income between these two sets of colonies had
moved from between US$500 and US$800 to over US$8, 000.
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Figure 2.1: Real GDP per Capita 1960-2010
We believe that the origins of this divergence lie in the post-emancipation colonial
period. Where planters faced a severe labour problem at emancipation (1834), as in
the case of the low colonial population density countries like Jamaica and Guyana, they
responded harshly with more coercive policy interventions. This created intense conflict
and weakened social cohesion. Where the labour problem was less severe, as in the
high colonial population density territories of Barbados, Antigua and Saint Kitts, the
planters’ response was less aggressive. This facilitated the development of a relatively
free society with less conflict and stronger social cohesion. When independence occurred
in the 1960s, the group of high colonial population density islands, found themselves
much abler (socially and institutionally) in spite of their relative lack of resources, to
take advantage of their democratic status, and thus grew faster and more robust (socially
and economically) than the fragmented countries of Jamaica and Guyana.
Our empirical results support this theory. We use slave population density data
from Higman (1986) for the year 1834 (the eve of emancipation) to proxy for colonial
labour availability for eleven former British territories of the West Indies. The measure
of institutional quality for these eleven territories comes from the World Governance
Indicators1 and is the average score for each country for the period 1996-2013. Our
analysis in this chapter relies of both OLS and two-stage least square (2SLS) regression
methods to highlight the causal impact of colonial labour availability on the quality of
institutions today. Both the OLS and 2SLS approaches confirm that higher levels of
colonial labour supply are associated with higher scores for institutional quality today.
In addition, our instrumental variable regression results suggest that an increase in
institutional quality scores of 0.01 is associated with 1.23 percent higher income per
capita among the West Indian territories today.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: the next section (2.2) surveys the current
economic and historical literature on institutions and economic performance as well as
work on the divergence among the former West Indian colonies. Section 2.3 presents
our analytical framework which describes our hypothesis. Section 2.4 provides empirical
1See reference in the data appendix.
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support for our hypothesis using various OLS and two-stage least square instrumental
variable regressions. Section 2.5 summarises and concludes the chapter.
2.2 The Existing Literature
On History, Institutions and Development
There has been, in the recent economic development literature, more emphasis on
the study of the role of institutions on economic performance. Acemoglu et al. (2001),
perhaps more than any other paper, has effectively shown that there is a strong causal
relationship between the quality of institutions and economic performance. The authors
theorize that differences in mortality rates faced by European settlers across the various
countries that they colonised, led them to employ different types of colonial policies which
in turn created different sets of institutions. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001), where
Europeans enjoyed low mortality rates, they tended to form settlements which replicated
the institutional setup of the colonising country.2 On the contrary, in countries where
they suffered from high mortality rates, the colonial objective moved from settlement
to exploitation with little regard for creating growth-enhancing institutions. Our paper
differs from Acemoglu et al. (2001) in several ways. First, unlike Acemoglu et al. (2001),
we do not seek to prove a causal relationship between institutions and economic growth.
We accept this relationship as true and, instead, we focus on the mechanism that led to a
divergence in the choice and quality of institutions among the West Indian sugar colonies.
Secondly, as it is clear that planters faced similar mortality rates across the West Indian
territories, we contend that variations in early 17th century European settler mortality
rates cannot adequately explain the institutional and economic divergence within the
region. In light of this, we explore a new mechanism: population density at the time
of legal emancipation in 1834. Thirdly, we survey the historical data and economic
literature to develop a theoretical framework within which an analysis of the relationship
between historical factors, institutions, and economic divergence among the West Indian
sugar colonies may be conducted. In addition, we adopt an econometric approach to
show a systematic relationship between population density on the eve of emancipation
(our measure of colonial labour supply) and institutional quality.
This is not the first work to consider the link between factor endowments and eco-
nomic outcomes today. Papers by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) have also explored
this idea. The authors argue that colonial factor endowments had a significant impact on
the institutions and development of economies in the Americas. They posit that colonies
that were well suited for high-value large-scale agricultural production motivated the use
of slaves, leading to a large share of the population in slave labour. According to their
hypothesis, large-scale plantation slavery, comprised of large slave holdings and scale
economies of agriculture, led to a vastly unequal distribution of wealth and power and
set the economies of these territories on different development paths. While our paper
2In the context of Acemoglu et al. (2001), measures of institutions used focused on property rights
and rule of law.
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also grants a substantial role to factor endowments in the present day institutional and
economic outcomes, there exist a few key differences between the present paper and
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002). First, we focus on divergence among the former
British West Indian colonies while Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) looked at diver-
gence among the larger sample of American colonies. Secondly, we do not support the
idea that it is merely large-scale slavery and plantation agriculture that are responsible
for the divergent outcomes in the British West Indies. Instead, we hypothesise that the
differences in long-term development paths in the West Indies are due to the relative
availability of labour to land in the post-slavery period. The fact that the long-term
economic development of the former colonies diverged, cannot be explained by differ-
ences in the scale of slave plantations as all the colonies in our sample suffered from
near total enslavement of their populations. We argue that the key source of institu-
tional divergence can be found in the post-emancipation period, with the response of
the plantation elite to their respective labour problems. Thirdly, in addition to evidence
from the historical literature, unlike Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002), we conduct
an econometric analysis to show that our thesis is supported by the data. We do, how-
ever, agree with Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) to the extent that they suggest a degree
of path dependence in the relationship between history and economic outcomes today,
which we will address later in this chapter.
There are a few other notable papers that deal with this research area. Specific to
the West Indies, Dippel et al. (2015) explore the role of international terms of trade
in inducing institutional changes which then act upon labour market outcomes. The
authors observe that falling sugar prices on the world market weakened the power of
the 19th century West Indian planter elite in territories with low sugar suitability. This,
they explain, led to an easing of the coercive apparatus of the planter class and, as a
result, wages in these colonies increased by 20 percent and incarceration rates were cut
in half. In colonies with high sugar suitability, the planter elite were able to maintain
their political clout, thus, existing coercive institutions did not change and fall in sugar
prices was passed on to the labouring class with wages falling by 24 percent. Like Dippel
et al. (2015), we explore the nexus between coercive institutions and wages. However,
unlike their work, we do not narrow our focus to the role of international markets. We
focus on the exogenously determined labour problem which led to differences in the
choice of institutions, not the effect of the terms of trade on the ability of the planter
to maintain his coercive instrument. More specifically, our theory posits that these
small, high colonial population density islands were endowed with labour to land ratios
which, in the political economic environment of the time, favoured the development of a
relatively free labour market. Thus, any changes in the price of output would be reflected
in the price of labour through the existing free market mechanisms. On the other hand,
sugar colonies endowed with less labour relative to land suffered from ‘unfree’ labour
markets during the years of sugar dominance.
To understand why institutional oppression of labour meant the oppression of West
Indian society and its economic development, one must study the annals of Caribbean
history. The very existence and character of West Indian economy and society is a by-
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product of labour relations. Cross (1988, p.1) writes, “the history of the Caribbean can
be defined as the history of labour.” The paramount importance of the labour question
is recognised in the writings of Bolland (2001, p.3) who states, “. . . in the aftermath of
Emancipation in the British Caribbean the interrelated struggles for control of labour
and land constituted the central political issue of these societies.” Any paper attempting
to study the role of institutional and economic development of these territories without
considering the industrial relations that characterise these former colonies and their role
in the formulation of institutions and economy, runs the risk of interpreting as exoge-
nous, policy decisions that are endogenous to the institutional and political economy
framework in which these policies are set. Henry and Miller (2009) is such a paper.
The authors reject the thesis of Acemoglu et al. (2001) and argue that, for the case
of the economic divergence between Barbados and Jamaica since independence, vari-
ation in institutions was not the fundamental cause. They argue that the two island
nations inherited an identical set of institutions, involving Westminster-style parliamen-
tary democracies and the English Common Law, which accorded strong protection of
private property, an element crucial for the long term economic prosperity. As a further
point of institutional similarity, they highlight that both countries consistently held “free
and fair elections with no unconstitutional transfers of power” and maintained in their
governments the English-built machinery of administrative justice with the use of the
Privy Council as their highest court of appeals (Henry and Miller, 2009, p.263). We take
issue with Henry and Miller (2009) on two fronts.
First, the authors misinterpret ideological similarity for functional homogeneity.
That Barbados and Jamaica shared similar parliamentary styles and constitutions on
paper, does not automatically translate to a functionally identical set of institutions.
Indeed, Patterson (2013, p.1) recognises this, stating that the set of institutions be-
tween Barbados and Jamaica were only “superficially similar” and that, contrary to the
Jamaican case, Afro-Barbadians inherited “an efficient pre-independence system institu-
tionally attuned to the challenges of development.” Patterson (2013, p.25) highlights the
crucial difference between “declarative and procedural institutional knowledge”; in light
of this, the misguided amalgamation of the two, summarises the analytical deficiencies of
Henry and Miller (2009). Secondly, by failing to consider the link between the differences
in the pre-independence realities of the two islands and their post-independence political
economy climates, the authors leave their analysis susceptible to a critical oversight: the
endogeneity of economic policy to the broader institutional framework in which it is
set. That Barbados and Jamaica employed very different economic policies (the former
favouring a free market economy with only moderate government control and the latter
opting for democratic socialist and nationalist policies with heavy government control)
is not independent of the heterogeneous procedural institutional framework the islands
inherited from their colonial histories. Our present work takes this into account, em-
bedding institutional choice within the peculiar differences of the West Indian colonies’
historical context.
Among the few economic papers which consider the role of historical factors in the
institutional development and subsequent divergent economic paths of West Indian ter-
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ritories, DaCosta (2007) stands out. The author conducts a case study of the two sugar
territories that experienced the greatest differences in economic prosperity, Barbados and
Guyana. He observes that crucial to how these two countries developed were differences
in the length of undisturbed colonial rule which led to a smooth path to independence
for Barbados and a more turbulent path for Guyana. Furthermore, differences in set-
tlement conditions, geography and land distribution as well as in labour policies in the
pre-independence period manifested in differences in the development of institutions and
the country’s economic development. Though similar to DaCosta (2007) in its theoret-
ical premise, our work differs from this earlier work in two very important ways. First,
DaCosta (2007) considers only two territories in isolation. In so doing, the author is
unable to present a comprehensive analysis of the divergence in the wider Caribbean.
Secondly, though DaCosta (2007) explores the historical context as an influencing factor,
he fails to formally identify, as we have done, a mechanism through which the colonial
history determined institutional quality and economic performance.
Another notable paper on the issue of institutions and economic divergence in the
West Indies is Grenade and Lewis-Bynoe (2010). The authors’ paper echoes the argu-
ments of DaCosta (2007) in both approach and theoretical premise and so differs from
our present work in much the same ways. The cross-disciplinary literature contains
relevant papers. Recently, Patterson (2013) presented a sociological perspective on the
divergent paths of Jamaica and Barbados. The history literature, specifically, Bolland
(2001), Cross (1988), Higman (2010), and McLewin (1987) have extensively reviewed
the role of post-emancipation industrial relations in the formation of a modern society
and economy in the West Indies. These works all lend support to our more economics-
centred approach to the divergence question.
On Conflict
Colonial conflict is a key factor in the causal chain linking labour availability to
institutional quality today. The economics and political science literature have produced
several influential papers on the causes of conflict within societies. The seminal paper
by Collier and Hoeffler (1998) investigated the economic roots of civil wars and found
that several variables help explain both the duration and probability of occurrence of
this form of conflict. They begin with the simple idea that occurrence of rebellion is
determined by the balance of the cost versus the benefits of engaging in rebellions and
construct a formal theoretical model in which the onset of such a conflict is determined
by proxies for the benefits and costs of civil wars, namely, the taxable base, the size
of the population, income per capita and a measure of coordination costs. Some of
the conclusion drawn from this work carry relevance for our present discussion. First,
one of the implications of their formal model is that individuals engaged in conflict are
prepared to accept longer conflicts if the perceived benefits are greater. This rings true
for the present study in two ways. First, the persistence of conflict in colonies with
weaker supplies of labour is related to the fact that where labour was scarce, there was:
(i) more to be gained by planters from coercion relative to the cost of that coercion than
in territories where labour was abundant, and (ii) where land was abundant, there was
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more to be gained by workers from rebelling against the planters and engaging in their
own peasant production. Thus, the observation that conflicts were more likely to occur
and last longer in labour-scarce territories is consistent with the model postulated by
Collier and Hoeffler (1998).
The empirical results of Collier and Hoeffler (1998) also produce some findings which
are useful in explaining the onset of social instability in the West Indies. The authors
found that wealthier countries had lower risk of such conflict and attribute this to the
higher opportunity cost of rebellion. Again, this opportunity cost motive can be seen
to be present in the West Indies in the sense that in labour-scarce territories there
existed a much lower opportunity cost to conflict than in labour-rich territories where
lost wages from conflict periods could not easily be supplemented by peasant production.
Ethno-linguistic fractionalisation was also a significant positive predictor of conflict, and
Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p.571) note that, statistically, the danger of conflict peaks
“when society is polarised into two groups.” This again bears some significance for the
case of West Indies in that West Indian societies were explicitly characterised into two
groups — the governing and entrepreneurial plantation elite, and former slaves and their
descendants. This, however, does not explain why some of West Indian territories (that
is, the labour-scarce ones) had far higher levels of social instability than others (that is,
the labour-abundant ones) as all the British West Indian territories were divided into
these two distinct groups. This is one area in which our work makes a contribution to
explaining the history of social stability in the region.
In their revised paper, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) use indicators for grievance (eth-
nic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality)
and opportunity (extortion of natural resources, donations from diaspora, and subven-
tion from hostile governments) and assess the relative strength of the two motives in
explaining outbreaks of conflict. They found that the opportunities model performs
better than the grievance model in predicting the outbreak of civil war for their sample
of countries. More specifically, in terms of the opportunities model, primary exports (a
proxy for finance of rebellions) increase the risk of conflict, and indicators of the cost of
rebellion and military power also show statistically significant power in determining the
risk of conflict. Meanwhile, most proxies involved in the grievances model were insignif-
icant. None of the indicators for the dominance of one ethnic group were significant.
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) admit that this might be because some of the proxies in the
opportunities model may be correlated with unmeasured grievances. They conclude that
the risk of conflict is determined by elements of both models.
The nature of social unrest in the British West Indies during the post-colonial period
was not the same as that being analysed by Collier and Hoeffler’s civil war study, but
there are important implications coming from their work for our present work. First,
their work suggests that opportunity is a key factor in determining the risk of conflict.
Our study of the history of the West Indian territories supports this idea. The scarcity
of labour relative to land in the sparsely populated West Indian territories offered rebels
greater opportunity for economic gain. Rebelling against the coercive efforts of planters
was much more attractive where the avoidance of plantation work allowed individuals
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the time to cultivate their own land. Conversely, while Collier and Hoeffler (2004) found
that, for the grievance model, proxies like political repression were weak predictors of
the risk of conflict for their sample — likely owing to the fact that some opportunity
proxies also proxy for grievances — our qualitative analysis of the link between labour
availability, interventions and social unrest in the colonial period is able to draw a strong
connection between grievances and conflict.
This connection is often bi-causal, a situation first pointed out by Alesina and Perotti
(1996), and controls for which are incorporated into our econometric model below. In
investigating the relationship between inequality and investment, the authors highlight
political instability (measured by an index compiled through principal component anal-
ysis on indicators of stability) as the channel through which this relationship operates.
Furthermore, while political instability may affect the level of investment, as it poten-
tially increases the risks and therefore the expected returns from investment, investment,
through its consequences for economic prosperity, may reduce the risk of political insta-
bility. Using a two-stage least square analysis to control for this simultaneity, Alesina
and Perotti (1996) show that a strong negative and robust relationship exists between
political instability and investment. Their work is useful to our present study for at
least two reasons. First, it provides a useful template for analysing social unrest and its
impact on economic outcomes and institutions as a two-way process. In our discussion of
the social unrest in the West Indies during the colonial period, it becomes useful to our
understanding to not only highlight the ways that social unrest has adverse effects on
economic and social institutions, but to also account for the possibility that social and
economic institutions perpetuate social instability. Second, the significant link between
political instability and economic performance, suggested by the results of Alesina and
Perotti (1996), offers support to our proposition that the labour problem, by causing
higher levels of social unrest, has adversely affected economic outcomes. The difference
is that while their work focuses on investment, we see the role of this conflict playing
out in its effects on the long-term development of growth-enhancing institutions. We
highlight the effect on institutions because we believe the pervasive nature of labour
problems in the West Indies, and their impact on the social and economic organisation
of present day West Indian society is best observed through the quality of institutions
that emerged in the post-emancipation period.
Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) also offer a significant contribution to the social conflict
literature. The authors analyse how four main factors (economic stagnation, income
inequality, competition for natural resources and ethnicity) contribute to humanitarian
emergencies. Their article is a qualitative one, but it relies on a survey of the existing
quantitative literature to draw some valuable conclusions. First, the authors, like Alesina
and Perotti (1996), discuss the nature of the relationship between conflict and economic
and political factors as a bi-causal one. They observe that while economic growth and
political decay can lead to incidences of conflict, conflict may also lead to economic
stagnation and decay political institutions. The second source of conflict discussed by
Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) is economic inequality which, as noted in Alesina and
Perotti (1996), increases instances of conflict. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) also note that
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for inequality and conflict relationship as well, there exists a tendency for bi-causality.
Furthermore, the authors explicitly highlight the role of historical discrimination and
colonialism in determining inequality through its implications for taxation and public
expenditure among other factors. This draws obvious parallels to our present work and
helps to place the present study in the existing literature as a more precise examination
of this relationship with our focus on the colonial British West Indies. The third source
of conflict noted by Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) is competition for natural resources.
Previous to Nafziger and Auvinen (2002), Collier and Hoeffler (1998) discussed natural
resources (the share of primary commodities in exports) in the context of financing
rebellions. With all territories in the West Indies during the period relying on primary
exports for over 90 percent of their exports, we cannot attribute the higher social unrest
in labour-scarce countries to differences in primary exports, but still, this factor is useful
in understanding why the region as a whole was prone to social unrest. We do, however,
conduct a deeper empirical analysis of labour conflict and colonial factors in Chapter 4.
Taken together, this literature offers strong support for our theory on the relative
state of post-colonial West Indian societies. The grievances stoked during colonial rule,
the onset of the labour problem and interventions undertaken to augment the labour
market in response, all carry implications for social stability and institutions today.
2.3 An Analytical Framework
A systematic analysis of the role of colonial labour availability in explaining present day
economic performance of former British West Indian territories requires a framework
that pins down the relationship between the two. In this section, we introduce a chart
to describe our theory. The flow chart in Figure 2.2 illustrates how colonial labour
availability is linked to present day institutions and economic performance.
Figure 2.2: Chain of Causation
There are two features which bear highlighting in this chain. The first is that the
relationships as presented recognise the simultaneous nature of the factors in this chain,
and the second is that of implied persistence in the form of institutions from the colonial
period to present day. We address persistence and path dependence in Section 2.5.1. In
what follows, we consider each node of the above chain and draw on the histories of the
colonies to make the argument for the relationship as expressed in Figure2.2.
Colonial Labour Availability
The first node of the chain of causation presented above is colonial labour availability.
The key factors in the production process were land and labour. Before emancipation,
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labour supply was kept stable through the total institution of slavery across all islands.
However, with the abolition of this institution, the relative availability of these two
factors became the catalyst for divergent social and economic trajectories among the
colonies. Table 2.1 which reports the cross-sectional characteristics of the colonies of the
British West Indies, shows the wide variation in colonial population density, which prox-
ies for labour supply. For our five sugar colonies, Barbados, Antigua and Saint Kitts had
Table 2.1: Characteristics of B.W.I Colonies
Colony YearFounded
Population
1836 Area (km
2) PopDensity
Antigua 1632 35188 282 125
Barbados 1629 105812 430 246
Guyana 1803 66561 11094 6
Jamaica 1655 381951 11234 34
Saint Kitts 1628 21578 191 113
Saint Lucia 1803 17005 630 27
Saint Vincent 1763 26659 386 69
Grenada 1763 17751 341 52
Dominica 1763 16207 772 21
Trinidad 1797 34650 4950 7
Notes: Source: Dippel et al. (2015)
over 100 persons per square kilometre while Guyana and Jamaica had 6 and 34, respec-
tively. The other colonies fell somewhere between the low figure in Guyana and that of
Saint Kitts. In colonies with low labour to land ratios, the governing planter elite faced
a dire labour problem that they sought to rectify through abuse of the political power
to enact repressive policies. These policies, in turn, helped to mitigate the extent of the
labour problem faced by the planters by forcefully increasing their labour supply. Hence,
the proposed bi-causal relationship between labour availability and policy interventions.
Policy Interventions
Interventions by the planter government into the labour market took several forms.
Among the most potent of these interventions was legislation around taxes, immigration
and the police. Phillips (1994, p.1369) identifies twelve types of legislation aimed at
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controlling labour. These laws generally involved legislation around trespassing and
ejectment, the Master and Servants Act of 1838, franchise laws and policing. Other
forms of intervention included the implementation of Apprenticeship (which involved
forced labour for up to eight years after emancipation), taxation, and laws concerning
immigration, specifically indentured labour. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 outline incidents of these
interventions, their duration, severity, and the observed consequences for our five sugar
colonies. We show that intervention of one form or another was present throughout the
colonies but that the degree of severity (ranked as very severe, severe, moderate and
low) varied across colonies and with the extent of the labour problem faced. In Guyana
and Jamaica interventions like indentured migrant labour were present but absent in the
labour-rich colonies of Antigua, Barbados and Saint Kitts. Apprenticeship was rejected
in Antigua and ended early in Barbados and Saint Kitts, before mounting pressure led to
its reluctant end in Jamaica and Guyana. Taxation was comparatively heavy in Guyana
and Jamaica as well. Laws concerning the electoral franchise, prisons and policing served
to restrict access to the franchise from the the masses and so keep repressive labour laws
in operation. The extent of its severity is reflected in the variations of the vote share
observed. While these actions were all influenced by the labour problem at hand, they
in turn affected available labour supply by helping to garner forced or otherwise coerced
labour. Reactions to these interventions varied with the severity with which they (the
interventions) were enforced. There was frequent and violent opposition in Jamaica
and Guyana leading to frequent bouts of social unrest. The planters often responded to
social unrest with more legislation and repressive measures causing interventions to both
determine (and be determined by) social unrest. This is represented by the bi-directional
connection between the second and third nodes of Figure 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Labour Market Interventions: Jamaica and Guyana
Jamaica Guyana
Intervention Description Political, Social and Economic Consequences Implemented? Duration Severity Implemented? Duration Severity
Institution of Apprenticeship
Former slaves were forced to provide unpaid labour
to their former masters for a minimum number
of hours per week.
An increase in the labour supply above what it
would have been under a system of wage labour.
Protests were carried out by former slaves.
Yes 1834-1838
Very severe (Williams, 2001).
The required number of hours was 40.5
and heavy flogging
and other forms of punishment reported.
The island reluctantly ended the system early,
only after pressure from the termination
by Barbados and Saint Kitts.
Yes 1834-1838
Very Severe. The required number
of hours was even 45 and the whip
was in use.
Institution of
Indentured Servitude
Under indentureship, labour was imported, primarily from India,
between 1838 and 1917. Contracts were particularly
oppressive and wages of immigrants were significantly
lower than the market rate so as to put downward pressure
on wages of locals.
An increase in the supply of cheap
labour as indentured servants were
contracted at lower wages for a period
of five years. There was also significant
conflict between immigrants and locals.
Heavy taxation, appropriated from the public
purse, was used to finance immigration.
Yes 1838-1917
Severe. Contracts were very oppressive
and immigration funds diverted resources
from public investment. During the period
over 36,000 migrants were imported.
Yes 1838-1917
Very severe. Guyana had the most indentured
servants. There was constant conflict between
immigrants and locals and as much as 19 percent of
public expenditures was used for immigration
(Adamson, 1972).
Taxation
Various forms of repressive taxation
were put in place to try to coerce labour
back onto the plantations by increasing their
cash demand. The main forms of taxation were
poll taxes, stamp duties, and (most importantly)
import duties.
Increased labour supply by forcing some
labourers back onto the plantations. Generally
reported to have impoverished local peasants.
Yes 1838-1930s
Very severe. The level of taxes rose dramatically
after emancipation and took various forms. In the
1860s import duty on fish and rice was as much
as 30 and 40 percent (Underhill, 1895).
Yes 1838-1930s
Severe. Taxes targeted the labourers and were
generally very high. Duties on fish and rice
were as much as 13 percent (Murray, 1970).
This helped to further impoverish the poor and
force them back onto the plantation, increasing
their supply of cheap labour.
Legislation Regarding
Trespassing and Ejectment
Former slaves could be ejected from their birth homes
after a week’s notice. Failure to vacate would lead to
imprisonment. The idea behind this was to prevent
peasants from buying land and force them to provide
regular labour to the estates in exchange for tenancy.
Rents would then be deducted from their wages, thus
securing regular labour and lower
real wages (Paget and Farley, 1964).
This served to temporarily increase the labour
supply and reduce the wages that planters had
to pay.
Yes 1839-1900sin various forms
Very severe. Rents charged were as much as
48 percent of wages (Bolland, 1981). Yes
1839-early
1900s
Severe. Although peasants could continue to
occupy dwellings for free in exchange for
labour, efforts to restrict acquisition of land by
peasants were intense. DaCosta (2007) notes
the colonial origins of the high
concentration of land ownership in Guyana
versus the wide dispersion in Barbados after emancipation.
Master and Servant Acts
Passed by all Caribbean governments in
the post-emancipation era, these acts sought
to regulate labour relations to the great disadvantage
of the workers.
Helped to maintain a more steady
supply of labour for planters through
repressive contracts. Frequently caused
arrests of workmen for minor breaches
and generated many disputes.
Yes Up to 1939
Very Severe. In Jamaica, the Master and
Servant Act allowed planters to legally repress
workers, using the police and prisons to enforce
the repressive terms of contracts.
Yes. Up to 1939
Very Severe. Guyana, like Jamaica, relied heavily
on such legislation as the abundant supply of land
meant that freemen were not willing to commit to
plantation labour. Punishment for minor
breaches were common and regular (Murray, 1970).
Franchise Laws
Laws concerning electoral franchise
were another source of power for the
planter in coercing labour onto plantations.
By ensuring that former slaves were unable
to vote, planters guaranteed their monopoly
power on laws concerning labour and policing.
Frequently caused social unrest leading,
to economic problems. In addition, planter
interest, not that of the general public,
continued to dominate economic policy
as we have seen in Chapter 1.
Yes 1838-1930s
Very Severe. Much of the population was
ineligible to vote several decades after
emancipation. In 1861 only 0.41 percent of the
population was registered to vote.
Figures for this intervention are from
Murray (1970, p.56).
Yes 1838-1930s
Very severe. Much like Jamaica, most of the
population was ineligible to vote until after the
1930s. In 1881 only 0.52 percent was registered to vote.
Prison and Policing
The planters use the police and legal system of
prisons and courts to coerce the population back
onto the plantations. Imprisonment was regularly
used to punish small infractions against repressive
vagrancy laws, breaches of contract and other
offenses defined by the planter legislature through
police and prisons acts.
This was a source of great conflict in the
West Indies. Bolland (1981) cites policing
as one of the crucial elements for increasing
planter labour supply and suppressing labour
rebellions. Such aggressive policing often
caused social and political unrest.
Yes 1834-onward
Very severe. The governments use of police to
shepherd a labour supply was perhaps
the most aggressive in the
West Indies. Anderson and Killingray (1991)
note that annual policing bills were
specifically used to prevent the peasant from
marketing his crops.
Yes 1834-onward
Severe. The extent of the labour problem in
Guyana, being similar to that of Jamaica, meant that
policing was needed to effectively coerce both locals
and indentured immigrants.
Notes: The details of interventions are from various sources, including Phillips (1994), the Colonial Blue Books of British Caribbean Colonies (1836-1945), Bolland (1981) and Underhill (1895).
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Table 2.3: Labour Market Interventions: Antigua, Barbados & St. Kitts
Barbados Antigua Saint Kitts
Intervention Description Political, Social and Economic Consequences Implemented? Duration Severity Implemented? Duration Severity Implemented? Duration Severity
Institution of Apprenticeship
Former slaves were forced to provide unpaid labour
to their former masters for a minimum number
of hours per week.
An increase in the labour supply above what it
would have been under a system of wage labour.
Protests were carried out by former slaves.
Yes 1834-1837
Low. Corporal punishment
was almost nonexistent
and the system
worked better for both
planter and former
slave than it did in
Jamaica (Hovey, 1838).
No - - Yes 1834-1838
Moderate. Some protest
action was reported in
the early days of
apprenticeship but the
system was generally
less severe. The island joined
Barbados in ending the
system early.
Institution of
Indentured Servitude
Under indentureship labour was imported, primarily from India,
between 1838 and 1918. Contracts were particularly
oppressive and wages of immigrants were significantly
lower than the market rate so as to put downward
pressure on wages of locals.
An increase in the supply of cheap
labour as indentured servants were
contracted at lower wages for a period
of five years. There was also significant
conflict between immigrants and locals.
Heavy taxation, appropriated from the public
purse, was used to finance immigration.
No - - No - - No - -
Taxation
Various forms of repressive taxation
were put in place to try to coerce labour
back onto the plantations by increasing their
cash demand. The main forms of taxation were
poll taxes, stamp duties, and (most importantly)
import duties.
Increased labour supply by forcing some
labourers back onto the plantations. Generally
reported to have impoverished local peasants.
Yes 1838-1930s
Low. The import duties
in Barbados,
for example, were reported
to be 6.5 percent on fish
and rice (Murray, 1970),
compared to the 13 percent in Guyana
and the rate of 40 percent in Jamaica.
Yes 1838-1930s
Low. Import duties, for example, compared
favourably with that of Jamaica and Guyana.
In the 1860s the import duty on fish
and rice were only 66 percent and
16.6 percent that of Jamaica, respectively,
according to calculations from the Colonial
Statistical Tables (1870).
Yes 1838-1930s
Low. In Saint Kitts as well,
import duties, for example,
compared favourably with that
of Jamaica and Guyana.
In the 1860s the import
duty on fish and rice were
both 33 percent that of Jamaica.
Legislation Regarding
Trespassing & Ejectment
Former slaves could be ejected from their birth homes
after a week’s notices. Failure to vacate would lead to
imprisonment. The idea behind this was to prevent
peasants from buying land and force them to provide
regular labour to the estates in exchange for tenancy.
Rents would then be deducted from their wages
thus securing regular labour and lower
real wages(Paget and Farley, 1964).
This served to temporarily increase the labour
supply and reduce the wages that planters had
to pay.
Yes 1839- early1900s
Low. Rents charged were
around 20 percent of wages
and workers often occupied
homes rent free (Bolland, 1981).
Yes 1839- onward invarious forms
Low. Issues concerning
ejectment and trespassing
were comparatively
rare on the island.
Yes 1839- onwardsin various forms
Low. Similar to the
situation in Antigua.
Master and Servant Acts
Passed by all Caribbean governments in
the post-emancipation era, these acts sought
to regulate labour relations to the great disadvantage
of the workers.
Helped to maintain a more steady
supply of labour for planters through
repressive contracts. Frequently caused
arrests of workmen for minor breaches
and generated many disputes.
Yes Up to 1939
Moderate. These acts were
also enforced in
Barbados, but were far
less repressive than acts in
Jamaica. With workers
willing supplying labour to
the estates as their outside
options were few, the
Barbadian planters did not need to
rely too heavily on such
coercion.
Yes Up to 1939 Moderate. Similar toBarbados. Yes Up to 1939
Moderate. Similar to
Barbados.
Franchise Laws
Laws concerning electoral franchise
were another source of power for the
planter in coercing labour onto plantations.
By ensuring that former slaves were unable
to vote, planters guaranteed their monopoly
power on laws concerning labour and policing.
Frequently caused social unrest, leading
to economic problems. In addition, planter
interest, not that of the general public,
continued to dominate economic policy (Murray, 1970).
Yes 1838-1930s
Moderate. Comparatively significantly
better than Jamaica and
Guyana. In 1887
the ratio of enfranchised
to total population
in Barbados was close to
three times that of
Guyana.
Yes 1838-1930s Moderate. Comparatively much betterthan Jamaica and Guyana. Yes 1838-1930s
Comparatively better than
Jamaica and Guyana.
Even in 1855 the ratio of
individuals registered to
vote to the total
population was twice
what Jamaica was able to achieve
in 1864.
Prison and Policing
The planters used the police and legal system of
prisons and courts to coerce the population back
onto the plantations. Imprisonment was regularly
used to punish small infractions against repressive
vagrancy laws, breaches of contract and other
offenses defined by the planter legislature through
police and prisons acts.
This was a source of great conflict in the
West Indies. Bolland (1981) cites policing
as one of the crucial elements for increasing
planter labour supply and suppressing labour
rebellions. Such aggressive policing often
caused social and political unrest.
Yes 1834-onward
Moderate. In a post-
emancipation society, even
in the colonies with adequate
labour, aggressive policing
was still needed. In this regard
the colony of Barbados was
not remarkably different from Guyana,
though with fewer rebellions,
Barbadian society was more
cohesive in their relationship
with planter police.
Yes 1834-onward Moderate. Similar to Barbados. Yes 1848 onward Moderate. Similar toBarbados.
Notes: The details of interventions are from various sources including, Phillips (1994), the Colonial Blue Books of British Caribbean Colonies (1836-1945), Bolland (1981) and Underhill (1895).
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Conflict and Social Unrest
Inevitably, responses to oppressive labour extraction varied with the degree of op-
pression exerted and the individual characteristic of the colonies. Throughout the post-
emancipation period and up to the end of colonisation, the history of the British West
Indies was punctuated with bursts of revolt, collective action and defiance through var-
ious means. Bolland (1995) provides a comprehensive account of the series of labour
rebellions that populate the history of the British West Indies. There existed some form
of labour unrest every year throughout the West Indian colonies. Bolland identifies
three serious waves of rebellion in the century after emancipation and up to indepen-
dence. These waves occurred in the periods 1895-1910, 1917-1925 and 1934-1939. Citing
the persistence of planter domination and labourer subordination which continued to
characterise labour relations in the colonial period, Bolland (1995, p.3) concludes that
“the labour relationship. . . [carried with it the] old traditions of resistance to slavery”
which served as a “basis for new tactics and the emergence of a new political culture.”
As has been the theme of this thesis, we identify that, conspicuously, some of the sugar
colonies had significantly higher levels of rebellion than others. Bolland identifies ten
serious disturbances in the five sugar colonies between 1884 and 1905. Of these ten,
five occurred in Jamaica (1884, 1894, 1895, 1901 and 1902) and four in Guyana (1889,
1896, 1903 and 1905) with the solitary one, among the densely populated sugar colonies,
occurring in Saint Kitts in 1896. Barbados and Antigua were completely free of any
serious disturbances in that period. Prior to that period, the most significant labour
rebellion occurred in Jamaica in 1865 and was followed by strikes in 1867, 1868 and
1878. Consistenly, these strikes “were directed against low wages” (Bolland, 1995, p.7).
Other rebellions in 1901 and 1902 occurred over land and taxes that labourers found
particularly oppressive towards their class. These rebellions often ended with several
fatalities and other injuries, with survivors sentenced to lengthy imprisonment of up to
seven years.
As for Guyana, Bolland (1995, p.12) describes the rebellions occurring in the colony
between 1889 and culminating with the Ruimveldt Riots of 1905 as “some of the largest
and most persistent disturbances.” Guyana also experienced “the most serious (rebel-
lions) in the British Caribbean in the period before the first World War” (Bolland, 1995,
p.14). Figures indicate that 100 disturbances classified as strikes or riots occurred be-
tween 1886 and 1889. Prior to this period, disturbances, like the one in Leonora in
1869, were of a smaller scale and often unorganised. Just as it had been in Jamaica,
in Guyana, in all periods from emancipation to 1938, the rebellions were lit with the
recurring theme of “de facto wage reductions and intensified exploitation” (Bolland,
1995, p.15). As for the densely populated territories, Barbados and Antigua were con-
sistently the most peaceful of the sugar colonies. One would have expected that, with
the population pressure and low wages that prevailed in these colonies, rebellions would
be frequent. Speaking of the two territories, Bolland (1995, p.111 and p.166) notes their
description: “Barbados has a reputation for being orderly and conservative” and An-
tigua was “one of the quieter areas of the regions.” When there was activity in Antigua,
it was duly described as “labour unrest, though not a labour rebellion” (Bolland, 1995,
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p.166). Furthermore, even in Saint Kitts, where a few rebellions did occur, the numbers
were significantly less than in Guyana and Jamaica. This is indicative of the fact that,
puzzlingly, the more densely populated areas where, in theory, the labourer should face
the lowest wages, were the most peaceful of the sugar societies. Cundall (1906) was
one of the first pieces of literature to comprehensively document instances of serious
disturbances in the British West Indies during the first 75 years after emancipation. In
Table 2.4 we present an overview of all the major disturbances in the five main sugar
colonies (between 1838 and 1906) as outlined by Cundall (1906). The table details the
year, type of conflict, reported cause of the conflict and outcomes of the conflict. There
were in fact many more disturbances such as strikes throughout the period, as we have
noted above, but those listed in our table are viewed in the historical literature as the
most serious during the first 75 years.
Of all thirteen major disturbances identified during the period, only two occurred
in the labour-rich colonies and even in one of those two, the cause was not labour
related. The disturbance in Barbados in 1876 was, contrary to the theme of resistance
to government in the labour-scarce colonies, in support of the form of government and
the constitution by which the island had always been governed. In terms of the rest of the
disturbances, what is interesting to highlight is that the reported cause of all disturbances
bares some resemblance to the modes of intervention identified in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
Many of the disturbances had their origins in issues of wages, immigration, policing
and political repression. In Guyana in particular, the wages issues were central, while
political and policing causes were often the catalyst for riot and rebellion in Jamaica.
The final column details some of the outcomes observed in the immediate aftermath
of these disturbances. Invariably, the result was often imprisonment, loss of life and
the erosion of social cohesion. In a few instances, wage reductions were won, but the
full outcomes of each incident cannot be precisely identified in the short-term. This is
because the effects of such persistent unrest are cumulative and can only be fully realised
in the long-term institutional changes which took place. In this sense, social unrest
both as a response to and a cause of the policy interventions identified above, led to
institutional change which has persisted today. In turn, the quality of institutions which
developed during the colonial period, the nature of the law and legal system, labour
and land institutions also had a significant role to play in stirring resentment, animosity
and social unrest, a feature represented by the bi-directional relationship between social
unrest and institutional quality identified in Figure 2.2.
Beyond the incidences of unrest documented above, the labour unrest of the 1930s
deserves special mention, perhaps representing the culmination of the long history of
repression and unrest around the labour problem in the colonies. During this time,
there was an unrest of some form in all five of the sugar colonies. Work by Bolland
(2001) has identified several causes of the 1930s labour rebellions, including low wages,
the restrictions on collective bargaining, political repression under franchise laws, and
general economic distress. The earliest outbreaks of what would become a region-wide
rebellion was documented by Hart (2002) to have occurred in Guyana and Jamaica in
1934 and 1935, respectively. In Guyana a Leonora Plantation strike in Demarara in
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Table 2.4: Major Disturbances in the British Sugar Colonies 1838-1905
Country Year Type Conflict Cause Outcomes
Jamaica 1841 Riot
Wilmot (1990) has linked the
root cause of this festival day
riot to political conflict and the planters’
quest to coerce labour.
There were at least two deaths
and several individuals were wounded.
The army was called out and the riot
was suppressed. Public investment share
of total expenditure fell 1.8 percentage
points the following year. Wages increased
by 4.1 percent
Guyana 1856 Riot
Anti-Portuguese immigration sentiment.
According to Chan (1970), locals
regarded the Portuguese as a threat to
the level of wages.
Several were killed and several more
were wounded. The riot left an even
more fractured relationship between
the immigrants and locals. There was no
change in the wage rate reported the
following year, immigration expenditure
share went up from 7 to 10 percent.
Jamaica 1859 Riot
Resistance to taxation. Since emancipation
the planters had consistently levied higher
taxes on the peasant population to finance
plantation interests. Sherlock and Bennett (1998)
notes that the tollage was another such tax
and it incited a fierce resistance.
No official numbers on the wounded
and injured could be cited, but the riot
was very serious and spread to several
areas. The riots was part of the eventually
successful effort to repeal the toll gate
legislation in 1863.
Jamaica 1859 Riot
Trespass. The result of the active Trespass
and Ejectment act, the riot came about from
a dispute over ownership of land claimed by
a peasant farmer.
Three were killed and several others were injured.
The militia was called in and by the time
the riot was quelled there were
over 100 arrests. Wages fell 27 percent
but public investment share grew
by 1.3 percentage points the following year. Policing expenditure
share also grew from 7 to 8 percent.
Jamaica 1865 Rebellion
Political dissatisfaction. The black and coloured
population had grown increasingly frustrated with
the governing planter elite’s suppression of their
political rights and franchise, and their partiality to
plantation interests. This boiled over into the worst
rebellion in the post-emancipation era.
The worst rebellion since emancipation. 608
individuals were killed and 34 others were
injured. This rebellion led to the successful
overthrow of the oligarchic planter government,
and the institution of a new, fairer constitution.
An immediate increase in public investment
in education, health and infrastructure was evident.
Public investment share grew from 6 percent to 19 percent,
policing expenditure share of total expenditure
also grew by 1.3 percentage points the following year.
Barbados 1876 Disturbances
Political resistance. Cundall (1906) describes this
as an unusual case in the West Indies where the people
sided with the planter government against the imperial
legislation for the creation of the one federative governing
body for all of the Windward Islands.
At least 40 individuals were killed or wounded. These
disturbances and the sentiment that accompanied them
eventually won over and Barbados left the Federation in
1885.
Guyana 1889 Riot
Anti-Portuguese sentiment. According to Cundall (1906),
this riot was indicative of the tension between the two
factions (local blacks and immigrants) since the 1856
riot mentioned above.
Five individuals were shot in the riot which
lasted four days. The relationship between
the two worsened, adding to the social
tensions existing in the Guyanese society
at the time. There was no change in the wage
rate reported the following year.
Jamaica 1894 Riot
Anti-police sentiment. A few regional soldiers and civilians
joined together in rioting against the police force on the
island. The police had historically been used as a coercive
apparatus by the state’s planter-government and so, sentiment
toward law enforcement was always negative.
Several individuals were wounded and the tension between
the public and police worsened. No real change in
public investment share, policing expenditure share, or
wages.
Saint Kitts 1896 Riot
Anti-Portuguese sentiment. Black workers felt that they were
being cheated out of wages by a Portuguese estate owner.
Their anger evolved into widespread discontent in the city of
Basseterre where they burned and looted Portuguese-owned
property.
At least 4 people were killed and 150 were arrested. Resentment
toward the Portuguese population grew.
Guyana 1896 Riot
Dissatisfaction with wages. In response to a reduction in
wages on sugar estates, the population of indentured
immigrants rioted, burning down cane-fields.
3 persons were killed and an unknown number
were injured. The government intervened
to stop an inquest into the unrest
by stipendiary magistrates who were charged
with looking after the welfare of labourers.
There was no change in the wage rate
reported the following year.
Jamaica 1902 Riot
Anti-police sentiment. The decades of tension between
the police who were seen as the enforcement arm of the
plantation class and the black population culminated in
a riot over the treatment of civilians by the police. According
to Cundall (1906), the riot was also connected to resistance
to an impending property law tax.
2 individuals were killed and 9 were injured. The relationship
between the legal system and the black population continued to
fray. Public investment share also rose by 3 percentage
points the following year. No change in policing share.
Guyana 1903 Riot
Dissatisfaction with wages. The riot began on a plantation in
Berbice and was in connection to the perceived efforts of
plantation owners to lower workmen wages.
5 individuals were killed and many more were injured.
Resentment toward the plantation class among the working
population grew. Wage rate remained the same
the following year.
Guyana 1905 Riot
Dissatisfaction with wages. Wage discontent started with wharf
workers but soon spread to the Ruimveldt
estate, along with widespread anger from the
labouring class.
Over 148 person were arrested, 8 killed and 103 were injured.
The state relied on the police force who were also attacked and
injured, worsening the animosity between the police and workers.
2 British warships with soldiers arrived to quell the riots.
No reported change in wage rate resulted the next year.
Notes: The sources of data on the occurrence of disturbances is Cundall (1906). Data from the Caribbean Colonial Blue Books for the country in question and the year after the conflict was used to
calculate changes to wages and government spending where mentioned. See appendix for references.
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September 1934 was immediate followed by a strike involving 2,000 workers at Uitflugt
Plantation. Before the unrest could settle, this was followed by another strike on Booker
Plantation and shortly after, in 1935 another strike on the Leonora Plantation which
Hart (2002) attributes to a demand to reverse a wage reduction which occurred in 1930.
The strikes in Jamaica started in 1935 on a banana plantation. This triggered a period
of the most prolonged and serious disturbances on the island since 1865 (Bolland, 1995).
These strikes spread throughout the Caribbean and lasted until 1939 by which time
many deaths had occurred, but discussions had began and progress made toward new
franchise and trade union laws which led to full democratisation in the 1940s and 50s in
most territories. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in Section 2.5.1, the quality of these
institutions, once established, and the nature of institutional change still reflected the
persistence of the ills of the historical labour struggle.
Institutions
We have already established that institutions were both a response to and a cause
of social unrest. In this section we look more closely at the final node in our chain of
causation, institutions and economic development.
In the post-emancipation period, “the former masters sought new forms of [labour]
coercion [while] the former slaves sought new forms of freedom” (Bolland, 1981, p.592).
The extent to which the objectives of the planter elite and the former slaves were at odds
depended heavily on the labour problem. Where labour was scarce relative to land, for-
mer slaves saw opportunities to engage in productive life outside the plantations. Where
labour was plentiful and land scarce, the former slaves depended on the plantations for
steady work. Working on the plantations was, therefore, mutually beneficial for planter
and former slave in these territories. The historical record tells that in the former case
(where labour was scarce), economic, legal and political institutions, and social stability
were much worse off than in the former case.
Labour Institutions
Perhaps the most affected by the history of slavery, the set of labour institutions
which developed in the post-emancipation period carried lasting consequences for labour
relations and economic development in the Caribbean region. Among those institutions
was Apprenticeship. Apprenticeship was instituted as further oppression in attempt to
retain near complete control of the population across the British West Indies. Under
this institution, former slaves were required to supply 40 hours of unpaid labour to their
former masters. During these 40 hours, the planter was to provide apprentices with
the customary rations that they received as slaves, and any labour provided surplus
to this mandatory time was to be compensated. Holt (1992, p.56) writes that “the
relationship between the planter and the worker was much the same as that between
master and servant” during apprenticeship. This relationship was legislated to last for a
maximum period of six years as the former slaves transitioned into ‘proper citizens.’ The
introduction of apprenticeship proved the first significant institutional divergence among
the West Indian colonies. Planters in labour-rich Antigua rejected the system outright
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and proceeded to full emancipation. In contrast, planters in low colonial population
density territories aggressively and often violently guarded the new system to prevent
further loss of their property than that which had already been suffered at emancipation.
The Jamaican plantocracy moved to intensify the level of repression of the labourers,
increasing the severity of their tasks while taking away their consignments, “insisting
that people who demanded their freedom should be deprived the indulgences of slavery.”
(Green, 1991, p.132).
In addition, while the use of the whip was retired in labour-rich colonies, Jamaica
and Guyana retained the use of the whip during apprenticeship, as a coercive instrument
with which to extract compliance from the apprentices. This practice was indicative of
more aggressive institutional labour repression which would become rampant in the
colonies where labour shortage was a major concern. The potential for higher degrees of
institutionalised oppression in low colonial population density territories was evident as
early as 1840 and was expressed by Green (1991, p.136) when speaking about Jamaica.
He commented that “even insolence by an apprentice towards superiors could serve as
sufficient cause for whipping when a presiding magistrate was in collusion with local
planters.” This collusion between magistrates, who were supposed to protect the labour-
ers, and the planters was not rare but was indeed the norm. Green (1991, p.141) notes
that the view of magistrates across the colony was that they amounted to little more
than purchased instruments of the planters, who they [the planters] “lavishly patronized”
and even in rare cases where the magistrates refused (as in the case of Guyana’s J. A.
Allen), they were “threatened and even prosecuted on the planters’ behalf on a variety
of trumped up charges.” Green (1991, p.141) laments that these practices resulted in
the judicial system of these labour-scarce colonies being discouraged from “too zealous
a defence of the rights of apprentices.”
The events contrasted starkly with the outright rejection of apprenticeship by An-
tigua and the decision to terminate the system early by Barbados and Saint Kitts. Green
(1991, p.160) explains that this decision was taken for economic practicality as “the losses
which planters anticipated by early termination were more tolerable” than the cost of
the system. This served as early indication of the tone that labour relations (which
was in part and parcel ubiquitous with West Indian life) would take in high density
colonies as opposed to that in low density colonies. When these two colonies did decide
to end the Apprenticeship system, it was because the decision of Antigua, Barbados and
Saint Kitts to terminate the system made it incumbent upon the labour-scarce colonies
to do the same as it eroded critical support for the system and rendered its abolition
inevitable. “A submission [that] was distinguished by an unparalleled expression of rage
[by the Jamaican planters]” (Green, 1991, p.159).
Following the end of apprenticeship, Indentured Servitude was instituted by the
planters of labour-scarce Guyana and Jamaica. The planters in Barbados, Saint Kitts,
and Antigua found that such an institution was unnecessary in their colonies. This form
of labour institution proved a potent form of labour reppression. Under the indentured
labour scheme, from 1834 to 1918, over 500 000 immigrants, primarily from India and
China, were brought to the West Indies, to labour under specified contractual terms. The
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Table 2.5: (Indentured) Migrants into the British Caribbean Sugar Colonies
Source of Migration Destination of ImmigrantsAntigua Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Kitts
India (1838-1918) - - 238,909 36,412 -
Madeira (1835-81) 2,527 - 32,216 379 2085
Africa (1834-67) - - 14,060 11,391 455
China (1852-84) 100 - 13,533 1,152 -
Europe (1834-1845) - - 381 4,087 -
Other (1835-67) - - 1,868 519 -
Total 2,627 - 300,967 53,940 2877
Source: Roberts and Byrne (1966, p.127).
motivation for this method of oppression rested purely in the intentions of the planter
oligarchy to guarantee themselves a category of persons who were legally bound to the
plantation. Table 2.5 details the statistics concerning indentured arrivals to the British
West Indies.3
It is unsurprising that of the five main sugar colonies, Jamaica and Guyana took
99.8 percent of the indentured servants while it was virtually absent in the labour-rich
colonies. By 1911, six years before indentureship ended, 40 percent of the Guyanese
population was made up of indentured servants and their descendants (Bulmer-Thomas,
2012). Though this form of recruitment was not enough to significantly alter the labour
to land ratio faced by the planter, it was effective in securing him cheap labour through
stringent contract specifications. The initial terms of the contract required nine to ten
hours of work per day (two more than was required from apprentice during that time)
for a wage of 16 cents plus food allowances, compared to the 32 cents daily wage of the
emancipated worker (Adamson, 1972). Contracts were stipulated for a period of five
years.
Historians describe indentured labour in the West Indies as an oppressive institution
for several reasons. The treatment of indentured servants have been described as being as
inhumane as slaves.4 There were several reasons for this. First, the scheme was heavily
financed from public revenue extracted from the non-planting population. Adamson
(1972, p.107) notes that, in order to finance the deficits created during the indentured
period, the planter dominated legislature increased direct taxes while lowering the export
tax on their sugar produce. He notes that the new tax ordinance doubled the tax and
excise on goods consumed in high frequency by the emancipated workforce. Figures
from the period indicate that the cost of the indentured scheme at once amounted to
19.7 percent of public revenue. In effect, the ex-slaves were paying for their replacements.
Secondly, indentured labour was particular oppressive to the servants. Controls
governing labour and earnings changed regularly in favour of the planters (Adamson,
3Table 2.5 is sourced from Roberts and Byrne (1966).
4The death rate among indentured workers peaked at 64.8 per thousand in 1861-63 according to
Adamson (1972).
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1972). An example of this is the abolition of the right to commute which usually came at
the end of the third year of indentured servitude.5 The planters argued that commutation
deprived them the benefits of having trained their servants who would then turn away
and accept higher contracts from other plantations. In response, the plantocracy took
action to eliminate this possibility and further established re-indenture at the end of the
initial contract, without the possibility of changing employers for the servants (Adamson,
1972). An 1870 Commission of Inquiry described this as a means of keeping indentured
servants “as a whole out of the free labour market.”6 The constraints were not limited
to the control of movement. Adamson (1972, p.11) notes that, 56 percent of indentured
servants were not earning the legal weekly minimum wage. This is exacerbated by the
fact that indentured workers earned about half as much as the creole field workers.
Enforcement of these oppressive labour terms was also engrained in the political and
legislative institutions of the Guyana and Jamaica. Adamson (1972, p.11) comments
that as a result of his broad legislative power and vaguely defined laws, the planter was
able to wield a legal weapon over his indentured servants, sufficiently potent to obtain a
conviction against them “every week and any week in the year.” He argues that this served
to physically contain the indentured workforce and force them into accepting lower wages,
deplorable working conditions and prevent desertion and strike. Planters often changed
the laws governing the work ordinance under which the indentured servants had been
contracted, to their benefit. The effect of these changes often amounted to a doubling
of the duration of prison sentences (Adamson, 1972). It was no comfort that there was
a sharp contrast between the available instruments for prosecution of the indentured
workforce and the forms of protection offered to this vulnerable population. Even where
the indentured workforce was able to bring a matter against a planter, the case was to
be heard by two Justices of the Peace, who were themselves planters.7 Indeed, by its end
in 1917, the effect of the indentured scheme was not only the institutional oppression of
a large share of the population, but also the ethnic fragmentation of the society of these
colonies. Undoubtedly, the length and severity of such a system had lasting effects on
the culture of labour relations, and labour institutions in these territories.
The forms and nature of labour relations highlighted above explain the puzzling re-
lationship between sugar prices and wages, observed in the post emancipation period.
In Figure 2.3, we plot an index of wages against an index of sugar prices in the sugar
colonies for the 40-year period following emancipation.8 Our theory in Section 2.3 sug-
gests that the planter class used their power and wealth to depress wages. As a result,
increases in the wealth and power of the planter class should be followed by reductions
in wages. The main source of planter wealth was revenue from sugar. Increases in the
price of sugar are thus expected to increase planter wealth. According to our theory,
5Indentured servants were initially allowed to pay a fixed sum of money to terminate their contracts
early.
6Page 72 of the Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Treatment of Immigrants
in British Guiana. See the primary sources bibliography for full citation.
7Adamson (1972) found that it was normal for even independent magistrates to contrive with planters
to abuse labour laws.
8Data for Saint Kitts was unavailable.
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in low density colonies with dire labour problems, this will likely result in a lowering of
wages. In this way, the planter is able to subvert the free labour market, and we may
fail to observe the standard economic relationship in which an increase in the price of
a commodity results in and increase in the wages of workers involved in its production.
The relationships in Figure 2.3 reveal this puzzle in our low historical population density
colonies.
Figure 2.3: The Sugar Colonies: Wage and Prices Index Comparison
(a) Jamaica (b) Guyana
(c) Antigua (d) Barbados
Source: Bulmer-Thomas (2012)
A visual inspection of these graphs immediately reveals two things. First, the price
of sugar series leads that of wages. Secondly, there is a major difference in the rela-
tionship between the two indices, between the low and high colonial population density
territories. For Jamaica and Guyana (our low population density colonies), the two in-
dices seem to move in contrast with each other. That is, for Jamaica and Guyana, there
appears to be a negative association between the price of sugar on the world market
and wages of local agricultural workers. Specifically, when the price of sugar on the
world market increases, this increase is not passed on as an increase in wages for local
labourers. Instead, workers’ wages seem to fall. The opposite may be observed when
we examine the relationship for our high colonial population density territories, Antigua
and Barbados. There, the two indices seem to move in tandem. Increases in the price of
sugar on the world market are followed by increases in local agricultural workers’ wages.
To ascertain the existence of these associations, we calculate the Pearson Correlation
Coefficient for the two indices, for each of our four colonies. We found that a significant
negative correlation existed between the price of sugar index and agricultural wage index
for Jamaica (−0.328) and Guyana (−0.132), but a positive and significant relationship
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was present in Antigua (0.677) and Barbados (0.322). These differences support our
theory that explains the puzzle as being the result of responses to the contrasting labour
situations existent in the colonies. This directly relates back to our findings in Chap-
ter 1, where we showed that the wage manipulation efforts of the planter led to labour
market relationships between wages and prices that was counter to standard economic
theory. There were political, thus, political economy channels in operation. We reasoned
that when sugar is doing well, the planters’ relative wealth and power improves and, in
colonies with labour problems, he is incentivised to use that wealth to artificially reduce
the wages of labourers. The opposite occurs when sugar market conditions turn against
his sugar commodity. On the contrary, in the colonies free from labour problems, the
significant positive correlations between sugar performance and wages display the stan-
dard free economy relationship of higher wages with increased sugar price. We reason,
therefore, that in contrast to the labour-scarce colonies of Jamaica and Guyana, a free
labour market was in operation in the labour-rich colonies. The absence of a free labour
market in Jamaica and Guyana, and its presence in Barbados and Antigua, we conclude,
has hurt the economic development of these two large territories relative to the latter
two islands.
Land and Property Rights Institutions
With the eventual termination of apprenticeship, planters seeking to control their
labour required new instruments. Coincidentally, that which motivated the introduction
of slave labour to the West Indies was still the central issue that divided the response
of the powerful elite in the low and high colonial population density territories. As
long as territories were sufficiently scarcely populated, land was accessible outside the
plantations, and the wage necessary to induce labour to remain on the plantations would
be well beyond the profit maximising level. Coercion (physical and institutional) was
therefore necessary. In the post-emancipation period, this meant that labour was forced
to live in a society with conditions akin to that of slavery. While in Barbados, Antigua
and Saint Kitts, the population was plentiful and land scarce, the situation was the
reverse in Jamaica and Guyana. Planters therefore needed extreme measures to force
labour onto the plantations. They quickly reasoned that this would also require control of
the availability of land. This was the fundamental source of the tension that would arise
between the existing planter class and newly freed men during the transition to wage
labour. Paradoxically, this transition amounted to nothing more than the transition
from one system of labour control to another, lasting over a century.
Lord Howick anticipated the need for land control on the eve of emancipation.9. He
notes:
The emancipation of the slaves in Jamaica. . . and British Guyana if un-
qualified by any corrective provisions, would at once bring them into the state
already described as characteristic of the inhabitants of countries imperfectly
settled. If at liberty to follow their own inclination, it may be confidently
9See page 168 of the appendix to the Fourth Report From the Select Committee on Sugar and Coffee
Planting. See bibliography containing primary sources for full appendix.
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predicted that they would not be allured from the occupation of land, to en-
gage in steady cultivation and manufacture of sugar for any wage the planter
could offer them... Where soil is capable of cultivation would support a num-
ber of persons far more numerous than the actual inhabitants, large tracts
of good land are unappropriated. . . Even those who are totally destitute of
capital may purchase on very easy terms. . . The natural tendency and the
invariable result of this state of things is to raise wages on manual labour far
beyond what may be termed the proper level.
The words of British Lords at the time mirrored the attitude of the colonial office which
sympathised with planter’s plight and argued for the development of land policy to
control labour. Lord Glenelg, quoted in Holt (1992, p.72), recommended that action be
taken to prevent squatting of public land and that land prices should be raised sufficiently
high so as to price lands “out of the reach of persons without capital.” This sort of land
control was duly followed by the planters who collectively refused to sell land to the
labouring population and actively sought laws which restricted the sale and purchase
of land to/by the labouring classes of Jamaica and Guyana. In 1850, for example, the
planters restricted access to land with a law that placed land out of the reach of the
labouring class by introducing heavy taxation on plots of land sold to groups of ten or
more individuals in Guyana. Because the labourers could not generate the capital (on
their own or in too small a group) to purchase land, this strategy was specifically aimed
at ensuring that they could not collectively own land either. In 1938, the effects of these
laws were still in operation. Stanley Engerman in Sheridan (1996, p.306) noted that the
planters were aware that “without the coercion created by the absence of free land, few
ex-slaves would be willing to work for others.” To remedy this problem, in low density
areas where plenty of land was available, “the land tax . . . was intended to raise the cost
and increase difficulties in land acquisition starting in 1836 and continuing until well into
the twentieth century” (Engerman in Sheridan (1996, p.301)). Engerman identifies the
words of Lord Howick as a telling example of the intentions of much of the land policy
designed in the West Indies in the post emancipation era: “. . . in order to pay this tax
or this rent, the Negroes will be under necessity of working for hire in the cane-field.”10
This example of institutionalised coercion typified much of the policies adopted where
land to labour ratios were not favourable to the planter elite. This form of systematic
repression resulted in the under-development of land tenure regimes in land abundant
territories. In high colonial population density territories like Antigua and Barbados,
virtually all land was already owned and the need for such institutional oppression was
not so great. There was also wide-spread legal land ownership on legal freehold which
ensured and sustained the development of far superior land tenure institutions which
could be inherited in the post-colonial period.
In Jamaica and Guyana, the persistence of these land tenure institutions which de-
veloped as an oppressive and coercive instrument of the planter, is highlighted by Besson
(2003) and Palmie´ (1995). The authors observe that the land tenure policy today, both
10Lord Howick as quoted by Engerman in Sheridan (1996, p.308).
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legal and unofficial, has its origins primarily in the culture of slavery which defined the
19th century. Besson (2003, p.39) credits the dual land regime existing in the West Indies
today, described by a coexistence of an official land tenure regime with roots in Euro-
pean land law, and an “unofficial family land regime among emancipated slaves and their
descendants.” The prevalence of family land “constituted an informal and extra-legal in-
stitution outside the bounds of colonial law” and was particularly high in low density
territories (Olwig, 1995, p.3). Besson (2003, p.41) notes: “like Jamaica, British Guiana
(now Guyana), the largest of the British Caribbean territories, manifested themes of
post slavery village settlements including unofficial land tenures originating in slave cul-
ture and reflected the constraining impact of state/planter legislation on the flight from
the estates.” So entrenched was planter land restriction policy in the land tenure system
of the modern Caribbean that both the 1897 Royal Commission and, thirty-three years
later, the Moyne Commission, set up to address labour unrest in the British West In-
dies in the 1930s, made explicit recommendation that land policy reform be an essential
feature in resolving the contemporary social and economic ills of the West Indies.11 The
persistence of repressive land institutions was also recognised by Stolberg and Wilmot
(1992) who showed that these constraints in land settlement schemes lasted, and were
evident even up to the post-colonial period. One of the economically paralysing facts
about unofficial land tenure is that it is an “unofficial transformation of official freehold
tenure” which implies that this form of land tenure was absent of legal documentation
and other modes of legally satisfactory validation (Besson, 2003, p.47) . This made
land relatively indivisible in property rights and thus could not be leveraged by an in-
dividual for credit, rendering the tenure capitally unproductive. In Barbados, Antigua
and Saint Kitts, with small land to population ratios and where land was coveted and
almost entirely owned in legal documentation, there developed wide-spread legal owner-
ship during emancipation which ensured continuity in the post-colonial era. Land was
therefore more widely held as productive capital and became part of domestic wealth
around which domestic investment could be generated.
Repressive land tenure regimes were further supported by a mechanism of wage-
rent system throughout much of the British West Indies. As has been the general
pattern, the severity of this scheme ranged from mild —in labour-rich territories—to
extreme in low density regions. Jamaica, for example, introduced the Ejectment and
Trespass Acts, “reinforced by a virtual veto on selling land to former slave” (Besson,
2003, p.40). Under the wage-rent system, the land-owning planter class effectively tied
the tenancy of provision grounds and cottages, which had customarily been the residence
of former slaves for generations, to employment on their plantations. Bolland (1981,
p.595) explains that this scheme “combined the roles of employer and landlord on the
one hand and that of employee and tenant on the other.” This was a useful tool for the
planter for several reasons. In the first instance, planters were able to secure labour at a
low cost by requiring work from labourers for the continued tenancy of provision grounds
and house. Secondly, by setting artificially high rents, the planter was able to reduce
the cost of labour by deducting rents from wages. The varied severity with which the
11See the primary sources appendix for full citation.
CHAPTER 2. COLONIAL FACTORS, INSTITUTIONS & PERFORMANCE 74
system was applied in different territories was based on the extent of the labour problem,
and is typified by the contrast between Barbados and Jamaica. Less burdened by the
labour problem, planters in Barbados often allowed labourers to continue to occupy small
provision grounds and houses rent-free while they remained on the plantation for work
for at least five days a week. Where a worker failed to meet this condition, rent deducted
amounted to less than 20 percent of his wages, on average (Bolland, 1981). Contrast
this with the case of Jamaica, where planters faced low supply and high wages. Bolland
(1981) reports that it was customary for rent to be charged per person. This practice
siginificantly increased the family’s rent expense. Bolland (1981) estimated that rent
amounted to 48 percent of wages in Jamaica. Historians have argued that the wage-
rent system may have been particular successful as a coercive instrument because of the
sentimental value that former slaves and their descendants attached to lands where they
had been born and their ancestors buried. However, such was the severity of the abuse
in Jamaica that, in spite of this attachment, labourers abandoned plantation tenancy
forcing planters to eventually end the system as labourers fled to squat on available land.
This history supports our theory that institutions (in this case institutions of prop-
erty rights), which are crucial for economic development, failed to optimally develop in
the plantation society where the labour-capital conflict was fiercest.
Legal, Penal and Political Institutions
Effective control over land and labour in the post-emancipation period required po-
litical power. Fortunately for the planter class,
the political structure of the two colonies embodied the development of slave
societies over a period of a century and a half. Membership in elective bod-
ies, franchise laws, the allocation of duties between executive and legislative
branches of colonial government and the Home Government remained essen-
tially unaltered by the act of emancipation. . . That is, the planters, working
through the institutions of government, could have passed laws whose aim
and result could have been a program with a direct impact on the sugar sector
of the economy (McLewin, 1987, p.66).
The self-perpetuating oligarchies, as Bolland (2001) describes them, protected them-
selves from demise with ever-evolving franchise laws which, created by the planters,
sought to promote and protect planter interest. In the immediate post-emancipation
period, franchise laws across the region required the possession of a minimum value of
land and wealth which the formerly enslaved population and their descendants were
systematically barred from obtaining. As a result, only the wealthiest planters and mer-
chants were eligible for representation in the assemblies where laws were passed that
affected a population from which over 80 percent were not eligible to vote. Evidence
of the sustained political power of the planters can be found in reports from elections
occurring in several territories in the post-emancipation period. In Jamaica in 1840, the
total number of votes neared 2, 200 from a population of about 400, 000. Twenty-four
years later, in 1865, the number of individuals eligible to vote was 2143 according to
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voter rolls, with 1, 457 votes cast.12
In Guyana, in the immediate post emancipation period, the number of persons voting
amounted to less than 1 percent of the population and included solely the class of planters
and merchants. The quality of laws passed inevitably reflected the economic interest of
the planter and conflicted with that of the labouring population. McLewin (1987, p.80)
writes, “It was a matter of economic interest, not political party, which determined
the quality of Jamaican legislation after emancipation... The result was the complex
machinery continued to do the job it was built for — the maintenance of a slave society,
whether de jure or de facto.” While this is true for all of the former British West Indian
territories, the degree to which the interest of the planter and the labourer conflicted
was determined by the severity of the labour problem which was, in turn, determined by
the density of the labouring population. Wrong (1923) documents several changes in the
franchise laws in the British West Indies in the post emancipation era, which McLewin
(1987, p.76) describes as having been “to the disadvantage of the small freeholder and
tenant.” These franchise laws would remain in effect well into the 1930s, when labour
rebellions finally toppled the plantocracy.
McLewin (1987, p.84) documents the link between the politically powerful planter
and the institutions of administrative justice for the case of Jamaica. He observes that,
“the assembly could not only formulate economic policies . . . but that such policies could
also be actually carried into effect — to the extent that courts were called upon by law to
function as a coercing agency for the errant field labourer. . . the mode of punishing and
of coercing can be transferred with relative ease from the whip of the field to the bars of
the jail.” A crucial part of that link, which allowed planters to use the legal institutions
to repress and coerce the free labour force was that for much of the colonial period,
judges were chosen by the elected planter elite from the class of planters and merchants.
McLewin (1987, p.85-87) further notes that, although there were few avenues of appeal
against planter favoured court decisions, the necessary financial qualifications placed it
out of the reach of the labourers. He laments that “given the structure of the judicial
system it was not possible for the labourer to obtain a fair trial as local magistrates
acted so as to promote mercantile and planting interests.”
Because of the vast amounts of free land, the Guyanese and Jamaican planter were
more likely to lose their labour than the envied, densely populated and fully cultivated
territories of Barbados, Antigua and Saint Kitts. This necessitated the use of stronger
policing systems through the courts and penal system, and the drafting of more aggres-
sive laws to control all aspects of the life of the free labourer. McLewin (1987, p.101)
recognises that “the administration of justice in Guyana was subject to the same abuses
of which existed in Jamaica. The potential for reintroduction of ‘slavery’ through coer-
cion of the law and criminal penalties was generally recognised.” He further points out
that, of the 227 laws passed between emancipation in 1838 and 1865, the governor at the
time observed that “most of the them [the laws] had. . . in their relation to the labour-
ing class, been either onerous, restrictive or oppressive” (McLewin, 1987, p.175). Where
it was necessary, such legislation included “laws to restrict emigration and ‘vagrancy’
12Data sourced from McLewin (1987).
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laws, various forms of taxation to pressure people into wage labour. . . , and the develop-
ment of systems of prisons, magistrates and police to punish those who broke the new
labour laws” (Bolland, 1981, p.594). Breaches of labour contracts, in forfeit of which
the labourer would lose his tenancy, were reinforced by imprisonment with hard labour
for workers found in violation, regardless of how small the worker’s infraction may be.
The history literature reports that most of the sentences for petty acts such as “careless
use of fire and abuse of cattle, could be punished with up to three months’ imprison-
ment with hard labour” (Bolland, 1981, p.595). Penalisation through hard labour was
extremely prevalent where labour was scarce, and prisons served to stock the plantations
with labour. In some territories, planters used the allure of salary advances and truck
shop credit to perpetually keep the labourers in debt and bind them to the plantation
(Bolland, 2001). To avoid imprisonment for debts, labourers were forced to agree to
exploitative work contracts.
Bolland (2001) identifies the masters and servant laws within the legal system as
intending, through its codified system, to control the free labour force under threat of
imprisonment and hard labour for breaching terms of their already exploitive contracts.
The enforcement of these codes was the main duty of administrative institutions, the
justice system and governments. Bolland (2001) observes that, though the means of
oppression had changed, the dynamic of the relationship between the dominated and
the dominant essentially remained the same after emancipation. He writes, in the post-
emancipation period, “the problem of policing labour [moved]. . . from the individual
planters. . . to the apparatus of the state” (Bolland, 2001, p.69). Indeed, while all terri-
tories suffered from some level of oppression backed by persistent institutions developed
to extract reliable and cheap labour from their populations, there were, however, wide
variations in the severity, totality, and thus consequences of these institutions and their
effect on the long-term economic and social development of the former British West
Indian colonies.
The close relationship between institutions and economic development has long been
established. To see this, consider the various forms of institutions that developed in
the post-emancipation period. Among the most relevant are; labour institutions, land
tenure (property rights) institutions, legal institutions, economic institutions, and polit-
ical institutions. It is straightforward to argue that while some of these can facilitate (or
discourage) productive investments that lead to better economic outcomes, some also af-
fect the quality of society. For example, while property rights and economic institutions
— such as those of trade and commerce— can facilitate the functioning of markets and
encourage productive investments that stimulate economic growth (North and Thomas,
1973; Acemoglu et al., 2001), these and other institutions — such as legal, labour and
political institutions— act to keep society stable through the imposition of accountabil-
ity, political stability, and the rule of law, all of which are essential for social cohesion.
A more cohesive and stable society is, in turn, more conducive to economic growth and
development (Easterly et al., 2006). In the next section, we proceed by examining the
post-independence institutional and economic divergence, which we have linked to the
labour problem between the low and high colonial population density territories.
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2.4 The Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Post-Colonial Institutional Quality
The central thesis of this chapter is that the former West Indian sugar colonies with lower
population densities — and thus lower labour availability — developed worse institutions
and economic outcomes. To assess the validity of this conclusion, in this section, we
broaden our sample to include the remaining plantation colonies and plot the population
density of the former British West Indian colonies at the time of emancipation against
various measures of institutional quality.13 Our measure of institutions comes from the
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). According to the World Bank
(2015) website, “these aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of
enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries.
They are based on over 30 individual data sources produced by a variety of survey
institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and
private sector firms.”14 We average the scores over the period 1996 to 2013 for each of
the six indicators. Colonial population density is calculated as the number of slaves per
square kilometre as at the year of emancipation (1834). These data were retrieved from
Higman (1986). Figure 2.4 depicts the relationship between our various measures of
institutions and our measure of labour availability.
From our plots, we observe a clear and consistent positive relationship between the
quality of institutions and labour availability. Specifically, territories with higher level
of labour availability during the colonial period enjoy better quality institutions today.
This relationship is observed for all of our measures of institutions. Consistently, Barba-
dos, Antigua and Saint Kitts are situated in the top right-hand corner of the graph, the
mid-level colonial population density islands lie in the middle, and Jamaica and Guyana
record the lowest quality of institutions. This relationship remains robust to the exclu-
sion of outlying countries. Table B1 in the appendix reports the correlation coefficients
between our measure of labour availability and institutional quality today. It appears
that the strongest correlation with colonial population density is observed for regulatory
quality, while the weakest correlation is reported for accountability. Nevertheless, these
correlations are highly significant and are all strongly positive, supporting our theory
that territories with more abundant labour developed better institutions.
To further inform our analysis, we conduct a regression of institutional quality on
colonial population density. Given the nature of causation and potential endogeneities as
discussed above, we perform both OLS and two-stage instrumental variable regressions
to ensure valid inference can be made from our results. Here again, we proceed with
the sample of eleven British West Indian plantation colonies. As we are examining the
relationship within the sample of former West Indian colonies, the sample size is rather
small, but there is much valuable information to be acquired from such an exercise.
Furthermore, given that we observe no major outliers in our plots, the small sample
13See appendix for full names of all countries in the sample.
14We provide a description of each indicator of institutional quality in the Table B9 in the appendix.
See Kaufmann et al. (2011) for further details on methodology.
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(a) Regulatory Quality (b) Corruption Control
(c) Accountability (d) Political Stability
(e) Government Effectiveness (f) Rule of Law
Figure 2.4: Colonial Labour Availability and Institutions Today
Source: The World Bank Governance Indicators and Higman (1995).
size should produce valid conclusions, especially as our theory is concerned only with
variations in institutional quality and the role played by labour availability during the
colonial period among the former West Indian colonies. Another advantage of this
sample is that there exists a great degree of homogeneity in many dimensions among
the colonies in our sample. Each of these colonies are former British territories located
in the Caribbean basin. They are all former slave economies with plantation societies
involved largely in the cultivation of agricultural crops during the colonial period, and
have since maintained similar economies, based on tourism, in the post-colonial period.
These similarities ensure that we are able to minimise the effect of omitted factors which
include cultural, geographic and historical differences, and make this regression analysis
a worthwhile exercise.
In addition to colonial population density, we introduce control variables to account
for other explanations of institutional quality. First, we use average real GDP per
capital from 1977-2014 to control for the role of income in determining the quality of
institutions in the region. The reason is clear; it is generally accepted that countries
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with more income are able to invest more in institutional development. Secondly, given
the central role of colonial population density to our thesis, we would like to address
changes in population in the post-emancipation era. Figures B1, B2, and B3 in the
appendix shows the trajectory of birth rates, death rates and total population in the
first 60 years after emancipation. Population increased in all countries but the relative
positions of Guyana and Jamaica (for example) as low population density territories
remains for the entire period. We can see this by comparing population density of our
labour-rich colonies in 1834 to that of Jamaica and Guyana several decades later. In 1836
the population density of Antigua, Barbados and Saint Kitts were 125, 246, and 113 per
square kilometre, respectively. Jamaica and Guyana, at the end of the period (in 1900),
had population density of 66 and 27 persons per square kilometre respectively, still far
from becoming sufficiently densely populated to suggest that they had become labour-
rich. This applies generally across the West Indian colonies. Furthermore, we expect
that even after 1900, when the labour problem eased, the effects of the colonial struggle,
along with the conflicts, divisions and the institutions it provoked, would persist. We
discuss this idea a further in Section 2.5.1. Nevertheless, we include different measures
to control for population change in our regressions. These include population change
from emancipation at two intervals (1850 and 1900) and the rate of natural increase
(calculated as birth rate minus death rate) averaged over the period 1836-1900.
Third, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) have argued that it is large scale planta-
tion slave use, which saw slaves held in large holdings, that has led to the poor institu-
tional outcomes among former slave states. In Section 2.2, we explained that we believe
that this cannot account for variations in institutional quality within the former West
Indian colonies as all these territories suffered near full enslavement of their populations.
Nonetheless, to rule out the idea that our results are simply proxying for the effect of
slavery, we follow Nunn (2008) and introduce controls for the size of slave holdings into
each of our regressions. Including a measure of the distribution of slaves by slave hold-
ing size in the regression effectively tests our labour supply hypothesis against that of
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002). If Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) are correct,
we should see countries with higher concentrations of large slave plantations have consis-
tently, and significantly, lower institutional quality today. While data limitations do not
permit us to incorporate policy interventions and conflict directly into our regressions,
we believe that the evidence highlighted in the forgoing section which explains the chain
of causation, supplements for this and allows us to confidently estimate a parsimonious
relationship between colonial labour availability and institutions today.
OLS Regression
Our first exercise involves an OLS regression of our measure of institutional quality
on colonial population density (our measure of colonial labour availability). In general,
the regression takes the following form:
Ii = αI + βISi + X′iγI + Ii (2.1)
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where i is a country identifier and I is an indicator of institutional quality.15 S captures
colonial labour supply in the post emancipation era and is measured as the log of slaves
per square kilometre in 1834, X′i is a vector of controls and includes such variables as
country income (average GDP per capita (1977-2014)), and an indicator of the scale of
slavery that the country suffered, measured as the percentage of a country’s total slaves
held on plantations of a particular size, as suggested by Nunn (2008).16 Both colonial
population density and income are entered in the regressions after taking their natural
logs. Data on the share of slaves on holdings of particular sizes is taken from Higman
(1995). An overview of this data is available in Table B2. The OLS results are reported
in Tables B3 to B8 in the appendix.
These results are supportive of our hypothesis. Regardless of which measure of
institutions we adopt, in Column (1) of each of the tables, the simple regression of in-
stitutional quality on colonial labour supply reveals a strong positive and significant
relationship between the two. The results also indicate that, on average, colonial labour
supply alone explains over 54 percent of the variation in the different measures of in-
stitutional quality. In Column (2) of each table, we control for present day income and
found not only that our results remain largely unchanged, but also that, in the presence
of the colonial labour supply regressor, income has no significant relationship with the
quality of institutions in the former British West Indian territories today.17 There is only
one measure of institutions (Voice and Accountability) where the inclusion of GDP per
capita has rendered colonial labour supply as a determinant insignificant. Nevertheless,
for regulatory quality in particular, the role of colonial labour supply as determinant
of the quality of this form of institution remains significant at the 1-percent level, even
in the presence of a control for countries’ incomes. The particularly robust positive re-
lationship between regulatory quality and colonial labour supply is worth highlighting
as it speaks directly to our theory which argues that the regulatory framework as an
economic institution, in these post-colonial territories, developed out of the culture of
repression of local enterprises that would challenge plantations for economic inputs. It,
therefore, follows that the regression results reveal a strong positive relationship between
colonial labour supply as an economic input, and regulatory quality. This suggests that
the regulatory institutions are better where there was less competition for economic
inputs.
In Columns (3)-(6), we include measures of the scale of plantation slavery to test the
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) hypothesis. In all but two measures of institutional
quality, when we control for colonial labour supply, we see no support for the nega-
tive relationship between large-scale slave plantations and institutional development, as
proposed by parts of the Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) hypothesis. Where their
hypothesis is supported, as is the case in Column (6) of Table B4, we observe that an
15We will individually test the six previously highlighted measures of institutional quality.
16We have three size categories: slave holdings consisting of 1 to 10 slaves, 11 to 200 slaves, and 201
or more slaves. The particular category used as our holding size indicator is made known in the results
table.
17In a later section, we examine the causal relationship running from institutions to income using a
3SLS instrumental variable regression to address any potential endogeneity issues.
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increase (1 unit) in the percentage of total slaves who were held in the largest holdings
(200 or more) is associated with lower (−0.0105) regulatory quality, significant at the
5-percent level. Furthermore, in Column (3) of Table B7, the results indicate that an
increase in the percentage of total slaves who belonged to the smallest holdings (10 or
less) is associated with a significantly higher level (0.0279) of voice and accountability
while, in Column (6), increases in the fraction of total slaves held in the largest holdings
is associated with lower (−0.0203) voice and accountability today. Yet, even where there
is evidence supporting the idea that large-scale plantation slavery was a key determinant
of institutional development, the role of colonial labour supply is not diminished. In fact,
for all six measures, including where we have failed to see support for Engerman and
Sokoloff (1997, 2002), the positive relationship between labour availability and institu-
tional quality remains significant. These results offer evidence of something interesting.
They suggest that it is not merely a history of plantation slavery, nor the scale of his-
torical slavery that is key for institutional quality today but, in fact, it is the extent of
the labour problem, and how those who have the power to set up institutions responded
to the labour problem that the termination of slavery presented. In Column (6) of each
table, we add controls for population, percentage change in population between 1834
and 1850 and between 1834 and 1900, as mentioned above. Among these controls, only
the percentage change in population between 1834 and 1850 was significant on occasion.
In all regressions, the natural log population density in 1834 (our measure of colonial
labour supply) remained a significant determinant of the quality of institutions. In all
cases, higher levels of colonial labour supply is associated with higher values of the insti-
tutional quality index. This suggests that the effect of the labour problem was present
until the turn of the century, despite the increases in population. In column (7) we add
a control for the natural increase in population (calculated as birth rate minus death
rate and averaged over the period 1838 to 1900). The results remain unchanged.
2.4.2 Instrumental Variable (IV) Regression
In the previous subsection we estimate the relationship between our measures of in-
stitutional quality and colonial population density as given by Equation (2.1). While
describing the relationships in this linear way is useful for easily explaining the process,
a fundamental understanding of the nature of this relationship requires a closer exam-
ination of the problem with a non-linear approach so as to capture the endogeneities
that may be involved in such a process. First it is important to note that a key de-
terminant of current institutions is early (colonial) institutions which we are not able
to include in the regression in Equation (2.1) and so, it forms part of the error term.
That is, Ii = δIξi + φIi; where ξi is our measure of colonial institutions and φIi is a
measure of other factors encompassed in the error term, Ii, from Equation (2.1). In
addition, it may be plausibly argued that colonial institutions are also determined by
colonial labour supply (S). This would suggest that corr(Ii 6= 0) and thus we have a
form of endogeneity in the regression described by Equation (2.1) which would lead to
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bias estimates. This relationship can be specified as follows:
ξi = αξ + βξSi + X′iγξ + ωξi (2.2)
where X′iγξ is a vector of covariates and ω is an error term. To see this, consider
the response of the planter elite to the labour shortages as we described in Section
2.3. Furthermore, while the labour problem helped determine the types of colonial
institutions, it may be plausibly argued that colonial labour supply was also determined
by colonial institutions, resulting in the simultaneous determination of ξ and S (see
Figure 2.2). The evidence for this argument can be seen in the outcomes of conflicts,
institutions of forced labour, and policies which facilitated expropriation of land from
former slaves so as to force them into plantation labour and thus increase the labour
supply, as highlighted in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.
Let us represent the square nodes in Figure 2.2 with the following symbols: ξ for
early institutions, C for conflict, P for policy interventions, and S for colonial labour
supply. We expect some form of simultaneity might exist in the relationships between
these factors. First, consider the relationship between ξ and C, it is entirely plausible
that while the intensity of conflict during colonial period led to poorer institutional
outcomes, the quality of these institutions also played role in the reproducing conflict
during the period. Our discussions in Section 2.3 point to the responses of the labouring
class to the legal system and its institutions as well as responses to the institution of
labour indentureship. This means that while the relationship may run from conflict to
institutions (C → ξ), it may also run from institutions to conflict(ξ → C). The same goes
for conflict and policy interventions. As we have highlighted in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, the
many policy interventions of the planter government to increase labour supply was met
by revolts and other conflicts (P → C), but these policy interventions themselves were
in some cases also a response to the conflict that the planters faced (C → P ). Finally,
the relationship between labour supply and colonial-era policy interventions may also
be simultaneous in the sense that, while the planters who faced labour problems were
motivated to implement various policies to help curb it (S → P ), the nature of policies
implemented may also attract or repel labour. This suggests that the reverse relation is
also possible (P → S). One such example is how the immigration policy, mentioned in
Section 2.3, increased the labour supply which, once increased, may cause adjustments
to the level of repression.
In the presences of the omitted variables and simultaneity described in this section,
regression estimates may be biased. We provide a mathematical description of the omit-
ted variable bias (OVB) in the 4 appendix. The presence of both this form of endogeneity
and simultaneity would mean that simply including measures of early institutions in the
regression in Equation (2.1) would not work to reduce the bias. Instead we use an in-
strumental variable approach to correct for both simultaneity and OVB. Through this
method, we can isolate variations in colonial labour supply across the sugar colonies
which are independent of early institutions and use this as a regressor in a two stage
least square regression of current institutions on colonial labour supply. Three require-
ments must be satisfied under this approach (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). First, the
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instrument (which we shall denote as Z) must be as good as randomly assigned. Sec-
ond, it must satisfy the exclusion restriction. That is, it must not have a direct effect on
the dependent variable except through its relationship with the instrumented variable.
Third, there must exist a first stage relationship between the instrumented variable and
the instrument. A suitable instrument would eliminate the correlation with the error
term in Equation (2.1) and reduce the bias (κIρ as highlighted in the appendix to this
chapter) to zero, resulting in E(βˆI) = βI . Thus we would have unbiased estimates.
The Instrument (Z)
One such instrument is the soil suitability for sugar in the West Indies. What makes
sugar suitability a potentially suitable instrument is first and foremost the fact that
it is completely exogenous. More specifically, soil suitability is determined by agro-
climatic factors and so is not endogenous to any of the variables highlighted in the
above regressions, as such, it satisfies the requirement that the instrument be as good as
randomly assigned. What motivates our use of sugar suitability as an instrument is that
we suspect it shares the necessary first stage relationship as highlighted above. More
specifically, we expect that the higher the fraction of a country’s total arable land that
is highly-suited for sugar production, the higher the concentration of slaves introduced
per square kilometre of land during the slave trade. Thus, we expect that there exists
a positive first stage relationship between the percentage of land highly suited for sugar
production and our measure of labour supply (population density in 1834, at the end of
slavery). A casual look at the plot in Figure 2.6 indicates this strong positive relationship.
We can test this relationship directly but we first explain the construction of our sugar
suitability variable.
Data for this variable was acquired with the help of the authors of Dippel et al.
(2015) who use both climatic and soil data to classify soil suitability at a very fine
spatial resolution (which is not typical of standard databases). The approach divides
the territories into 604 square metre cells and assess the suitability of each cell for sugar
cultivation. The authors use six factors well documented to be important for sugar
production to classify sugar suitability: temperature, rainfall, elevation, soil pH, slope,
and soil texture. Weights are then assigned to each factor according to the specifications
constructed in Jayasinghe and Yoshida (2010) to aggregate the factors into an index score
for each cell of land. Within each cell, they classify each factor into four bins, each bin
reflecting one of: highly suitable, moderately suitable, moderately unsuitable and highly
unsuitable. An example of the classification can be made with the rainfall, according
to the authors, “rainfall in the ranges of 950–1100 or 1500–1990 is moderately suitable
for sugar cane, rainfall in the ranges of 800-950 or 1990–2500 is moderately unsuitable
for sugar cane, and rainfall in the ranges below 800 or above 2500 is highly unsuitable
for sugar cane” (Dippel et al., 2015, p.29). A full description of the methodology to
generate the sugar suitability data can be retrieved from their paper. Using this data,
our sugar suitability variable measures the proportion of the cells for each country that
is highly suitable for sugar cane according to this index.
Our two-stage instrumental variable regression is, therefore, described by what fol-
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Figure 2.6: Sugar Suitability and Colonial Population Density
Source: Sugar Suitability data from Dippel et al. (2015) and Pop. Density from Higman (1995).
lows.
The First Stage: the regression of colonial labour supply on the proportion of land highly
suitable for sugar.
Si = µS + λSZi + νSi (2.3)
The Second Stage: is the structural equation which uses the first stage to regress our
measure of institutions today (I) on instrumented colonial labour supply.
Ii = µI + λISi + X′iθI + νIi (2.4)
The exclusion restriction implied by our instrumental variable approach is that, con-
ditional on the other explanatory variables included in the regression, the share of total
land highly suitable for sugar has no significant direct effect on the quality of institutions
today, other than through its effect on colonial labour supply. To the extent that sugar
cultivation determined whether (and how many) slaves were imported to the territories,
and the fact that sugar was only significant as a colonial-era crop and has not been a
major crop in the West Indies for most of the 20th century, we have no major concerns
around the exclusion restriction. We think it reasonable to argue that the effect of sugar
suitability on present day institutions plausibly goes through what it meant for labour
supply in the colonial period and the colonial institutions which developed to control it
in the post-emancipation period. We present the results of the two stage least square
estimation in Table 2.6.
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Results: Two Stage Least Square Regression
Table 2.6: Instrumental Variable Reg. of Institutions on Colonial Labour Supply
Panel A: Two Stage Least Square Dependent Variable
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule
of Law
Control
of Corruption
Voice &
Accountability
Political
Stability
Log Pop. Density
(1834)
0.174***
(0.042)
0.169***
(0.024)
0.212***
(0.065)
0.268***
(0.070)
0.087**
(0.040)
0.172***
(0.063)
% of Slaves on
holdings >200
-0.011*
(0.006)
-0.014***
(0.004)
-0.015
(0.010)
-0.019*
(0.010)
-0.014**
(0.006)
-0.014
(0.009)
Constant 0.205(0.159)
0.171
(0.092)
0.143
(0.246)
0.182
(0.264)
0.883***
(0.152)
0.362
(0.237)
R-square 0.73 0.89 0.62 0.65 0.56 0.59
Panel B: First Stage for Log. Population Density (1834)
% of Land Highly
Sugar Suitable
% of Slaves on
holdings >200 Constant R-square
0.051**
(0.015)
0.0311
(0.046)
-0.93
(1.34) 0.50
Notes N = 11 for all regressions. The sample consist of 11 former British West Indian territories. A full list of the countries is
presented in Table B10 in the appendix. All regressions are estimated as cross-sectional two stage least square regressions and
include a control for population change between 1838 and 1900. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The measures of
institutional quality are the mean scores (1996-2013) of governance indicators obtained from the World Bank’s World Governance
Indicators. A higher score indicates better quality institutions. Sugar suitability data is from Dippel et al. (2015) and slave
holding data is from Nunn (2008). * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. In addition, with only one instrument for one endogenous
regressor (log. pop density), the model is exactly identified (that is, k instruments for k endogenous regressors).
Panel A of Table 2.6 reports the two stage least square estimation of institutions
today on colonial labour supply as measured by the log of colonial population density
(Equation (2.4)). As with the OLS estimates, we use several different indicators of
current institutions to check that the relationship is robust to different measures of
institutions. The estimation of the first stage relationship (Equation (2.3)) is presented
in Panel B. The coefficient of interest in Panel B is that on % of land highly suitable for
sugar (λS from Equation (2.3)). The coefficient is 0.051, positive and significant at the 5
percent level, indicating a strong first stage relationship as required for the instrumental
variable regression.18 Indeed, the positive sign confirms our reasoning from the previous
subsection where we hypothesised a positive relationship between sugar suitability and
colonial population density.
18Hall et al. (1996) found that, in search of a strong instrument, it is not enough that the F -statistic is
significant at the typical 5-percent or 10-percent level. Instead, as recommended by Stock et al. (2002),
the F -statistic on the instrument should also exceed 10. We test our instrument using the estat firststage
command developed for this purpose. The F -statistic on our instrument is 11.56 and significant at the
1-percent level (Prob > F : 0.0073), and therefore meets the threshold for a strong instrument, as
proposed by Stock et al. (2002).
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The resulting second stage regressions in Panel A all confirm the nature of the re-
lationship between colonial labour supply and current institutions. In each of these
regressions we include a control for the scale of plantation slavery (as this was signif-
icant in some of the OLS regressions) to ensure that our measure of colonial labour
supply is not simply acting as a proxy for the effect of large scale plantation slavery on
institutions today. The results reaffirm the conclusions made from the OLS regressions.
No matter which measures of institutions used, the instrumental variable regression re-
ports a positive and highly significant relationship between the measure of institutions
and log colonial population density in 1834. In the first of these regressions, our measure
of institutions (I in Equation (2.4)) is Government Effectiveness. The coefficient on our
measure of colonial labour supply (λI form Equation (2.4)) is 0.172 and significant at
the 1-percent level. This suggests that greater labour supply in the colonial period is
associated with better quality of institutions today. When we use Regulatory Quality
as our measure of institutions, the result is similar with a positive and highly significant
coefficient of 0.169. In fact the same can be said for Rule of Law (where λI is 0.212),
Control of Corruption (λI = 0.268), and Political Stability (λI = 0.172). The measure
of the present day institutions with the weakest relationship to colonial labour supply
is Voice and Accountability but it remains positive and strongly significant (at the 5-
percent level). The significance of our control for the scale of plantation slavery varies
with our choice of measure but retains the negative relationship that we observed from
the OLS estimates. Including different control variables for the size of slave holdings
and a control for current income (as we did in the OLS regressions) does not change our
results.19 The coefficients are, in some cases, smaller (though not significantly) than that
obtained from the OLS regressions, indicating that our fear of positive bias resulting from
the proposed simultaneity between colonial labour supply and early institutions, which
are both important for institutions today, may have been well-founded. Nevertheless,
the qualitative results for our several measures of institutions from both the OLS and
IV regressions, support the idea that greater colonial population density (our measure
of colonial labour supply) is associated with a significantly higher levels of institutional
quality in the West Indies today.
Post-Colonial Social and Economic Development
We have seen compelling evidence of the role of colonial labour supply as a determinant
of institutions in the former British West Indies today. In this subsection, we turn our
focus to the economic and social outcomes of the former sugar colonies, comparing the
high colonial labour supply colonies of Antigua, Barbados, and Saint Kitts to the low
colonial labour supply territories of Jamaica and Guyana in the post-colonial period.
Data on selected indicators are available in Table 2.7.
A cursory glance at the data reveals an obvious pattern; colonies with higher popula-
tion density during the colonial period seem to enjoy significantly better socio-economic
19Current income was not significant in any of our IV regressions. A control for population
change between 1838 and 1900 is included in the regressions and its coefficient in each regression is
0.03, 0.08, 0.05, 0.11, 0.03, and 0.006, respectively, and never significant.
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Table 2.7: Selected Social and Economic Indicators
Country
GDP per
Capita 2014
(PPP)
Avg. GDP per
Capita Growth
Rate 1960-2014
Debt to GDP
2014 (%)
Foreign Direct
Invest. (2014)
(% GDP)
Labour Force
Participation
(2014)
Life
Expectancy
(2014)
Literacy
Rate (2014)
Homicide
Rate (Avg.)
1995-2014
HDI
Rank (2014)
Low Pop.
Density
Jamaica 8053 0.00 132 4.2 63 76 88 44 96
Guyana 6892 1.35 51.2 7.7 61 66 88 17 121
High
Pop. Density
Barbados 15297 2.28 100.4 11.2 71 75 99.7 9 59
Antigua 19521 4.08 102.1 12.7 77.1 76 99 10 61
St. Kitts 15021 3.46 79.8 13.9 77 76 98.7 25 73
Source: Penn World Tables (PWT 8.0) and the World Bank.
outcomes, on average. Jamaica’s and Guyana’s levels of GDP per capita are signifi-
cantly lower than that of high colonial population density colonies. Furthermore, the
two low colonial labour supply colonies experienced a lower average growth rate over the
post-colonial period. As of 2014, the high colonial population density former colonies
enjoyed significantly higher foreign direct investment, with Saint Kitts recording FDI of
14 percent of GDP, while Jamaica received the lowest at 4.2 percent. The areas of lit-
eracy, violence and human development show similar patterns. While Barbados (99.7),
Antigua (99) and Saint Kitts (98.7) record near 100 percent literacy among its adult
population, Jamaica (88) and Guyana (88) trail behind their Caribbean counterparts.
Jamaica (44) recorded the highest yearly average homicides per 100,000 persons over the
period 1995 to 2014, while Antigua and Barbados showed the familiar patterns of peace
and social cohesion that they enjoyed during the colonial period, with an average of 10
murders per 100,000 persons per year over the same period.
The divergence in these social and economic outcomes between our two groups of
former colonies remains consistent with that observed throughout the colonial period.
In Chapter 1, we showed instances of economic repression as far as public goods pro-
vision was concerned. At this point we should note that, interestingly, the increase in
public expenditure after the intervention in Jamaica in 1866 though significant, still saw
Jamaica lagging behind the labour-rich colonies. See Figure A1 in the appendix. The
disparity in the trends of public investment in education and health in Jamaica, com-
pared with Antigua and Barbados, were fairly apparent. We do not have a full data
series for St. Kitts but data points for health and expenditure shares at the end of each
decade from 1860 to 1900 were 9, 17, 11, 17, 15, and 10, respectively, and higher than
Jamaica’s in each of those periods.20 Today, for almost every socio-economic indicator,
the low colonial population density territories fared worse than the high, just as they
did during the colonial period. These observations, along with the empirical results,
form the basis of our argument that responses to the labour problem during the colonial
period fostered the development of institutions that have perpetuated the old traditions
of violence and resistance, and labour and economic repression in those former colonies.
20Note that Figure A1 only uses the health and education expenditure shares for this comparison as
we did not have consistent time series data for infrastructure spending for all colonies, whereas Figure
1.3 includes infrastructure shares for Jamaica.
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Table 2.8: 3SLS Regression of Income on Institutions
Coefficient StandardError z-Statistic R-square
Log GDP per
Capita (2013) 0.39
Government
Effectiveness 1.258*** 0.472 2.66
Constant 8.445*** 0.237 35.51
Government
Effectiveness 0.65
Log Pop.
Density 0.157*** 0.045 3.45
Constant -0.008 0.147 -0.06
Log Pop. Density 0.57
Sugar
Suitability 0.053*** 0.0137 3.83
Constant -0.382 0.9367 -0.41
Observations 11
Notes N = 11. The sample consist of 11 former British West Indian territories. A
full list of the countries is presented in Table B10 in the appendix. The regression is
estimated as cross-sectional three-stage least square. The measure of Government
Effectiveness is the mean score (1996-2013) of governance indicators obtained from
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators. A higher score indicates better
quality institutions. Sugar suitability data is from Dippel et al. (2015). * p < .10,
** p < .05, *** p < .01.
We more formally test the effect of the colonial labour problem on economic outcomes
today using a three-stage least square instrumental variable regression (3SLS). Again, the
sample size here is extremely small as we are studying a small region, so caution must be
exercised in interpreting the results beyond the context of the West Indies, or as anything
but simply indicative. Our 3SLS regression involves regressing country level income
observed in the West Indies today on the quality of institutions which is instrumented
by colonial labour supply which is itself instrumented by sugar suitability, as described
in the sections above. The measure of institutional quality chosen for this exercise is
government effectiveness as we feel this measure best captures the broad institutional
functions necessary for development. Results with other measures are qualitatively the
same. The results are presented in Table 2.8.
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The results accord with our theory. The channel running from colonial labour avail-
ability to economic performance today appears to be relatively strong. Each of the three
panels in Table 2.8 show a stage of the three-stage least square regression. The top panel
is the third stage and is of main interest. It presents the regression of instrumented mea-
sure of institutions (Government Effectiveness score) on cross-country per capita income.
The relationship is positive and significant at the 1-percent level. Specifically, an increase
in the index score of 0.01 is associated with approximately 1.23 percent higher income
per capita today.21 In the second and third panels, the relationships being estimated
are the second and first stages and they are as expected, with a positive and significant
relationship between government effectiveness and colonial labour supply, and a positive
and significant first stage relationship between sugar suitability and population density
in 1834. Though the small sample and limited data mean that we cannot hold these
results up as definitive, we nonetheless think that it does add relevant evidence to our
theory that the colonial labour problems and the resulting effects on institutions have
persisted. These colonial factors continue to affect the development of these territories
today.
2.5 Further Discussion
2.5.1 On Path Dependence
History matters. Many economic phenomena are at least in part determined by historical
forces under which their earliest incarnations developed. The work presented in this
thesis recognises that. The history of the West Indies is still consequential for economic
development today. By examining the role that post-emancipation labour problems
have played in the development of institutions, we show that the paths that these former
colonial territories were set upon, as institutions developed to respond to these problems,
continue to be determined by the historical factors that shaped the choice of institutions,
through which historical relationships persist. The economic literature has for a long
time recognised this and, more specifically, work on path dependence has shed light
on the role of history in explaining outcomes for which neoclassical approaches have
struggled to account.
Some of the earliest and most influential work on path dependence was produced by
Arthur (1989) who, in this hugely significant paper, describes path dependency as a sit-
uation in which a small event in history determines the path of a system. Using a simple
model of competing technologies under constant, increasing, and decreasing returns, the
author shows that even a historically insignificant event may result in an early advantage
for a particular choice. This early advantage may prove critical to the eventual outcome
in the market for these technologies when there exists increasing returns to adoption of
these technologies. Describing the dynamics of this process, Arthur (1989, p.117) writes,
21This may seem quite large, but it is not implausible as our data on Government Effectiveness ranges
from −0.27 to 1.41. Thus, an increase of 0.01 represents a significant change in a country’s Government
Effectiveness score.
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“once an outcome (a dominant technology) begins to emerge it becomes progressively
more ‘locked in’; and non-ergodicity in that historical ‘small events’ are not averaged
away and ‘forgotten’ by the dynamics - they may decide the outcome.” This, he continues
on to say, explains why an “economy might become locked-in by ‘historical events’ to the
monopoly of an inferior technology.” This happens because, in the presence of increasing
returns, once a choice to adopt a particular technology is made, there are ever increasing
benefits to the continued adoption of the technology which leads to the exclusion of other
technologies which may in fact have been superior, but by some small and insignificant
event suffered in the early stages of adoption. Because of increasing returns to adoption,
there exist a positive feedback loop in the sense that adoption begets further adoption
of a particular technology leading to the exclusion of competing technologies. When
the initial choice of the adoption is affected by some small and insignificant event, path
dependency occurs in that this has set the system on path to which it becomes increas-
ingly locked-in. An example of this, cited by Arthur (1989, p.126), is the QWERTY
keyboard; an incidence of path dependence studied in David et al. (1975).
The form of path dependence highlighted by Arthur (1989) applies beyond just tech-
nologies but also to the choice of policies and the institutions within which they are set.
It is in this sense that Arthur’s work applies to our study of the British West Indies. We
can explain the present day procedural institutional framework of the labour-rich and
labour-scarce sugar colonies as the outcome of the historical choice of both the planters
and the labourers. Consider the labour-scarce colonies; the planters, facing an acute
labour problem, conducted heavy intervention in the labour market, utilising coercion
to extract surpluses from the labouring class. Such intervention required sunk costs
from investment in law and legal systems, policing and political frameworks designed to
repress the population. Once these means were adopted and costs sank, there existed
increasing returns to protecting this system of extraction and coercive policies. There
were persistent gains to making additional small investments to protect this regime
rather than suffer the significant loses that its collapse would inflict. Thus, these insti-
tutions persisted and the institutional and economic path became locked-in. The choice
of responses of the labouring class also contributed to this path. Refusing to work on
the plantations, and open and violent rebellion to the efforts of the planters to force
them to do otherwise, once adopted, became an institution in its own right. It played
out in the fiercely antagonistic relationship between labour unions and capitalists. In
Chapter 4, we explore this issue and argue that, owing to the history between these two
groups, trust had been lost and compromise is shunned as potential loss of hard-fought
gains against a history of oppression. Sub-optimal policies are, therefore, likely to be
followed as the historical adoption of an oppositionist stance has produced gains which
compromise may threaten, even when such compromises may result in a more efficient
outcome. Such is the impact of path determining historical events as described by David
(1994).
According to David (1994, p.205), “history matters so vitally to the form and func-
tioning of human organizations and institutions,” and the “functioning of organizations
and institutions, including many legal institutions, [act] as ‘carriers of history’.” To ex-
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plain the role of path dependence in economic phenomena, David (1994) identifies three
key features of a path dependent system. The first concerns the role of history in the
forming of structures of what he terms ‘mutually consistent expectations’ which facili-
tate the coordination of the actions of agents without the need for centralised direction.
These mutually consistent expectations allow for the development of a system which
perpetuates a course of action which becomes know as a convention. Furthermore, ac-
cording to (David, 1994, p.210), “shared historical experiences and conscious perceptions
of a shared past provide one of the principal means by which groups of people justifiably
may form a system of consistent mutual expectations.” In this way, behaviour becomes
institutionalised. These institution are based on historical experiences and ,in turn, in-
stitutions carry these historical experiences forward, allowing history to affect present
day economic outcomes. In the case of the British West Indies, this is self-evident.
Territories with historically higher levels of government repression, conflict and labour
coercion are less politically stable, as is evident from Table 2.6. Collective responses to
government action are often more fierce and come from mistrust owing to the historical
experience. Government is thus less effective, creating space for rent-seeking behaviour
and the erosion of regulatory quality and with it, accountability. Deviation from this
path is difficult as history has made the human organisations that reproduce the be-
haviours which lead to these outcomes into convention — a form of sunk organisational
capital (David’s second feature). The system thus becomes self-reinforcing, forming a
cluster of interrelated and complementary institutions that lock-in a particular path
(David’s third feature).
This ‘locked-in’ state need not be inefficient, as pointed out by Liebowitz and Mar-
golis (1995) who identify three degrees of path dependence. According to Liebowitz and
Margolis (1995, p.210), a “process exhibits path dependence if an action ao from the
set Ao taken at some time to affects the set of choices An that are available at some
later time tn.” In the first degree, the action is not inefficient. In second degree path
dependence, the action seems ex-ante efficient, but is at some time t > to shown to
have been inefficient. Finally, under third degree path dependence, an action is seen to
be ex-ante inefficient but is chosen anyway. Liebowitz’s and Margolis’s insight is useful
for explaining the case of the institutional outcomes observed in the West Indies. The
responses of the planters and ex-slaves to emancipation in the labour-rich colonies can
be seen to have set these territories along a first degree dependent path in the sense that
they allowed an amicable economic and social relationship to develop between the two,
facilitating a rather stable transition from slave economy to free society with the major-
ity black population inheriting comparatively high quality institutions from the white
planter elite. This is identified by Patterson (2013, p.1) who explains that Barbados
“during the colonial period acquired far greater learning of the procedural knowledge of
effectively running institutions. Geography, ruthless elite manoeuvring, and the counter-
hegemonic strategy of appropriating the institutions and culture of the white elite by
Afro-Barbadians, resulted in an efficient pre-independence system institutionally attuned
to the challenges of development.” Jamaica (for example), on the other hand, being a
labour-scare colony, the response of the planters may be argued to have set the country
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upon a path which resembles Liebowitz’s and Margolis’s third degree path dependence.
In this case, policy choices coming out of an institutional framework which developed
under the conditions highlighted above are known to be inefficient but historical fac-
tors, including the nature of relationships between the legal system, government and the
citizenry, preclude the choice of a more efficient alternative policy.
More recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2001) has applied the concept of path depen-
dence to cross country difference in economic development. The argument presented in
this work revolves around the idea that current institutions affect future institutions as
they shape the nature and likelihood of future institutional change. In this way, this
paper and other works by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Acemoglu (2008) looks
beyond simple lock-in effects and consider persistence in path dependence. This view
helps to explain why, even though the West Indian territories are on a path that is depen-
dent on their historical experience, we observe small and gradual institutional changes
(what the authors call ‘institutional drift’), but these changes still carry with them the
legacies of previous institutional arrangements which are readopted in various forms. So
while, in the former British West Indian colonies, white planters no longer monopolise
political power and forced labour has been abolished, the institutional conventions that
they spurred, especially the manipulation of governmental power towards corrupt ends,
is still evident. Of this, Jamaica’s and Guyana’s low Government Effectiveness, Corrup-
tion Control and Accountability scores, relative to those of Antigua, Saint Kitts, and
Barbados (see Figures 2.4e, 2.4b, and 2.4c), are indicative. It is in thise sense that the
themes explored in Chapter 1 of this thesis carry over to Chapter 2, where we see the
impact of these historical relationships on institutions today.
2.5.2 Conclusion
There are few papers that examine the economic divergence among the former British
West Indian colonies. Of these papers, one of the most notable, Henry and Miller (2009),
has attributed the significantly poorer performance of Guyana and Jamaica to poor
economic policy. Others, such as DaCosta (2007), give a greater role to poor institutional
development and unstable political relations which led to destructive, counter-productive
governance and the collapse of the rule of law. This work bridges the divide between the
two points of view by tracing the historical development of the West Indies. We posit that
colonial labour availability was a key determinant of the economic and social development
of the West Indies. Where population density was high, there was little to be gained
through oppression or rebellion, and thus, industrial relations were comparatively more
amicable which led to more stable economic, social and political institutions, out of which
more progressive economic and social policy emerged. The theory developed in this
paper presents a framework within which we have tested our hypothesis and examined
its implications by studying the case of the main five British West Indian sugar colonies.
The empirical analysis relies on both OLS and instrumental variable regressions to ensure
robustness. Our findings, supported by the historical and empirical data, suggest that
economic and social outcomes today reflect the broad patterns developed during the
colonial period.
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This chapter identifies several channels through which colonial factors have persisted
and ultimately influenced the development of those societies in the post-colonial period.
The historical evidence has been shown to support the idea that labour institutions today
carry the legacy of (and resistance to) labour repression and exploitation. In societies
where the labour problem was most pronounced, this has led to continually poor labour
relations and instability. Similarly, institutions of property rights, particularly land
tenure institutions, have continued to perpetuate the narrow ownership of land which
was developed by, and was particularly useful to, planters in colonies with poor labour
supply. This inequality in the distribution of land has continued to suppress development
prospects and credit markets, making the development of small scale enterprise difficult.
The law and legal systems have also persisted from the colonial period of exploitation.
This is particularly problematic in territories where the legal system was specifically
geared towards repression and exploitation. The responses to these repressive efforts
have historically been violent and rebellious, still a feature of society today, and further
add to the instability and lack of social cohesion in former plantation societies.
We have seen that no matter which measure of institutional quality we consider,
former British West Indian territories with more available labour during the colonial
period have developed better quality institutions in the post-colonial period. This implies
that efforts to improve the quality of institutions and economic outcomes must identify
the features of institutions today which do not act to enhance the social and economic
possibilities of society, but are instead remnants of the capital-labour conflict of the
colonial period. Efforts must then be made to rectify those institutional anachronisms
in order to better enable economic prosperity.
Chapter 3
Literature Survey: Colonial
Labour in the African Colonies
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we focused on the relationship between colonial labour avail-
ability and the development of labour relations and the structure of labour institutions
in the West Indies. There are, however, similar instances of such a relationship among
other former colonies. In particular, the literature on the former African colonies reveals
that efforts to expand the supply of cheap labour were conducted through remarkably
similar practices as we have seen in the West Indies.1 Invariably, these efforts included
the use of taxation, legislation around land and movement of people, exploitative con-
tracts and forced labour. In this chapter we survey the literature on the African colonies
and show how, there too, the themes around colonial labour availability and labour re-
pression and exploitation marred the development of labour relations. Many of these
studies concern the settler economies and explore the antagonism between native peas-
ants and European settlers engaged in production in the capitalist sector. They provide
a systematic analysis of the development of this relationship and aide our understanding
of the motivations underlying some of the practices that we have previously explored.
The first of these works is that of Arrighi (1970). Arrighi (1970) highlights the limits
of the application of the Lewis (1954) model in terms of explaining the development of
the capitalist sector in Rhodesia. He rejects wholesale application of the Lewis Model
by Barber (1961) to Rhodesia, and shows that, far from market forces predominating
in the siphoning of labour from the traditional sector to the capitalist sector, extra-
market forces were employed by the capitalists during a period of what he terms ‘capital
accumulation’ to widen the productivity gap between the two sectors. In so doing, he
1Much of the focus in the literature on the Asian colonies revolves around land revenue generation
and thus, examinations of issues involving government intervention into the labour market to cheapen
supply are often assessed only as an aside to colonial policy around land matters. Cases of labour supply
intervention in Asia can be found in Kumar (1962), Bose et al. (1993) and Sen (2002), but do not warrant
a full section of review for our purpose.
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provides a very effective analysis of the extra-market forces at play in the Rhodesian case,
many of which resemble those we highlighted in the development of labour institutions in
the West Indies. He does not dismiss the validity of the Lewis Model entirely, but rather
shows that once this process of capitalist accumulation had successfully taken place to
sufficiently disadvantage the traditional sector, the market mechanism identified in Lewis
(1954) predominates. This was the case for a period of two decades (1920s to mid-1940s)
in Rhodesia, according to Arrighi (1970).
The second piece of literature we review in this chapter is Wilson (1972). Wilson’s
work represents an outstanding contribution to the explanation of the social and eco-
nomic factors which resulted in the incredible growth of annual real earnings (69 percent)
of whites in contrast to a fall of 1 percent in the earnings of blacks in the South African
Gold mines between 1911 and 1969. For the purpose of our work, Dr Wilson’s Chap-
ter Four on the testitSupply and Demand for labour in the gold mines is particularly
relevant. In it, Wilson (1972) explores the fundamental drivers of labour supply and
demand, ranging from the political mechanisms utilised by a colluding group of mine
owners, the role of white trade unions, and the economic forces driving the natives to and
away from the mines, among other factors. Wilson (1972) also provides some empirical
support for his arguments which only strengthen with his methodical approach to the
analysis.
We follow the review of Wilson (1972) with a look at the work of Van Onselen (1976),
which stands as one of the most significant pieces of work on forced labour in Rhodesia.
Van Onselen (1976) discusses the process of labour mobilization in the context of the
regional economic system within which the Rhodesian mines were operating. Indeed the
Rhodesian mines were in competition for labour with those in South Africa which were
offering higher wages. Van Onselen (1976) gives an account (more so than the previous
two pieces of literature) of the various extra-market methods employed by mine-owners
to tilt labour supply in their favour without raising the wages of workers. The work of the
Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau, the corruption of Native Labour Commissioners, and
predatory credit systems were just a few examples of the manipulative means through
which the mining interest sought to expand their supply of cheap labour. Several of
the techniques bare resemblance to the strategies employed in the West Indies and Van
Onselen’s exposition of these methods in colonial Rhodesia offers strong support for the
systematic nature of these extra-market operations as we have described them in earlier
chapters on the plantation colonies of the West Indies.
While most of the work on the development of Africa at the time was being con-
ducted under the the umbrella of underdevelopment theory, Mosley (1983) questioned
this prevailing theory, highlighting the deficiencies in these approaches in terms of the
logic of the arguments presented and how they square with the empirical data. This the-
sis is the fourth piece of literature we review in this chapter. While the work presents an
effective critique of underdevelopment theory more broadly, the aspect of Mosley’s 1983
work which is most relevant to our present work is the careful observation that, while
the extra-market operations conducted by the Rhodesian and Kenyan settler farmers
did indeed cheapen and expand an otherwise reluctant labour supply, there is in fact
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a reverse relationship running from economic factors to political forces. His analysis
rightly forces us to consider the interplay between these two forces more carefully, as the
nature of this relationships carries interesting repercussions for our understanding of the
extent and implications of political intervention into markets.
This chapter concludes with two pieces of work by Robert Bates: Bates (1981)
and Bates (1987). Bates (1981) presents a remarkable exposition of the extent and
motivations of government intervention in agricultural markets. This work, more than
any other, provides a detailed analysis of the operations of the sates in these markets,
paying special attention to one of the key institutions affecting the peasant economy,
marketing boards. Bates (1981) carefully analyses government intervention as it pertains
to policies towards cash crops for export, the political dynamics of pricing policies in
the food sector, and the use of non-pricing strategies in the same. He shows that efforts
to protect the emerging sector from competition and revenue generation motives of the
political class ultimately determine policies in these three areas to the detriment of the
peasant farmer. Bates (1987) extends the scope of his previous work to consider both the
colonial and post-colonial periods, bringing into focus the evolution of African societies
across these two periods. His third essay in the collection is most relevant to our present
study.2. In it, Bates (1987) examines the implications of the contrasting policies in
Ghana and Kenya and explores the role of the nature of competition between peasant
farming and other more commercial interest in the determination of policy. This work
shows how state policy sought to allocate the benefits of production to special interest
by redistributing resources away from indigenous interests.
3.2 Arrighi (1970): Rhodesia
In his seminal work on political intervention in the labour market of Rhodesia, Arrighi
(1970) presents a compelling account of the development of wage labour in the African
state. In his paper, Arrighi (1970) accomplishes the twin goals of providing an effective
critique of the Barber (1961) and Lewis (1954) representation of the development of
an African workforce and providing an alternative theoretical explanation. According
to Arrighi (1970), the a priori assumptions of Barber (1961) callously misrepresented
African countries as existing in a original state of underdevelopment which, by the model
proposed in Lewis (1954), is gradually subsumed into the the capitalist sector as the pro-
cess of industrialization siphons labour away from the traditional subsistence economy.
Arrighi (1970) challenges this view, taking issues with several of the assumptions made
by Barber (1961). Contrary to Barber’s (1961) insistence that African states, up to the
1940s, experienced excess supplies of labour, Arrighi (1970) argues that in these coun-
tries the onset of capitalist development coincided with a state of labour scarcity. This
meant that in order to attract workers into the capitalist sector, high wages needed to
be paid to the indigenous workers, a cost that the capitalist sector was not prepared to
incur.
2The essay is titled Pressure groups, public policy, and agricultural development: a study of divergent
outcomes.
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According to Arrighi (1970), the African peasants allocated their labour-time taking
into consideration the effort-price of their decisions. More specifically, they weighed the
respective effort-price of engaging in agricultural production to that of engagement in
wage employment. Where the effort-price of peasant production was lower, they allo-
cated their labour-time to agriculture and shunned wage employment. This observation
by Arrighi (1970) disputes another of the claims in Barber (1961); the idea that Africans
did not at first respond to opportunities in wage employment because of unfamiliarity
with income improving opportunities. Using data on the cost of living index and African
participation rates for Rhodesia between 1904 and 1943, Arrighi (1970) demonstrates
that Africans, in several periods, altered the composition of their labour-time when
so incentivised by the wage offerings on the labour market. The true reason for the
low participation rates in wage labour overall, he concluded, must, therefore, lie in the
discretionary nature of African participation in wage employment and the unfavourable
comparison between the effort-price of this participation to that of income earnable from
peasant farming.
These two factors (the discretionary character of wage employment and the relative
effort-prices) meant that there did not exist a market clearing wage which allowed the
capitalist sector to be profitable. Consequently, according to Arrighi (1970, p.184),
“changes in wages were no longer to be the equilibrating factor in the labour market,
political mechanisms became of crucial importance in closing the gaps between supply
and demand for labour.” The Barber (1961) and Lewis (1954) models, starting from a
state of excess supply of labour and ignoring the political mechanisms at play up to the
1920s, thus, at best, provide an incomplete picture of the development of the African
labour force. Here again, these political interventions are of similar mould to that seen
in the British West Indies in Chapters 1 and 2. Arrighi (1970) notes several of these
so-called extra-market operations in Rhodesia.
First, he identifies incidences of forced labour which he explains was widely utilized
during the early days of settlement. This involved native commissioners and police
engaging village chiefs and headsmen to enforce a policy that villagers were conscripted
to supply work to Europeans at the minimum wage. This, in effect, eliminated the
discretionary element of labour market participation as Africans had no choice in the
matter. Arrighi (1970) found that much of the increases in labour supply 1908-1909 was
due to this practice (as much as a 50 percent increase). In 1911, these practices were
still in effect and help to significantly increase the participation rate of Africans in wage
labour.
A second political mechanism identified by Arrighi (1970), in operation in the Rhode-
sian labour market was taxation. Again, this practice sought to make participation in
the wage economy less discretionary by requiring money incomes that needed to be
gained by payments from wage labour. Arrighi (1970) points out this intention by not-
ing that payment in kind, which was traditionally accepted, were rejected for the hut
tax of 10s in an effort to induce Africans into wage employment. The results of taxation
as a political mechanism to drive Africans into wage labour were mixed, similar to that
observed in the West Indies. Arrighi (1970) notes that taxation did not discriminate
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between income from peasant production and income from wage labour and so, facing
higher taxes, peasants in areas where land was abundant intensified or expanded their
production of produce to generate the funds needed to pay taxes. This necessitated
an increase in labour-time devoted to peasant cultivation and, in these areas, had the
unintended consequence of reducing participation in wage employment.
To correct for this and alter the effort-price of participation in produce market for
peasants land expropriation proved most fitting. According to Arrighi (1970, p.195),
“by 1902 the African people had been expropriated from more than three-quarters of
all land in the country.” Such expropriation, and its consequences, proved a gradual
process. Much like the practice that we have shown in the case of labour-scarce British
West Indies, at first, peasants were allowed to stay on expropriated land in exchange
for labour services. The reasons for allowing the Africans to initially remain on the
land expropriated by Europeans is summed up by Arrighi (1970, p.608): “land was
abundant and labour-scarce, so that land with no labour on it had little value.” Hence
the necessity for the semi-feudalistic relationship which developed from such a practice.
Allowing Africans to remain on the land in exchange for labour time helped to reduce
their level of discretion toward participating in wage labour in the capitalist sector.
However, it had little effect on the relative effort-price of peasant production to wage
employment. To affect this effort-price a take-off of European agriculture would be
required. This would have the dual impact of supplying the capitalist sector with the
required food surpluses and allow Europeans (no longer dependent on food surpluses
from peasant farmers) to expel them from the land and therefore make wage labour (for
Africans) less effort-costly relative to producing to market. Arrighi (1970) notes that
such a take-off was not possible without state power being brought to bear upon the
indigenous farmers.
After 1904, the state became even more directly instrumental in the strengthening of
the competitive position of the European farmers. Arrighi (1970) cites the shifting of the
tax burden to the African population and the fact that the composition of government
expenditure had altered dramatically in favour of more public investments in European
agriculture. Government assistance came in various forms. Two specifically highlighted
by Arrighi (1970) were the introduction of a department of agriculture in 1903 and the
establishment of central farms where European settlers could acquire knowledge and
practices for local farming. Meanwhile, spending on indigenous agriculture remained
negligible. As the competitive position of the European farmer strengthened, that of
the African farmers weaken as the effort-price of participation in the produce market
increased relative to wage labour. Still, according to Arrighi (1970), the government
maintained strong support for the white farmers sponsoring grain development and en-
gaging in state funded recruitment of extraterritorial Africans to labour on European
farms. Figures from Arrighi (1970) indicate that the share of extraterritorial Africans in
the labour force rose from below 50 percent in 1904 to 68 percent by 1922. These factors
combined to cheapen the value of African labour and facilitate movement of Africans
into reserves where land quality was poor, hastening the decline of indigenous agricul-
ture in Rhodesia. What began as a state of excess land and discretion in terms of where
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to supply their labour, by the late 1920s, had turned to a situation of labour shortage
and a relatively high effort-price to participation in the produce market for Africans.
According to Arrighi (1970), it was only after these conditions had become ‘set-in’ and
an irreversible state for the indigenous people due to non-market mechanisms that the
process described by Lewis (1954), in which by market operations the capitalist sector
siphoned labour from the non-capitalist sector, became appropriate as a description of
development of the labour force in Rhodesia.
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3.3 Wilson (1972): South Africa
Wilson (1972), like that Arrighi (1970), also highlighted the presence of extra-market
forces in the determination of the supply of labour in the South African gold mines. Wil-
son (1972) begins by identifying two major factors which influenced the supply of mine
labour: recruiting organisations and the law. As far as recruiting was concerned, Wilson
(1972, p.72) notes that “by widening the sources of supply, recruiting was clearly effec-
tive in holding down wages, particularly of blacks...”. Relief from such wage repression
should have come at the outbreak of increased competition for labour as other sectors
began rapidly developing, and it did so for the white mine workers, but the aggressive
response of labour recruiters who ventured further inland for cheap labour meant that
the natives’ wages remained low. While these factors may be argued to be market forces,
Wilson (1972) uniquely identifies two types of African subsistence sector workers whose
difference help explain the approaches to the extra-market activities of the Chamber of
Mines.3 The first type of worker makes a decision on whether to leave his rural peasant
life behind based on whether his real earnings in the city are at least as large as that
which he receives in the rural sector. Wilson (1972) likens this type of worker to that
identified by Lewis (1954). The second type of worker is Wilson’s migrant-labourer who
works on the mines primarily to supplement the earnings which he receives from working
land as a peasant farmer. For the first type of worker, efforts at cheapening the supply
of labour need only focus on ensuring that the rural wage is kept as low as possible.
For the second type of worker (the migrant-labourer) “once employers have ensured
that subsistence earnings are lower than the worker requires to meet all his needs it
is in their interests not to allow the rural earnings to fall any lower” (Wilson, 1972,
p.74). The idea here is that a wage lower than this would simply mean that the wage
the migrant worker earns in the mining sector would need to be even greater. This is
because the wider the gap, the higher the supplementary wage offered by the employer
would need to be (or conversely, the smaller the gap, the smaller the supplementary
wage can be). Interestingly, this realization motivated arguments by the employers’
group against an increase in wages for migrant workers. According to Wilson (1972,
p.74) “the Chamber opposed this on the grounds that, although mine wages were lower
than what was generally agreed to be necessary minimum, they were in fact adequate
because the Commission had, the Chamber maintained, underestimated the migrants
income from land.” Other arguments included the thought that if black workers were
paid more, they would work less as they would quickly accumulate the supplementary
funds that they needed. The more repressive efforts against the indigenous workers,
however, according to Wilson (1972), came in the form of the comparatively repressive
attitudes of government and the Chamber towards black unionization relative to white
trade unions and influx control aided by the law.
Legislative power was regularly used to suppress black trade unions. Governments,
aided by the power of white trade unions, were particularly prejudicial against black trade
union activity. Wilson (1972) identified several instances where this prejudicial treatment
3The Chamber of Mines was founded in 1887 as mining industry employer organization.
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was used to repress the wages of the indigenous Africans and ensure a steady supply of
labour. One of the most significant ways, according to Wilson (1972) was the responses of
government commissions to black trade union activity. One such response came in 1941
when demands for better wages and working conditions were met by a government decree
explicitly outlawing all strikes by black workers under any circumstances. This was
preceded by war regulation No.1425 which, according to Wilson (1972, p.78), “prohibited
meetings of more than 20 persons of mine property without a permit.” There existed a
strong record of aggressive government repression of black workers with one example
being the government’s response to the 1946 strikes where “seventy men were dismissed,
nine were killed and more than twelve hundred injured” (Wilson, 1972, p.79). Wilson
(1972) concludes that these responses, along with the explicitly stated opposition to black
trade unions represented the attitude of both prior and successive governments to the
unionization of black workers. “The combination of Chamber opposition and government
legislation effectively prevented its (black trade unions) re-emergence and black workers
remain without countervailing weight to balance... the power of the Chamber of Mines.”
(Wilson, 1972, p.80).
Other legislation passed to increase the supply of labour included taxation, the Land
Act of 1913, the establishment of the Labour Department which Wilson (1972, p.2)
describes as having the “objective of assuring an adequate and regular supply of black
labour,” and the establishment of the Labour Association whose introduction was with
the explicit purpose of reducing wages. Many of the legislative actions of the repressive
state and private enterprises closely mirror that which we have identified in the West
Indies and other African territories. According to Wilson (1972), laws aimed at con-
trolling the movement of Africans (influx control) were among the most effective. In
particular, The Natives Urban Areas Act of 1923 laid the ground work for control of
the native labour force. Laws around influx control in effect made it “more difficult
for labourers to move to other farms or towns in search of better wages” (Wilson, 1972,
p.81). Wilson’s figures show that the intensity of enforcement increased in the late 1940s.
The number of convictions between 1948 and 1962 more than doubled from 176, 000 to
384, 000 and by 1969 the number of Africans convicted under laws restricting movement
was 632, 000, “more than one person for every minute of the day and night” (Wilson,
1972, p.81). Overall, between 1936 and 1962 the percentage of convictions as a share of
the black population had risen from 1.9 to 3.4 percent.
Regression analysis carried out by Wilson (1972) supports the hypothesis that en-
forcement on this scale significantly improved the supply of African labour to white
producers. Furthermore, the years after 1947, which we have identified as a period of
increased intensity movement control by white producers, were indeed more significantly
correlated with labour supply than earlier years.
3.4 Van Onselen (1976): Southern Rhodesia
Van Onselen (1976) noted some novel methods by the South Rhodesian miners to ex-
pand their supply of labour beyond that which the free market allocated. According to
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Van Onselen (1976), between 1898 and 1903, the South Rhodesian miners considered
solutions to the labour problem which were of two forms; the proletarian school and the
migrant school. The proletarian school considered developing a stable labour force which
resided on the mines along with their families, while the migrant school wanted migrant
employed at the mine under contracts but still attached to their families in rural areas.
Ultimately both approaches would fail to secure an adequate supply of cheap labour as
various impediments, including but not limited to the variety of outside options which
the peasants enjoyed and desertion by workers, made success in acquiring required labour
a near impossible tasks during this period. This failure was to be remedied during the
reconstruction era (1903-1912) with the introduction of various repressive labour con-
trol instruments, including taxation, restricting access to land for peasants, legislation,
contract “tickets”, wage debt, and the formation of various labour bureaus.
Just as we have seen from Wilson (1972), taxation on peasants was extensively used
with the purpose of increasing the cash requirements of the native population so as to
drive them to seek the required cash from mines. Van Onselen (1976) too identified
the contradicting forces at play in the use of taxation policy. Specifically, increases in
taxation, which increased peasant demand for cash, pushed them to expand the area
of land under cultivation and thus reduce the labour supply still further.4 At first,
Van Onselen (1976) explains, the Chamber of Mines proceeded to resolves this with a
recalcitrant attitude, arguing for further increases in tax, lobbying the Secretary of State
for a labour tax on top of the annual hut tax which the peasants already suffered. This
motion ultimately failed but, as Van Onselen (1976, p.97) points out, other measures,
including having tax collection, were “arranged in such a way as to spread the flow of
labour to the mining and [settler] agriculture industries.” As we have seen from Wilson
(1972), Van Onselen (1976) also concludes that while taxation on its own was limited
in its success as a labour generating device, when motivated by the intent to drive
natives off the land, it was more effective in sourcing native labour. Commenting on
land access, Van Onselen (1976, p.91) notes, “to maximise production of existing mines,
and the labour demands of a new class of producer, the small worker, both necessitated
an expanded labour force, so within Rhodesia the B.S.A took steps to increase supply.
Essentially this involved restricting further access to land during a period when the
peasantry was expanding its production by the sale of agricultural produce.”
Other measures to induce cheap labour ranged from the introduction of legislation
such as the Masters and Servants Ordinance, the Pass Laws and the Native Regulations
Ordinance to the individual actions of mine employers. Such actions included the use of a
ticketing system with its ambiguous terminology which was abused to unjustly lengthen
the contract of labourers. Employers also held workers’ wages in arrears to reduce the
risk of desertion by holding back a month of the worker’s wages, a sum that the employer
would eventual keep if a worker fled. While this did succeed in increasing the supply of
labour, nothing was more successful than the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (R.N.L.B)
formed in 1903.
The exposition of the operation of the R.N.L.B as an extremely coercive and repres-
4To make tax payments, peasants needed to acquire cash as‘in kind’ payments were not accepted.
CHAPTER 3. AFRICAN LITERATURE SURVEY 103
sive institution is one of the triumphs of the work of Van Onselen (1976) and is what,
for our present interest, takes the work beyond the repressive instruments highlighted
in Wilson (1972). Van Onselen (1976, p.104) identifies three tasks that the forma-
tion of the R.N.L.B. endeavoured to accomplish: ”the contradiction which arose from
trying to expand the labour supply during the years when the industry was also cut-
ting black wages..., secure for the Rhodesian mining industry its share of African labour
within the regional economic system... [and] channel a supply of African labour to mines
within Rhodesia which, because of poor conditions or exploitative practices, could not
normally secure ‘voluntary’ or, as it was sometimes called, ‘independent’ labour.” To
achieved these, the R.N.L.B. employed several aggressively coercive means. So ruthless
were the activities of the bureau that “work secured through the R.N.L.B. became know
as chibaro — ‘slavery’ or ‘forced labour’” (Van Onselen, 1976, p.104). And forced labour
it was indeed. The description presented by Van Onselen (1976, p.104-105) conveys as
much:
In some districts of North Western Rhodesia between 1904 and 1910, peas-
ants were simply rounded up by the Native Labour Commissioner’s African
messengers and sent to boma where they were handed over to agents of
the R.N.L.B. and their black assistants, and then marched to the South-
ern Rhodesian mines. Those peasants who refused to go were in some cases
whipped by the Native Commissioner or his black assistant, or in others had
their grain-stores burnt down.
Bureau agents also took to strategically positioning themselves to intercept vulnerable
natives on route to other labour markets. One such examples of was the ‘recruiting’ on
ferries which transported workers from region to region. In fact, according to Van On-
selen (1976), in 1908 the bureau was placed in charge of these ferries where they would
divert unsuspecting natives to the mines under forced labour practices.
Another means of obtaining labour utilised by the R.N.L.B. was by trapping peasants
in debt in misleading schemes. Here again Van Onselen (1976, p.108-109) provides a
useful description of these schemes:
The R.N.L.B. advanced supplies of cloth, grain and cash to the poorest mem-
bers of traditional society. These men from the very periphery of the regional
economic system thus started their R.N.L.B. contract with the added burden
of indebtedness... One stratagem employed by agents was to intercept ‘in-
dependent’ workers and then, under the guise of having greater powers than
they really possessed, to order them to remain one place until ‘authorisation’
for the continuation of their journey had been received. Once the men had
waited for a number of days and exhausted their food supplies, they would be
forced to accept the R.N.L.B. ‘offer’ of further food in exchange for a contract
with chibaro.
While such activities proved fruitful, the effectiveness of the bureau was greatly en-
hanced by how well it linked with other mechanisms aimed at expanding and cheapening
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the labour supply. One such example, according to Van Onselen (1976), was the situation
where, as the rising tax burden created for ‘tax defaulters’ in the African community,
Native Commissioners would send these defaulters to R.N.L.B. agents. Some would suf-
fer this fate even when the taxes had been paid. This link was strengthened with the
introduction of the Pass Law which restricted the movement of natives. Not only was
there a practice in some districts to only offer passes to individuals who had agreed to
serve with the R.N.L.B., but also, R.N.L.B. agents themselves were licensed as ‘pass
officers’, putting the ability of the natives to move around in search of work directly in
the hands of the R.N.L.B.. Summarising the success of the bureau, Van Onselen (1976,
p.114) notes: “It was the R.N.L.B. that ensured the industry its share of labour drawn
from within a regional economic system in which it could not offer competitive wages.
It was the supply of chibaro-labour which ensured that mines who could not attract a
supply of ‘voluntary’ labour remained in continuous production.”
3.5 Mosley (1983): Kenya and Southern Rhodesia
This work sought to improve the existing database on the economic history of Kenya
and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), but eventually “traced certain elements of [their]
economic history... over the entire colonial period” (Mosley, 1983, p.2). The more
relevant elements to our present work is the political constraints on economic behaviour
and the labour market during the colonial period. Mosley (1983, p.2) insists that “the
historical development of the settler economies must, indeed, be seen as a process of
mutual interaction between the economy and the political system...”. The author pointed
out the simultaneous nature of policy determination and policy variables, describing the
process as a relationship running from the political system to the economy and from the
economy to the political system. In so doing Mosley (1983) highlights several deficiencies
in what at the time stood as the stereotypical view of the economic system of the so called
‘Settler Economies’. Of this view, which characterised the settler economies as entities
comprising a largely inefficient European minority bourgeois farming class whose survival
was assured only by the use of the state apparatus to coerce African labour onto white
farms, Mosley (1983) notes several significant contradictions.
First, Mosley (1983) uses empirical data on yields per acre from 1920-60 for Southern
Rhodesia and Kenya to show that the “the stereotypical view that European agriculture
in settler economies was uniformly less efficient” was indeed inaccurate (Mosley, 1983,
p.172). In fact, the data confirm that during the inter-war period, maize yields for Kenya
and Southern Rhodesia were only below that of Argentina when compared to other ma-
jor producers. Furthermore, coffee yields in Kenya equalled that of Brazil, and tobacco
yields for Southern Rhodesia were on par with that of Australia. Second, Mosley (1983)
identifies the conflict which existed within the settler-producer group as a crucial con-
tradiction to the homogeneous rural settler bourgeoisie which, at the time, the existing
literature on underdevelopment theory espoused. More specifically, Mosley (1983) reex-
amines ‘Crown land’ and ‘alienated land’ policy to highlight the critical conflicts which
arose between different types of settler-producers, and points out the importance of con-
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sidering these conflicts when trying to understand the outcomes of policy intervention
by the colonial government. As a third contention with the existing literature (at the
time), Mosley (1983) dismantles the idea of a powerless African peasantry. The African
peasantry posed significant problems for the settler-farmers on two fronts: economic
and political. Using statistical evidence on African farmers’ productivity, Mosley (1983)
effectively argues against a uniform decline in African agriculture and that, in fact, the
1920s and 1930s saw high productivity in this sector. This, he explains, put upward
pressure on the supply price of labour for settler-farmers, who had to resort to economic
incentives to curb labour shortages on their farms. So too did economic concession won
by the organised political action of African labourers who posed a significant industrial
threat to the white settler-farmers in the 1940s.
These revelations notwithstanding, Mosley (1983, p.130) agrees that “political mech-
anisms of course had their place also, as was inevitable in a an environment where small-
scale farmers not only could not afford to increase wages in time[s] of labour shortage,
but also risk social ostracism within the local Farmers’ Association if they did so...”. In
fact, Mosley (1983) identified several of these political mechanisms through which the
white settler-farmers of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia sought to expand and cheapen
the supply of labour. These mechanisms (or extra-market operations) included non-wage
adjustments, legislation, recruited labour, and juvenile and female labour.
With respect to non-wage adjustment, Mosley (1983) cites the recommendations of
the Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Commission of 1910 and the Kenya Native labour
Commission of 1912, which were “unanimous in their recommendations for government
action to augment the labour supply” (Mosley, 1983, p.131). He notes that all European
producers supported increasing taxes and restricting the land reserves available to native
Africans. According to Mosley (1983), even when variations in tax rates were not used to
control labour supply (after 1903 in Southern Rhodesia and after 1920 in Kenya) there
was a significant increase in the intensity of tax collection by local governments who had
advised staff to maximise their tax collection in years of labour shortage. Mosley (1983)
points out that the specific nature of some taxes seemed to be so engineered as to have the
specific purpose of expanding labour supply. He notes (p.131), that some taxes “which
fell on [African] agriculture but not on labour income, were.. a more effective instrument
in channeling Africans into the labour market than [others]... which did not discriminate
between sources of income.” Much like in the labour-scarce British West Indies during
the post colonial period, these taxes and efforts to reduce the availability of land were
overwhelmingly aimed at forcing labour back onto farms of European producers.
The second political mechanism, according to Mosley (1983), used to control the sup-
ply of labour in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya was legislation. He identifies three main
types: ‘compulsory labour legislation’, ‘resident labour (squatter) legislation’ and ‘reg-
istration certificate (pass law) legislation’. On compulsory labour, Mosley (1983, p.134)
explains “administrators [commonly] made ad hoc requests to Chief Native Commis-
sioners for workers for mines and farms that badly needed help,” and that “state-backed
recruitment organizations took a great deal of the task of securing labour for less pop-
ular employers off the shoulders of the government” in Southern Rhodesia. In terms of
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resident labour legislation Mosley (1983, p.134) describes them as being “unique to the
settler colonies” and explains that these policies left many Africans without land and
so acted to subject them to rendering “a quota of labour if they wished to continue to
occupy alienated land.” Mosley (1983) also provides specific pieces of legislation which
served this purpose. In Southern Rhodesia, the Private Locations Ordinance of 1908
was a form of land restriction and was complemented by a rental fee per acre of Crown
land, “the net effect of the two measures being to drive many Africans living outside
the reserves either back into the reserves or alternatively into employment on European
farms” (Mosley, 1983, p.134). Similar motives underlie the Resident Natives Ordinance
of 1919 in Kenya. The other critical piece of legislation involved registration certificates
or ’passes’ for Africans who ventured outside the reserves. Here again Mosley (1983,
p.135) notes that “the principal function of the pass was to keep down the wages of
Africans at times of labour shortage when they might otherwise have been pushed up-
ward.” These passes recorded information on the period of employment and the wage
paid by a former employer and thus limited the power of an African to switch employers
to bargain for a wage higher than his supply price.
Among the other measures employed in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia to expand and
cheapen the labour supply was the practice of recruited labour. These were less repressive
in nature than outright forced labour legislation, but were no less crucial as a means of
expanding the labour supply and cheapening the supply price. Much like indentureship
in the British West Indies, recruited labour practices in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya
involved securing labour from outside the country on fixed-term contracts and at prices
below the prevailing domestic market wages. However, as pointed out by Mosley (1983),
in Kenya and Rhodesia, recruiting was carried out by private organization, whereas this
was directly carried out by the government in the West Indian case. Nevertheless, these
labourers, like those under indentureship in the West Indies, once recruited, were bound
by the terms of their contracts and thus subjected to much of the abuses of ’unfree’
labour.
In his second chapter, which deals with the political constraints on economic be-
haviour, Mosley (1983) makes the case that government intervention in the settler
economies was endogenous to economic variables, in that intervention was a response
to economic factors. He explains that the level of subsidy on maize, and to some ex-
tent the structure of export rail rates, could be seen as a “conditioned governmental
response to situations of crisis” (Mosley, 1983, p.142). Similarly, the extra-market op-
erations identified above may be described as conditioned employer response to labour
shortage,” which describe a crisis on the input side (Mosley, 1983, p.142). These argu-
ments support Mosley’s argument that there exist a significant simultaneous interplay
between economic conditions and political mechanisms. That is, there exists, as Mosley
(1983, p.2) describes, “a process of mutual interaction between the economy and the
political system,” and that a model which ignores this simultaneity risks painting “a
picture which is the reverse of the truth.” We took heed of this warning in testing our
hypothesized relationship between labour supply and institutions in Chapter 2 and in
our subsequent Chapter 4 with the estimation of a two stage least square instrumental
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variable regression.
3.6 Bates (1981): Various African States
One of the more comprehensive analyses of state intervention into markets in former colo-
nial states can be found in Bates (1981). The author uses a rational choice framework
to explain the historical, political and economic origins of the development problems
of Africa, paying explicit attention to the plight of African farmers who form part of
the continent’s largest economic sector. Bates’s approach recognizes that government
intervention in the African agricultural economy is concentrated around intrusion in
three primary markets: the market for agricultural output (both cash crops produced
for export and food stuff for the domestic market), the market for inputs used in the
production of agricultural goods, and the market for the good which agricultural produc-
ers consume (that is, the manufactured goods from the urban sector). By investigating
the government’s role in manipulating the operations of these key markets and link-
ing it to their various motivations, Bates (1981) provides much needed context for the
pervasiveness of state intrusion and its consequences.
Bates’s work is instructive in many respects, not least because it highlights motiva-
tions, themes and specific behaviours of state actors which carry the familiar patterns
which we have previously explored in our investigation of the British West Indies. This
is especially evident in his chapters one through three, where Bates discusses the states’
attempts to manipulate the prices received by farmers in the export and domestic mar-
ket. Describing the agricultural policies of African states, Bates (1981, p.4) notes, “they
intend to transform their economies; they intend to move resources from agriculture to
industry; and therefore they set prices in markets in order to capture resources from agri-
culture.” This evokes the spirit of interventionism that we identified in Chapter 1 where
we examined the revenue extraction motive behind extra-market operations conducted
by the planter elite. This extraction, Bates (1981) explains, is made possible through
the monopsony power of a state institution known as marketing boards, an institution
with origins in the colonial period. Bates (1981, p.12) notes that “by using their market
power to keep the price paid to farmer below the price set by the world market, they
accumulate funds from the agriculture sector.” This sort of market intervention through
the use of marketing boards could be extremely potent as a source of revenue appropri-
ation. Figures from Bates (1981, p.12) various sources show that these agencies handled
as much as “90 percent of the exports of palm kernels, 80 percent of exports of coffee,
65 percent of exports of tea, and 60 percent of exports of ram cotton.”
The appropriation of these revenues from indigenous farmers was exacerbated by the
fact that the government, even during the colonial period, would divert the funds ac-
quired by these boards toward, as Bates (1981, p.13) puts it, “subsidizing the acquisition
of raw materials by their imperial overlords and the reconstruction of the homelands of
their colonisers.” Such diversions were not rare. Indeed, they were the norm during the
post colonial period when the revenue imperative was strengthened by the desire of local
government to acquire financial resources to reward their electorate. This amounted to
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a deliberate transfer of resources from agriculture to the modern sector. Bates (1981)
places marketing boards at the centre of the market intervention against the agriculture
sector at the end of the post-colonial era. By that period, the functioning of these mar-
keting agencies had strayed far from their original purpose of protecting the indigenous
farmers, to maximising the size of the revenue surpluses. To this end, they had moved
from subsidizing farmers to imposing taxes on the agriculture sector.
Bates (1981) identifies two other beneficiaries of the exploitation of farmers enabled
by marketing agencies: the investors in industry and manufacturing, and bureaucrats.
“[These] industrialists seek concessionary prices for raw materials, and both use in-
struments of the state to secure their needs by appropriating resources from peasants”
(Bates, 1981, p.19). Describing the nature of the relationship as state-sponsored capi-
talism, Bates (1981) notes that marketing agencies in many African states consistently
lent funds appropriated from farmers to corporations who abused this privileged finan-
cial relationship to redistribute income from farmers to industrialists. The state actors
benefited from this redistribution as it meant that they could influence the types and
location of projects that these funds were invested toward; “such as a plant location that
is political desirable” (Bates, 1981, p.25). As for the bureaucrats who are charged with
organizing the markets, Bates (1981, p.27) describes them as abusive of “their monopo-
listic positions so as to radically enhance their [personal] incomes.” According to Bates
(1981), the marketing agency bureaucrats, through their significant price setting power,
were able to sustain large inefficiencies in operations. In fact, Bates (1981) sources data
which indicates that between 10 and 35 percent of the differential between the price of
agriculture on the world market and that received by the farmer went towards marketing
board costs.
In addition to the revenue motive, there also existed, as we have touched upon,
a political motive behind state intervention into the agriculture sector. This motive
manifested in the governments’ intrusion into the market for agricultural inputs as well
as the price that farmers received for domestic food crops. We have already seen from
Bates’s exposition, how the state, through marketing boards, lowered the price that
farmers receive from cash crops to below the world market price in order to generate
revenue, but there was indeed another motive also at play. Turning to the domestic
food market, Bates (1981) explains that political pressure for low-cost food, both from
urban workers (the political elite’s constituents) and the fact that the government as an
employer faces increased wage demands when the cost of food is high, encourages the
government to intervene in market operations to appease these two interests. For the
farmer, this alliance between the urban worker and the government invariably means
a lowering of the price he receives on the domestic food market as governments use
agricultural policy to curb the demands of urban workers while avoiding higher wage
bills for themselves. Writing on the matter, Bates (1981, p.35) states: “agricultural
policy is thus derivative. It is devised to cope with political problems whose origins lie
outside the agricultural sector. Pricing policy finds its origins in the struggle between
urban interests and their governments; and in the political reconciliation of that struggle
it is the rural producers who bare that cost: they are the ones who bare the burden of
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policies designed to lower the price of goods.”
Bates (1981) goes on to identify two major ways that African governments manipulate
the price of food (the prices of farmers output): (i) through the manipulation of trade
policies and (ii) through the use of government controlled marketing institutions. Bates
(1981) argues that African governments manipulated trade policies in several ways which
adversely affected African development. One of the key practices was the maintenance
of an over-valued exchange rate to facilitate cheap imports which competed directly
with the food products produced by indigenous farmers. Furthermore, according to
Bates (1981), governments deliberately avoided tariff protection for farmers as they
intended to keep food prices low for the urban areas which formed a key part of their
electorate and banned the export of farmers’ food crops when the domestic price is
below the world price. With regard to marketing institutions, Bates (1981) identifies
African governments’ practice of creating monopsonistic marketing board for food crops
much like those implemented for cash crop exporters. The practices of these institutions
included buying farm produce at price-controlled (reduced) levels and the importation of
competing food stuff to be redistributed at lower prices in the urban sector. This created
significant competition for the local farmers, according to Bates (1981). While this kept
the cost of food for urban areas low, it greatly reduced the returns to agriculture for
local producers. In this sense, both the returns to agricultural capital and labour are
significantly negatively altered, forcing farmers to pay lower wages —much like the wage
manipulation efforts that we observed in the West Indies in Chapter 1. Furthermore,
according to Bates (1981, p.43), “when the elite engages in the production of a food
item, policies are not employed to depress its price.”
In fact, not dissimilar to what we observed in Chapter 1, which described the setting
in the British West Indies, Bates (1981) notes that governments, ran by the political elite,
engaged in direct competition in agricultural production with farmers, though the motive
was different. In the African case, government competition in the form of state farms
was created with the immediate intent to “enter the food market and set themselves
up as rivals to the peasant producer... [and] sell their products below the prevailing
market prices” (Bates, 1981, p.46). The reason being that the aim of the government
was to keep the electorate happy by providing cheap food. Bates (1981) reports that
these farm incurred large debts and consumed disproportionately large shares of public
resources in pursuit of this aim. The government further subsidized farm inputs to
the advantage of the large scale elite producers. Subsidies included, “the acquisition
of land for commercial farming..., tax holidays..., the development and distribution of
improved seeds...” and cheap state credit to these large farms (Bates, 1981, p.49-52).
These subsidies often came at the expense of the mass of peasant farmers. Describing
the practice, Bates (1981, p.56) writes, “the resources allocated to these programs have
been channelled to those whose support is politically useful or economically rewarding
to the state — that is, to members of the elite.”
Finally, government’s intervention into the third market — the market for commodi-
ties consumed by the farmers from the urban industrial sector — manifests in govern-
ment efforts to shield the manufacturing firms from competition. This, Bates (1981)
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argues, inevitably leads to farmers paying part of the cost of industrialization. African
governments find it politically advantageous to protect the manufacturing sector from
competition and so impose effective and nominal protection5 measures in aid of the
industrial sector. “Few barriers are placed on the importation of goods used by the in-
dustries but protection is given to their products” (Bates, 1981, p.65). The consequence
of this is an increase in domestic prices and a fall in the real incomes of the mass of the
farming population. Bates (1981) concludes with the observation that the appropriation
of revenue from cash crop exports by marketing agencies, depression of domestic prices of
farm products for political benefit, and the implementation of policies providing effective
protection to the manufacturing sector have all served to reduce farmer’s real returns
and enhanced the flight of capital and labour from agriculture to the manufacturing
sector. This led to the under-development of African agriculture and contributed to the
poor economic performance of Africa at large.
3.7 Bates (1987): Kenya and Ghana
Bates (1987) considers the case of African societies in three periods: pre-colonistion, dur-
ing colonisation and during the post-colonial period. Of key interest to our research are
the questions that Bates (1987) addresses during and after colonisation. Under colonisa-
tion, the author investigates how the colonial system distorted patterns of development
in rural Africa. Bates (1987) looks at how colonisation biased the allocation of resources,
as well as how the economic change which took place during the colonial period formed
the catalyst for the nationalist movements which drove out the colonial powers. As for
the post-colonial era, Bates (1987, p.2) notes that he seeks to answer three key questions.
These include: ”why do the states of Africa choose policy which impoverish its farmers?
What influences the selection of these policies? And how do certain governments remain
in power even when the adopt policies which are antithetical to the interest of most of
their citizens?”
The most relevant (for our discussion) essays in the book analyze the reasons for the
contrasting patterns of agricultural development and the role of agricultural factors in
igniting political unrest in Africa in the colonial period. In the first of these essays, Bates
(1987) studies the case of Ghana and Kenya to highlight the origins of their contrasting
agricultural development. Bates (1987, p.61) notes that “in one case [Kenya], producer
interests became paramount in the colonial period; in the other [Ghana], the interest of
producers were sacrificed to those of other sectors.”
Bates (1987) narrows the examination down to two aspects; the inputs to farming and
the market for farming. Investigating the inputs to farming, Bates (1987) considered the
difference between Ghana and Kenya as they related to labour, land, and capital. With
regard to labour, Bates (1987, p.61-62) notes that the Kenya farmers “struggled against
5According to Bates (1981, p.65), nominal protection is that which is given to the price of products
by the imposition of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports. Effective protection, on the other
hand, is protection given to profits of firms. African governments preferred effective protection so as to
not increase prices to politically undesirable levels.
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the wage rate set in the private market” and sought to remedy this ill by endeavouring
to manipulate the “public arena to set prices advantageous to themselves... much of
the politics of the early period of Kenya revolved around attempts to lower the supply
price of labour.” (Bates, 1987, 62). He identified several instances of such behaviour
on the part of the settler (European) farmers in their attempts to limit competition
from government hiring, restrict the ownership of land by the native people and limit
the variety of crops that the natives could grow. The settler farmers also leveraged the
privileged position to pressure the government to places coercive taxes on the native
population to force them into labouring in the commercial sector.
The labour market interventions, highlighted by Bates (1987), carried out by the
Kenya settler farmers, closely resemble those of the European planters in the labour-
scarce colonies of the West Indies. The problems of the Jamaican planter and that of
the Kenyan farmer emerge from the same root cause: the abundance of land relative
to people. Thus, European farmers in both areas adopted strategies around reducing
the availability of land in an effort to reduce competition for labour from subsistence
farming.
By contrast, the actions of the Ghanaian farmers, which Bates (1987) notes were
starkly different to those of the Kenyan farmers, more closely resembled those of the
planters in labour-rich West Indian colonies. He explained that the cocoa farmers of
Ghana made little effort to alter the labour market of the country. The reason for
this contrast,Bates (1987) explains, lies in the difference in the relationships between
the commercial and subsistence sectors in the two countries. Specifically, (Bates, 1987,
p.63) notes that the degree of complementarity between the commercial farming sector
(producing cocoa and other cash crops) and the production of food crops was particularly
high. (Bates, 1987, p.62) explains, “in establishing cocoa farms, food crops such as
plantains, cocoyams, and peppers, are used to provide shading for young cocoa trees...
[In addition] young cocoa trees require very little care... young trees were simply left to
grow naturally.” Furthermore, “the peak period of labour demand, complements, rather
than rivals, the period of peak demand for labour in the production of food crops.” The
result was that commercial farmers in Ghana did not suffer from a want of labour and
thus had no incentive to coerce labour away from subsistence activities.
The absence of this motivation to aggressively alter the free labour market was also
a feature of the labour-rich West Indian colonies. The situation in the West Indies did
not arise because of complementarity between the subsistence and commercial farming
sector. However, because subsistence farming was not an option available to the pop-
ulation in these territories, labourers found that supplying their labour to plantations
was a useful way to generate income. In this way, labourers in labour-rich colonies like
Barbados and Antigua depended on plantations for subsistence income — they needed
the planters’ land to complement their labour in order to secure a means of survival.
According to Bates (1987), the development of property rights in Kenya followed
a process which overwhelming favoured the commercial settler farmers. This, Bates
(1987) explains, is another source of the difference in agriculture development in Kenya
and Ghana. While the establishment of land rights in Kenya involved the forceful redis-
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tribution of land from native farmers to white settler farmers, farmers in Ghana had to
fully compensate the subsistence farmers who initially owned the land. Interestingly, the
development of land rights in the West Indian territories were more similar to that of
Kenya. That is, in the sugar colonies, where the formation of plantation society meant
that the majority of the population were held as slaves, only the European planters had
rights to land. This applied to both labour-rich and labour-scarce colonies. Yet, the
actions of the planters in labour-rich colonies (like Antigua and Barbados) more closely
resembled that of the Ghanaian farmers while those of the labour-scarce colonies (like
Jamaica) mirror that of the settler farmers in Kenya. The reason for this difference in the
West Indian planters’ actions is the different realities of the labour market in labour-rich
and labour-scarce colonies. More specifically, the scarcity of labour in Jamaica meant
that there was strong incentive to manipulate wages, while a surplus of labour in An-
tigua, Saint Kitts and Barbados meant that this motive was absent. Thus, as mentioned
in previous chapters, the efforts of Jamaican and Guyanese planters to keep land out of
the hands of subsistence farmers were similarly made by Kenyan farmers through various
land committees like that of 1905, which pressured the government to confine natives to
marginal lands.
There were, however, critical differences between the plight of the Kenyan settler
farmers and planters in labour-scarce Jamaica and Guyana. First, the Kenyan settler
farmers faced competition from not only subsistence farming but also government em-
ployment and the railway construction sector. Secondly, the Jamaican and Guyanese
planters were also members of the island government, an institution that they held a
near monopoly over.6 The Kenyan settler farmers, on the other hand, had to rely on
lobbying and collective political action to have their will carried out through government.
These differences meant that Jamaican planters had much lower cost in the efforts to
artificially reduce the wage rate below the free market level. This fact allowed them to
be very effective in this regard. The result was that the Jamaican planters were able to
more easily setup and fundamentally alter institutions to advantage themselves in the
labour market. Nonetheless, there are strong parallels between what we observe in the
West Indies and in other colonies, such as those in Africa.
6Carvalho and Dippel (2016) report that over 85 percent of representatives in the Jamaican parliament
were planters while a further 10 percent were of planting interests (as they were merchants).

Chapter 4
On the Manifestation of Colonial
Labour Problems in Present Day
Labour Institutions
4.1 Introduction
Does history determine the quality of labour institutions today? Holmlund (2014, p.62)
describes labour market institutions as “policy interventions or collective organizations
that interfere with wage and employment determination.” The efficiency (and overall
quality) of these institutions is a function of the relationships between agents in the
labour market. From the previous chapters, we have seen that, for labour-scarce colonial
territories, these relationships have historically been poor. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have
shown that intervention by extra-market forces has led to institutional oppression of
labour, which has fractured industrial relations. However, research on the determinants
of labour institutions have largely ignored the historical circumstances from which these
institutions have developed. The present chapter plugs this gap in the literature. We
consider the development of labour institutions in a context that gives due consideration
to the historical realities within which they evolved.
We examine the case of former European colonies located between the Tropic of Can-
cer in the northern hemisphere, and the Tropic of Capricorn in the southern hemisphere,
otherwise known as ‘tropical dependencies’.1 Colonial writer Shaw (1906) popularized
the term tropical dependency as a description of the tropical colonies in which the
colonial policy of the European colonizer was invariably exploitation. The historical
literature suggests that such colonies were created for economic gain rather than set-
tlement. Their agriculturally desirable location facilitated the production of valuable
cash crops, using the labour of the native populations ruled by a small number of Eu-
ropeans. These colonies offered attractive opportunities for large scale production in
1In Figure C1 of the appendix to this chapter, we provide a list of former tropical colonies for which
we have labour institutions data.
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high-value European imports. As such, labour was crucial, so various forms of forced
labour were introduced to help maintain a steady supply of labour. What makes this
group of countries particularly interesting is that the labour issues dominated all aspects
of life. Consequently, the blueprint of these societies was delimited by the demands of
the production process. We exploit this historical event to show that the effect of the
labour problem that emerged during this colonial era has not only persisted, but also
continues to affect the quality of labour institutions today.
This research represents a departure from the current literature on the colonial ori-
gins of institutions in two important ways. First, we emphasise that historical context
must be given due consideration when assessing the determinants of labour institutions.
Secondly, the focus here is on institutions that affect labour, whereas property rights
institutions have received overwhelming attention from institutionalists. Recent scholar-
ship supports the ‘reversal of fortune’ story which proposes that more densely populated
colonies motivated Europeans to develop more extractive colonial institutions, leading
to growth restricting institutions today. Implicit in this theory is the idea that the abun-
dance of a resource (in this case, labour) can motivate the development of a particular
type of economic institution. In this chapter, we explore this idea and show that the
reversal of fortune relationship is reversed when colonial population density and labour
institutions in former tropical colonies are considered. This is because the stronger mo-
tivating factor was the abundance of highly productive land for crop production. To
exploit this land, where labour was abundant, persons were willing to work for minimal
compensation and without much coercion. In Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2), we laid out the
channels through which colonial labour scarcity affects institutional development. We
can apply this to the nature of labour institutions today as well. Where labour was
scarce, extensive coercion and repression was required, leading to a historically antag-
onistic relationship between capitalists and the labour force. This conflict resulted in
rigid industrial relations and labour market institutions. This relationship is also unique
to the tropical colonies where cash crops were particular easy to grow. The simple form
of this hypothesis is depicted in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Tropical Dependency Hypothesis
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Simply put, we propose that where the climate and geography were suitable for
large-scale cash crop production and mineral extraction (in tropical dependencies), the
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need for a reliable labour force determined the very make up of society and the eventual
development of labour institutions. Where the population was denser, the Europeans
required less repressive devices to obtain a reliable supply of cheap labour. Harsher and
more repressive methods were needed to ensure this supply where the population was
sparse and labour unavailable. This led to more rigid labour relations and institutions
(such as slavery and other forms of forced labour) and social conflict. These early
outcomes have persisted today. Furthermore, we expect that this systematic relationship
between colonial period population density and present day quality of labour institutions
is non-existent for countries outside the group of tropical dependencies, because the large-
scale, labour-intensive agricultural production motivation was absent. The above theory
contrasts with that proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2002) because we are considering
a different set of institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2002) consider institutions of private
property, and suggest that where colonial populations were denser, it was more attractive
for the colonial power to employ extractive colonial policy, which secured property rights
for the elite and exposed the masses to expropriation. The relationship between colonial
population density and labour institutions, which we propose here, works differently. As
we have explained above, this is because of what population density meant for available
labour and, thus, the development of labour relations and labour institutions.
A test of this hypothesis results in some interesting findings. We use OLS and two-
stage least square methods to analyse the effect of the availability of labour during the
colonial period (measured by colonial population density) on the present day quality of
labour institutions (measured by the labour market flexibility today). Our findings indi-
cate that while tropical dependencies had, on average, lower scores for quality of labour
institutions than the rest of the world, higher colonial labour supply was associated with
significantly higher levels of present day institutional quality for these tropical colonies.
We also found that the systematic relationship between colonial labour availability and
the quality of labour institutions (as measured by labour market flexibility) was unique
to the tropical colonies. In fact, 1 percent higher colonial population density is asso-
ciated with a present day labour market flexibility score which is 0.04 percent higher,
relative to the mean score. When we considered other colonies and countries that were
not colonised, there is no significant relationship between historic population density
and scores for the quality of labour institution today. In addition, our instrumental
variable regressions show that there is a causal relationship running from colonial labour
availability, to post colonial labour conflict. Specifically, for tropical dependencies, we
observe that a 1 percent increase in colonial labour availability was associated with a
0.64 percent reduction in the number of days of work lost due to strikes and lockouts in
the post-colonial period.
This paper proceeds as follows; in the next section we explain, in a qualitative way,
the channels through which colonial labour problems have manifested in present day
labour rigidities. In section 4.3, we review the existing literature on determinants of
rigid labour institutions. Section 4.4 makes the case for flexible labour institutions as a
desirable economic feature. A theoretical model of conflict and wage expropriation —
which relates colonial land-labour availability to conflict between labour market actors
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— is considered in section 4.5. The data and research design are presented in section
4.6, while section 4.7 details the OLS and 2SLS instrumental variable regression results.
Section 4.8 concludes the chapter.
4.2 From Repression to Rigidity
Here, we make a heretofore absent, rigorous attempt at directly connecting the colonial
labour problem to present day outcomes of labour institutions. To understand this, we
may partition European colonialism into two periods; New World Colonisation, which
refers to the period beginning at the end of the 15th century when the Europeans
colonized the Americas, and New Imperialism during the late 19th and 20th century,
which refers to the colonisation of parts of Asia and the ‘Scramble for Africa’.
During New World Colonisation, much of what is now Latin America and the
Caribbean became tropical dependencies. Spain and Portugal, being the early colonists
in the Americas, settled in areas where large numbers of native Americans were available
as a substantial supply of labour, while the British were left to settle for the more sparsely
populated Caribbean region (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002). The existing labour supply
among the Latin American and Caribbean colonies afforded the colonist in the more
densely populated continental lands the opportunity to implement institutional controls
under an encomienda system2 and, later, repartimiento3 over the native population.
When the native population sufficiently declined, and where the numbers were too few
from the onset, enslaved Africans were introduced as slave labour to the silver and gold
mines as well as the coastal cash crop plantations. The escalation of the harshness and
degree of repression of the introduced labour institution can, therefore, be seen to be in-
creasing in the severity of the labour problem. In densely populated colonies like Mexico
and Peru, the elites relied on indenture or similar forced labour institutions to extract
labour from the natives, whereas, in sparsely populated colonies, the total institution of
slavery was required (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002). These rigid labour institutions rep-
resented Latin America’s first experience with the use of labour in large scale capitalist
production and was, thus, the foundation upon which labour institutions evolved.
The Scramble for Africa, also motivated by the pursuit of tropical resources, required
labour-intensive production methods for imperial export. Similarly, scarce labour had
to be effectively controlled to guarantee the same. Writing on the persistence of colo-
nial institutions, Acemoglu et al. (2001) explain that a litany of extractive institutions
introduced by colonial powers have persisted after independence because irreversible
investments and sunk costs in their construction make abandoning these repressive in-
stitutions less attractive. We explored this path dependent behaviour in Chapter 2.
Similar arguments apply to the persistence of repressive and inflexible colonial labour
institutions. The culture of restrictive labour institutions has manifested in several ways
which serve as hindrances to the performance of labour market institutions today. One
2Under this system, Spanish colonists were awarded lands and the forced labour of native inhabitants.
3Repartimiento involved the distribution of the native population to serve as labourers for Spanish
colonists.
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can certainly identify the imprints of this colonial legacy in labour market regulations,
the political ethos of labour movements and the nature of social dialogue among ac-
tors in the labour market, all of which are intimately linked to the level of rigidity and
inefficiency plaguing labour markets in former tropical dependencies.
That labour regulations today have colonial origins logically implies that these reg-
ulations were influenced by the nature of the issues faced by the designers of colonial
labour institutions. This is evident in former colonies like India, where labour insti-
tutions developed under the unequal relationship between capital and labour and can
trace their origins back to British colonial rule (Papola and Pais, 2007). Invariably,
across the former tropical dependencies, the class of persons with the most power to
shape labour institutions were colonists, and throughout these colonies they chose to
pursue an agenda which protected their interests and sought to curb the labour prob-
lem. Where this problem was more severe, more drastic measures were required. Costly
regulations, for example, are the reflection of the legacy of colonialism, and they intro-
duce high levels of bureaucracy and restrict the development of smaller scale productive
activities (Tokman, 2008). The attempt to restrict peasants’ productive activities, in
particular, was driven by the need to eliminate competition for already scarce labour.
This led to the development of a system of labour laws and predatory contracts which
sought to continually exploit the nominally free labour force (Bolland, 1981). The inter-
ventions highlighted in our previous chapters provide strong evidence for this conclusion.
In turn, the response of labour movements against the owners of capital led to a cul-
ture of regulation which promotes inflexible labour structures that perpetuate rigidity
and labour insecurity, simultaneously. It is the intersection of this exploitation and the
antagonistic response to it, which served to gestate the overwhelming levels of rigid-
ity observed in early and present-day labour market institutions in the tropical region.
Among economies that fit into our tropical dependency group, according to the World
Bank’s Doing Business Index for 20144, African countries recorded the worst scores in
terms of difficulty of hiring and the rigidity of working hours. In addition, these coun-
tries fare better than only South Asia where difficulty in firing workers is concerned. A
composite index of these 3 sub-indices places the African labour institutions as the most
rigid in the world (Alby et al., 2005). Similar levels of rigidity are found by Loayza et al.
(2004) in Latin America. The authors observe that the region employs 2.6 times more
regulations than the OECD countries, less than only Africa and parts of the Middle
East.
This level of rigidity in labour institutions among former tropical dependencies is
not, however, merely the result of a one-sided exercise of power by labour organisations
or capitalist elites. It is the product of a two-sided struggle between labour and capital
in which labour, through its collective effort, used its political power to advance its
own interest against which capitalists have historically encroached. Among the most
significant factors affecting the behaviour of labour as a collective are the strength of the
labour movement and political institutions (Nelson, 1991). The conflict between colonial
4The World Bank Doing Business Report is published anually and can be retrieved from:
http://www.doingbusiness.org/
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elites and the repressed labour force has evoked an antagonistic response from organised
labour in this class of colonies. This antagonism, empowered by labour’s collective
political power, is greater where labour was more scarce and therefore more aggressively
repressed. It is easy to identify the link between labour movements, political power
and labour market rigidities through an examination of the relationship between labour
unions and the evolution of political parties in these former tropical colonies. Nelson
(1991) describes this relationship as analogous to that of a business transaction, in which
workers’ cooperation is gained in exchange for influence in policy issues of interest; these
policies being rigid ‘protective’ legislation.
For tropical dependencies, this relationship was particularly crucial. Gutkind et al.
(1978) note that, continuously repressed, the African working class developed a partic-
ularly militant and nationalist labour movement which served as a reliable voting block
for the political class. In many of the Latin American and Caribbean dependencies,
colonial labour movements evolved into political parties which would eventually form
governments capable of passing overly restrictive legislation, as in the case of Jamaica,
Guyana and Peru, among others. Where the relationship was not so direct, unions still
depended on the state apparatus to push through their interests in exchange for political
support. In this way, labour organisations came to rely on governments, choosing polit-
ical agents and statutory action in place of negotiations between unions and employers,
resulting in labour legislation that was frequently in favour of protecting workers in spite
of the narrow coverage of labour institutions in those developing countries (Weller, 2009).
The reliance of labour movements on the state in affecting labour policy contributes to
rigidities in labour institutions in several ways. First, it leads to an overcorrection of per-
ceived inadequacies in protective labour legislation, resulting in the introduction of rigid
legislation, driven by the historical conflict between agents in the labour market. Sec-
ondly, when different labour organisations support opposing political parties, this may
stimulate tension between unions themselves, leading to antagonism among unions and
resistance toward dialogue which would facilitate cooperation and improved flexibility.
Two such examples can be seen in the West Indies: in Jamaica, where the Bustamante
Industrial Trade Union (BITU) and the National Workers Union (NWU) were affili-
ated with the Jamaica Labour Party and the People’s National Party respectively; and
Guyana, where the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and Guyana Agricultural and General
Workers Union (GAWU) were affiliated with the People’s National Congress and Peo-
ple’s Progressive Party, respectively (Meditz and Hanratty, 1987). Third, the tendency
to bypass employer-union negotiations reduces social dialogue between labour market
agents, further reduces the space for union-employer cooperation and increases reliance
on rigid legislation (Weller, 2009).
This lack of social dialogue among labour market agents is the another significant
channel through which colonial labour relations have persistently affected flexibility and
the quality of labour institutions at large. Weller (2009), in assessing labour market
institutions in Latin America, recommends as a fundamental need that labour market
agents recognise all parties as legitimate stakeholders; a task which he describes as being
made particularly difficult by the extensive history of conflict, extending from the colo-
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nial period to present day. Jørgensen (2009) describes the Danish model, which is widely
regarded as the pinnacle of labour market flexibility and worker security (flexicurity),
as being built on a long history of social dialogue and a recognition of mutual inter-
ests. This is precisely what we argue that the former tropical dependencies lack. The
severity of colonial labour scarcity motivated owners of land and other capital to employ
repressive tactics to guarantee themselves cheap labour, triggering a militant response
from the working class. This severed the channels for social dialogue and birthed a long
and persistent history of labour market conflict which institutions have come to reflect.
This deficiency in dialogue is evident across the tropical dependency class of colonies,
while its severity varies with the intensity of historical conflict and the colonial labour
problem. For Latin American countries, Weller (2009, p.16) describes the dialogue as
lacking “mutual coherence and consistency over time”, while for African countries, Alby
et al. (2005) observed that dispute resolution is dominated by the state. Evidently, in
the absence of a tradition of dialogue, agents in the labour market wait upon oppor-
tunities to advantage political favour to their one-sided ends. In this way, flexibility
is hampered by poor social dialogue in multiple ways. First, recognition of the cause
of rigidity and its consequences becomes a challenge when stakeholders and those who
shape the institutional environment cannot come together. Secondly, where rigidities
exist, agents tend to recognise these as hard fought ‘gains’ from years of conflict, and
thus become unwilling to concede these ‘gains’ for unsecured rights, resulting in the per-
sistence of rigidities. Third, without the necessary parley, achieved flexibilities become
unsustainable as agents, when the opportunity arises to do otherwise, are less willing to
maintain policies that were implemented without their input.
Thus, the path from a history of labour repression to present day labour rigidity is
through the nature of industrial relationships which have developed over time. Historical
labour repression has been the catalyst for a conflict-ridden relationship between labour
market factions. This has led to the breakdown of social dialogue and a tendency for
labour dispute resolutions to occur through restrictive legislation rather than employer-
union negotiations, leading to high levels of rigidity.
4.3 Literature Review
The starting point of the theory in Figure 4.1 is geography. One of the earliest works to
comprehensively look at the role of geography in economic development was Diamond
et al. (1997). The authors review 13,000 years of human history to find the causes of
unequal wealth and power distribution among countries. They argue that geographical
endowments of minerals, animals and resources facilitated an early advantage for some
regions. Furthermore, these endowments enabled the development of technologies which
hastened progress of some countries relative to others. These technologies were more
readily adaptable within ecological zones and so gave rise to higher levels of income
and wealth in some zones. Diamond et al. (1997) make the case that the geographical
differences ultimately determined power and economic prosperity. This work has been
particularly useful to the field of economic geography.
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Within the field of economic geography, there have been crucial developments in the
literature which points to the significant role of geography in economic outcomes. This
new economic geography school began with the work of Krugman (1991) and has devel-
oped into a major area of study. The author argues that competitive general equilibrium
models do not adequately account for the spatial dynamics observed in economic growth
and development. Krugman proceeds to introduce a model of new economic geography
predicated on increasing returns to scale, which highlights the significant role of trans-
port costs, the movement of productive factors, and their interaction in the organisation
of economic activity. Krugman (1991) spurred a series of works which hold relevance for
the analysis below.
The most significant of these works is that of Gallup et al. (1999). In it, the authors
consider the role of geography in economic development and the economic disparities
present in the world today. Much like our theoretical work above, their starting point
is physical geography and the study of how the differences in physical geography affect
economic development. They use a series of economic models and introduce the presence
of geographic factors (transport costs) under the assumption that transport costs reduce
the gains from trade and, therefore, act as a barrier to trade. Using these simple mod-
els, they were able to make a series of conclusions including; (i) that the growth rate
is inversely related to transport costs, (ii) even small transport costs have significant
adverse consequences for economic growth when the share of intermediate (imported)
inputs in final demand is large, (iii) that advantages conferred by geography may be
deterministic in economic outcomes well beyond the initial period in which such advan-
tages were directly beneficial, and (iv) geography can have a potent effect on economic
policy choices.
This final conclusion is most relevant for our present analysis. The theory described in
Figure 4.1 proposes that differences in geographic factors (the suitability of land for cash
crop production) led to differences in the choice of economic institutions concerned with
labour. These institutions are tantamount to the geographically induced policy choices
described by Gallup et al. (1999). The difference is that while Gallup et al. (1999) focus
on policies that affect economic growth, such as the tax rate, we focus here on what it
meant for labour organisation. There has been a heated debate among academics over
the geographic versus institutional causes of long-run development, with researchers
like Gallup et al. (1999) arguing that geography was more fundamental for economic
development while, Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue for the primacy of institutions. We
believe that the two interact to ultimately determine economic outcomes.
This line of research has received some recent attention from various authors. The
general consensus among economists is that institutions do indeed affect long-term eco-
nomic development. Yet, most economic research has almost exclusively focused on
institutions that foster investment in physical capital, such as those that govern prop-
erty rights and contracts. From the early institutionalism work of Veblen (1899) and
Mitchell (1910), to the Post-World War II institutionalism of Kapp (1950) and Myrdal
(1968), to the New Institutional Economics approach of North and Thomas (1973), and
recently Acemoglu et al. (2001), much of the theoretical and empirical work has paid
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keen attention to institutions of property rights. Lewis (1954), with his exposition of
the dual sector model, has helped to draw more attention to the significance of labour
institutions in the development process. Since Lewis’s seminal work, Freeman (Freeman
(1988); Freeman et al. (1998); Freeman (2007)) and Heckman (Heckman and Pages (2000,
2006); Heckman (2007)) have all contributed greatly to the research on the implications
of labour institutions for economic development.
Furthermore, an invaluable body of research has developed which seeks to examine
the determinants of labour institutions. The significance of such a research agenda
to the process of demystifying the impact of labour institutions cannot be overstated.
This research is exemplified in Botero et al. (2004). The authors construct a dataset
for 85 countries to examine the determinants of the level of labour market regulation,
measured by employment, collective relations and social security laws. They found that
the primary determinant of a country’s level of regulation is its legal origins. More
specifically, the authors found that countries that have laws based on the French and
Scandinavian legal systems have significantly higher levels of regulation. This result
implies that for ex-colonies, the quality of labour institutions today is to a significant
extent determined by their colonial history, where the legal system of the coloniser was
transplanted from the mother country to the colonised territory. In this chapter, we
conduct a deeper examination of this theme, though, unlike Botero et al. (2004), we
focus not on the origins of laws but, instead, consider the evolution of labour relations
from the historical colonial labour problem, and how it has affected the development
of labour institutions today. The reason is simple, although legal systems do indeed
explain a great deal of the variation in labour legislation, compliance issues, especially
in developing countries, cause significant difference between what is legislated and what
is practised. By looking at the issues that determined the quality of labour relations
throughout the history of former tropical colonies, and investigating its effect on an
index that captures the impression of stakeholders in the labour market, the approach
taken in this chapter is better able to capture the reality of labour market institutions,
not just according to decree, but also in practice.
Among others, Campos and Nugent (2012) have looked at the determinants of
changes in the level of rigidity of labour market institutions over time. They develop
a new index which captures the rigidity of labour legislation for 140 countries starting
from 1960. The authors conclude that although Botero et al. (2004) is significant in
explaining the level of rigidity across countries, the task of explaining the changes in the
level of rigidity over time is not well explained by their approach. Instead, Campos and
Nugent (2012) find evidence that the level of development and trade liberalization are
better determinants of changes in the level of rigidity. This chapter differs from Campos
and Nugent (2012) in so far as the outcome of interest here is not changes in the level
of rigidity, but rather, the determinants of the variation in the levels of rigidity across
countries.
Though empirical work on developing countries is remarkably scarce, there has been
substantial qualitative work in this area. Nelson (1991) looks at the variables that de-
termine unions’ response to adjustment programmes which often involve a move towards
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labour market flexibility. He notes that unions’ responses to changes in labour institu-
tions depend on several factors: the strength of the labour movement, economic cycles,
and the political institutions that characterise the environment within which labour re-
lations exist. He argues that an explanation of labour militancy against labour flexibility
in developing countries accords with theory which suggests a ‘humped-back’ relationship
between increased centralisation and militancy.5 Specifically, he observes that most de-
veloping countries fall along the centre of the scale because, although unions are often
quite small and lack significant coverage, they tend to be strong and wield sufficient
political clout to affect policy. The present chapter bares resemblance to the approach
taken by Nelson (1991) in the qualitative aspects through which it describes the de-
terminants of labour institutions. We capture the rich historical context that describes
the storied history that underpins the wider social and political context of relationship
between key three agents (governments, unions and employers) in the labour market.
However, we go one step further thanNelson (1991) by providing the empirical evidence
that links this history and political context to labour market rigidity today.
There is high quality research coming out of the cross-disciplinary literature which
seeks to understand present day post-colonial society as a by-product of tropical de-
pendency.6 Among the qualitative literature, Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) is most
similar to the work of this chapter in the way it relates colonial factor endowments to
‘new world’ paths of development. Their work also suggests that societies continue to
suffer from their pasts because institutions tended to develop in such a way that they
reproduce the status quo. This echoes our discussions of path dependence in Chapter 2.
4.4 The Case for Flexibility
In this section, we develop the case for labour market flexibility. Thus far we have
used the term flexibility (or rigidity) when referring to the quality of labour institutions
without giving a clear definition of what it means for labour institutions to be flexible.
A useful definition provided by Weller (2009, p.41) refers to flexibility as the “mobility
of workers, fostered by the ease with which firms can hire and fire staff,” and also to the
“options available to these workers in a dynamic labour market.” This definition may be
better understood by considering the components that underlie the flexibility variable
involved in the present analysis. In addition to the previously mentioned flexicurity
model, there is considerable evidence that flexibility is a desired labour market feature.
Lazear (1990) is one of the earliest papers to highlight the existence of a significant
negative relationship between rigid labour institutions and certain economic desirables.
Examining employment protection legislation (EPL) as a form of rigidity, the author
found that there existed a significant positive relationship between EPL and various
5The humped-back relationship cited here predicts little labour militancy at the low end of the scale,
greater militancy as we move up the scale, and falling militancy at the highest levels of centralisation,
resulting in an inverted U-shape.
6See for example Beckles (2016); Curtin (1998); Best (1968); Beckford (1999); Bolland (1981) among
others.
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undesirable labour market outcomes, including the level of unemployment. Subsequent
work by Elmeskov et al. (1998) confirmed the link between EPL and unemployment,
and also looked at the interaction between institutions and labour market policies to
determine the implications of this interation for labour market outcomes. Besley and
Burgess (2004) strengthened the case for flexible labour institutions. The authors anal-
ysed amendments to India’s Industrial Disputes Act and found that pro-worker (rigid)
regulation was associated with lower output, employment, investment and productivity
in the formal manufacturing sector, while output and employment increased in the infor-
mal sector. Similar results were established by Botero et al. (2004) for a cross-section of
85 countries. The authors found that, not only was increased rigidity through collective
relations legislation linked to an increase in the size of the informal sector, but also,
employment in this sector rose while formal sector employment fell. Recently, Ahsan
and Page´s (2009) reinforced the case for flexibility as they found similar evidence of this
negative association between EPL and formal employment, using job security regulation
as a source of rigidity. Furthermore, they observed that increased job security does not
increase labour’s share. On the back of this overwhelming evidence in favour of flexible
labour institutions, several countries have made the move towards reducing rigidities.
Among the present group of tropical dependencies, the need for such action is dire
as these countries suffer from the highest levels of rigidity in the world. This problem
is exacerbated by the pre-existence of high informality among these countries. A large
informal sector implies that even where there are gains to be had from employment
protection, a significant share of the workforce remains unqualified for these gains while
more workers are forced into the informal sector, reinforcing the ills of rigidity. Below,
we conduct an exercise to examine the association between informality and flexibility for
our sample of countries. In a comparative exercise, we first collect available information
on our indicator of flexibility7 and the size of the informal sector in these countries.
Secondly, we split the countries into two groups based on whether they fall within the
50th percentile, or above the 50th percentile for each of the two variables. Specifically,
countries with GCI labour flexibility score above the sample median are categorised as
the high flexibility group, while those with scores below the sample median form the low
flexibility group. Similarly, we define those countries with informal sectors (measured
as the value of the informal sector as a share of GNP) above the median level as having
comparatively high informality. Countries with scores below the median form the low
informality group. Finally, we create a matrix to illustrate the association between
informality and labour flexibility. The results are presented in Table 4.1 below.
The table represents information for 33 of the countries in our sample for which data
on informality and institutional flexibility is available. The output from this exercise de-
picts a clear association between informality and flexibility. Of the sample of countries,
15 fell in the category of comparatively high flexibility. Of this sub-sample, 73 percent of
countries featured a low level of informality. For the second sub-sample which consists
7The flexibility indicator is the measure of labour market flexibility produced by the World Economic
Forum for its Global Competitiveness Index. We describe this indicator in more detail in the Data
Appendix to this chapter.
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Table 4.1: Informality and Flexibility
Informality
High Low
Le
ve
lo
fF
le
xi
bi
lit
y High Benin, Mali, Peru, Uganda Burkina Fa., Cameroon, Costa
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Jamaica,
Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia
Nigeria, Nicaragua, Singapore
Low Bolivia, Colombia, Ethiopia,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Panama, Philippines, Senegal,
Tanzania, Zambia
Brazil, Dom Rep., Ecuador, Ghana
India, Venezuela, Vietnam
of countries with comparatively rigid (inflexible) labour institutions, 61 percent suffered
from a comparatively larger informal sector, while only 39 percent had small informal
sectors. Furthermore, two thirds of the sample fall along the secondary (south-west-
north-east) diagonal of the matrix, which represents a negative relationship between
flexibility and informality. The evidence in Table 4.1 suggests that flexible labour in-
stitutions are associated with a smaller informal sector, while rigid labour institutions
are associated with larger informal sectors. We do not speculate on whether the rela-
tionship is causal. In the current context, a causal relationship is not pertinent to the
argument for flexibility. This is because, regardless of whether or not the flexibility leads
to informality, or the other way around, or even if the relationship is bi-causal, what
is most relevant here is that these countries have substantially large informal sectors
within which a significant share of the labour force cannot access the benefits of rigid
employment protection legislation. Yet, the efficiency cost of such legislation remains
high. When rigidity leads to further informality, this only exacerbates the problem.
Considering this, in addition to the established results linking rigidity to unemployment
and lowered productivity, the case for flexibility is strong. In the section that follows, we
formalise the theory linking colonial labour supply problems to rigid labour institutions
today.
4.5 Conflict Theory of Wage Appropriation and Rigidity
What follows is a model that characterises the development of rigid labour institutions as
the outcome of an antagonistic relationship developed in response to repression (or wage
appropriation) by capitalists. This model is set in the colonial period when cash-crop
labour-intensive production motivated the exploitation of former tropical dependencies.
In this sense, we consider a simple agricultural economy populated by two groups, a
labourer family and a capitalist family. Labourers own all the labour resources, which is
equivalent to a fixed population of labourers (N¯), while capitalists own all the land (L¯),
which we assume is in fixed supply. Members within each group are homogeneous and
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have shared interests with other members of their own family. Therefore, for simplicity,
we treat each group as single entities.
Labourers supply their labour, inelastically, to the capitalists who undertake pro-
duction by combining land and labour according to the technology: NαL1−α, where N
and L are labour and land demand for production and 0 < α < 1. We further assume
that the agricultural economy is labour-intensive and so N > L. This is quite plausible
as this industry, throughout the 19th and 20th century, has remained heavily supported
by manual labour input.
Define a fair economy as a perfectly competitive one in which factor markets clear,
so that L = L¯ and N = N¯ , and each factor is paid the value of its marginal product.
In this state of the economy, output per unit of land is given by ηα, η > 1, and the
capitalist hires labour at a given wage rate, w, per unit of labour employed on the land.8
His profit per unit of land is thus given by:
pi = ηα − wη (4.1)
accordingly, the fair wage rate satisfies
w = αηα−1 (4.2)
and the profit of the capitalist family is equal to the returns to land ownership
pi ≡ r = (1− α)ηα (4.3)
Suppose that the capitalist family has the power to initiate another state of the world.
In this repressive world, the capitalists are able to expropriate labourer wage in the sense
that they can repress wages by paying only a fraction, (1− τ), of the fair economy wage
rate. This fraction is determined through conflict with the labourer family, in accordance
with the following contest success function
τ =

L¯ec
L¯ec + N¯el
if (ec + el) > 0
0 otherwise
where ec and el are the effort levels invested by the capitalist and labourer families,
respectively. By this specification, τ , the fraction of the wage rate expropriated by the
planter, is determined by the relative efforts of each party, and the land and labour
resources of each party determine the effectiveness of their efforts. Thus, the more land
the capitalist family owns, and the more labour power the labourer family possesses, the
more effective their respective efforts. We can divide both the numerator and denomi-
nator of the fraction by L¯ so that we can rewrite the contest success function as
τ =

ec
ec + ηel
if (ec + el) > 0
0 otherwise
(4.4)
8And η = N¯
L¯
.
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where η = N¯
L¯
and ec, el ≥ 0.
There is a cost to effort in this setting. We assume that repressing larger families
is costlier for the capitalist and organising a larger family is costlier for the labourer
family, so the total cost of effort for each group is increasing in the labour units per
unit of land. Each party’s total cost of effort is thus, ηei, i = c, l. The capitalist family
expends effort to maximise the share of the total labourer family’s wage wealth (where
total wage wealth is given by wn) that it can appropriate, while the labourer family seeks
to minimise this expropriation. Mathematically, the capitalist chooses ec to maximise
τwη − ηec (4.5)
while the labourer family attempts to protect its wage wealth in the repressive state of
the economy. It thus chooses el to maximise
(1− τ)wη − ηel (4.6)
This is effectively a model of wage repression. The capitalist family is able to pay a
wage a fraction less than that due under a fair economy. In so doing, the capitalist
family transfers a share of labourer wealth (the labourer family’s total wage earnings,
wη) to itself. In seeking to expropriate the labourer family’s wages, the capitalist family
develops a conflict relationship with the labourer family. The more intense this conflict,
the more rigid their relationship. A suitable measure of this rigidity or conflict intensity is
the aggregate level of conflict efforts (ec+el). One may consider this an approximation of
the level of rigidity of labour institutions shaped by the capitalist-labourer relationship.
Through this conflict process, labour institutions are set up by the capitalists to exploit
the labour force, while labourers expend effort to set up fiercely protective institutions.
The solution to this model may be analysed as a Cournot equilibrium with each party
choosing its respective effort levels.
After substituting equation (4.4) into (4.5), we can then derive the first order con-
dition of the capitalist family. From the first order condition for the capitalist family’s
objective function given by equation (4.5), we have the best response function of the
capitalist family to the effort of the labourer family:
ec = −elη + (elηw)1/2 (4.7)
Similarly, from the first order conditions of the objective function of the labourer family
in equation (4.6), the best response function of the labourer family is
el =
− ec + (ecηw)1/2
η
(4.8)
Substituting equation (4.7) into equation (4.8) and simplifying yields the optimal
level of labourer effort (el∗) in terms of labour per unit of land and the fair economy
wage rate:
el
∗ =
ηw
(η + 1)2 (4.9)
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Using (4.9) and (4.7) we are able to solve for optimal capitalist effort level as
ec
∗ =
ηw
(η + 1)2 (4.10)
This suggests that in equilibrium, effort levels are identical, a well-established result of
contest with symmetric valuations and costs. The fair economy wage rate can now be
substituted into (4.9) and (4.10) to obtain the equilibrium effort levels in terms of labour
per unit of land and labour’s share in the fair economy:
ec
∗ = el∗ =
aηa
(η + 1)2 (4.11)
In previous sections, we developed the idea that a key determinant of the level of
rigidity of labour market institutions in former tropical colonies is the historically an-
tagonistic relationship developed between actors in the labour market. This relationship
developed under attempts by capitalist landowners in these agricultural economies, fac-
ing varying degrees of labour problems, to repress wages below the fair economy level.
Through the model presented in this section, we have proposed that this conflict can
be modelled using a contest success function with the aggregate conflict effort level
representing the degree of rigidity of the relationship between the two parties, and by
extension, labour institutions. Using this model of labour market conflict, we are now
able to assess the implications of labour scarcity on various outcomes, including the
conflict intensity (level of rigidity) and labourer’s share of aggregate wealth.
Proposition 4.1. In the labour-intensive agricultural economy with conflict, charac-
terised by equations (4.1) to (4.11), the level of rigidity, proxied by conflict intensity, is
decreasing in the availability of labour per unit of land.
Proof of this proposition is straightforward. Differentiating conflict intensity (ec∗ +
el
∗) we have
2aηa((a− 2)η + a)
η(η + 1)3 (4.12)
which is less than zero if η > a2−a . Recall that agricultural economy is labour-intensive
so η > 1, which guarantees that this inequality is satisfied and so (4.12) is negative.
This is our main result. It implies that where labour per unit of land was available
in larger numbers, the intensity of conflict was lower. In the present context, this sug-
gests that territories with greater labour availability, relative to land, had better (more
amicable) capitalist-labourer relations. This observation is the result of two effects. The
first is with regard to the relative effectiveness of effort and the second is with regard
to the value of the prize (wage rate) at stake. First, as η increases, in equilibrium,
the labourer family can protect the same share of the wage rate with lower levels of
effort since the effectiveness of their efforts is increased by higher levels of labour per
unit of land. They thus reduce their effort level. Correspondingly, the capitalist family
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maximises the fraction of the fair economy wage that it can obtain in equilibrium by
choosing a lower effort level, resulting in a lower aggregate level of conflict. This implies
that in territories with higher levels of labour per unit of land, the labour force was suf-
ficiently powerful to discourage exploitation by capitalists, leading to more cooperative
relationships. Secondly, as labour per unit of land increases, the marginal product of
labour falls and so the market clearing fair economy wage rate is lower. This means the
value of the prize at stake is lower, or in the present context, wages are sufficiently low
that both the incentive to exploit the labour force and the will to protect what would,
even in a fair economy, be a low prize (wage rate) are lower, resulting in lower levels of
conflict.
In Section 4.2, we charted the path from repression to rigidity, and assigned a key role
to the historical conflict resulting from a history of repression in these former colonies.
We used historical arguments to show that the absence of social dialogue is directly
related to the history of conflict between the factions in the labour market. This has
led to the prevalence of rigid labour institutions. The discussion in Section 4.2, the
preceding theoretical model, and the subsequent proposition, taken together, imply that
in territories where labour was more widely available, there was less incentive to exploit or
engage in conflict and, therefore, more amicable (less rigid) labour institutions developed.
In the subsequent sections, we turn to an empirical analysis of the tropical dependency
hypothesis and explore the evidence for our proposition from the simple model discussed.
4.6 The Data and Research Design
4.6.1 Measuring Flexibility
The measure of flexibility used for this chapter is taken from the Global Competitiveness
Index (GCI) compiled by the World Economic Forum (WEF).9 The GCI ranks 140
countries according to the quality of the factors that influence their productivity. The
variables that comprise the index are divided into twelve “pillars of competitiveness”
before they are aggregated into three sub-indices, with each pillar given a fixed weight.10
The variable that we are particularly interested in as the indicator for labour market
institutions, ‘Flexibility’, forms part of the seventh pillar titled Labour Market Efficiency.
According to the Global Competitiveness Report:
The efficiency and flexibility of the labour market are critical for ensuring
that workers are allocated to their most effective use in the economy and
provided with incentives to give their best effort in their jobs. Labour markets
must therefore have the flexibility to shift workers from one economic activity
to another rapidly and at low cost, and to allow for wage fluctuations without
much social disruption. (Sala-i Martin et al., 2014, p.6-7).
9The WEF, based in Switzerland, was established as a non-profit organisation in 1971. The organi-
sation produces a steady stream of economic and political research reports, the most comprehensive of
which is the GCI.
10See www.weforum.org for the detailed methodology of the GCI.
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By this rationale, the authors constructed a labour market flexibility indicator by ag-
gregating the five subcomponents which include: (i) Cooperation in labour-employer
relations, (ii) Flexibility of wage determination, (iii) Hiring and firing practices, (iv)
Redundancy costs, and (v) Effect of taxation on incentives to work. There are, however,
two other influential indices capturing the rigidity of labour institutions frequently used
in the field. These are the Labour Market Regulations Index (LMR) constructed by the
Fraser Institute and Labour Regulations Indicator compiled by the Institute of Man-
agement Development (IMD). The motivation for the use of the GCI rather than either
of the other two prominent indicators of the rigidity of labour institutions is straight-
forward. Firstly, the GCI has significantly greater coverage than the IMD and Fraser’s
LMR index. Secondly, the WEF’s GCI is able to capture not only de jure labour mar-
ket institutions, but also the perceptions of actors operating within the institutional
environment of these labour markets through its use of opinion surveys, coupled with a
more robust methodology. Finally, while GCI uses primary data from the WEF survey,
Fraser’s LMR index simply makes use of the surveys of the GCI and IMD to compile its
indicator and thus suffers from several methodological issues.11
Aleksynska and Cazes (2014) identify two main concerns with the GCI as an indicator
of labour flexibility, the first of which is that there have been slight modifications to its
subcomponents over some years. Consequently, comparisons over time are less reliable.
However, these modifications have generally proven insignificant to the outcome of the
index. Furthermore, when using the flexibility component of the index as our measure of
rigidity (flexibility), we use the average from 2008 to 2016 (where there were few changes)
and are not interested in comparisons over time. The second critique put forward by
Aleksynska and Cazes (2014) highlights that the GCI and other measures of flexibility fail
to account for the benefits of regulation, such as protection of more vulnerable workers
from exploitation, increased job security and assurance of collective bargaining rights.
Yet, the Danish ‘flexicurity’ model serves to show that the co-existence of flexibility and
security is not only possible, but also symbiotic, through the arch of social dialogue.12
For these reasons we find the WEF’s GCI flexibility indicator suitable for measuring the
rigidity of labour institutions across countries.
4.6.2 Descriptive Statistics
This analysis uses historical and recent data. Here, we go into more detail about the key
variables.13 All data are at the country level as further disaggregated labour institutions
data are unavailable. Descriptive statistics for our key variables are presented in table
4.2 below.
Population density is the number of people per square kilometre of arable land. For
the former colonies, it is taken on the eve of colonisation; the latest date for which
11See Aleksynska and Cazes (2014) for a critical overview of each index.
12See Weller (2009) for an overview of the Danish Flexicurity Model.
13Detailed definitions and sources are available in the Data Appendix to this chapter.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
Tropical Dependencies Rest of the World
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Flexibility 60 4.453 0.574 89 4.551 0.585
Log Pop Density 60 1.145 1.358 80 2.324 2.112
Legal Origins 71 0.296 0.46 94 0.277 0.45
GDP per Capita 65 3.319 0.579 89 3.969 0.599
Notes: The source of data and full description for each variable is listed in the Data Appendix. We also
describe each variable more fully below.
data on population density before colonisation is available.14 For countries that were
not colonised by the Europeans, we use population density in the year 1500 to show
that there is no effect of historical population density on present day labour institutions
outside the colonised tropics. All historical population density data is retrieved from
McEvedy et al. (1978). We use the natural logarithm of this variable to account for the
skewness caused by a few outliers present in the data. The use of population density is
intended to capture the state of the historical relationship between the owners of capital
and the labour force during colonial times. In accordance with our theory, we propose
that where population was low relative to cultivable land, labour repression was more
intense and led to an antagonistic relationship that saw labour institutions evolve from
historically repressive to present day rigid.
Legal origin describes the origins of the country’s regulatory system. Botero et al.
(2004) tested English, French, Socialist, German and Scandinavian legal origins and
found that French legal origin was associated with more rigid (less flexible) labour in-
stitutions. The tropical dependencies in this study are primarily of English and French
legal origins. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, we restrict this variable to
simply identify whether the legal origin of each country is French (i.e. Legal origin equal
1 if French). Data on legal origin was retrieved from La Porta et al. (1999). As a further
control, we use the GDP per capita to rule out any influences that difference in the level
of income across countries may have on the quality (flexibility) of labour institutions.
More specifically, we use the log of average GDP per capita (constant 2005 US dollars)
over the years 2000-2010, as available from the World Bank. Additional controls used in
this analysis are fully described in the Data Appendix.
Previously, we contrasted our hypothesis with the reversal proposed by Acemoglu
et al. (2002). We suggested that, for tropical colonies, the idea that larger native pop-
ulations motivated Europeans to plunder and set up extractive institutions was not the
14We take data on the eve of colonisation to ensure that we are measuring the population level that
the colonist found when they arrived. Year of colonisation refers to the year the first governor arrived
in the territory.
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Figure 4.2: Expropriation Risk and Flexibility
full story. To get a sense of why we think that the implications of colonial population
density for labour relations are important, we may take a closer look at the data. In
Figure 4.2, we plot the relationship between property rights institutions15 and labour
institutions for our sample of tropical colonies.16 The slope is close to 0 and the cor-
relation coefficient is −0.08 with a p-value of 0.56. This indicates that, for our sample
of tropical colonies, there is no discernible relationship between the standard measure
of property rights institutions used by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) and the measure of
labour institutions.17 This observation is important because it shows that there are dif-
ferences between the types of institutions, and that having high quality property rights
institutions does not automatically translate to high quality labour institutions. It is
possible, therefore, to observe that under different circumstances, a particular factor may
have different relationships with different types of institution. We believe that this is
the case for colonial population density and labour institutions, compared with colonial
population density and property rights institutions. This is because of what colonial
population density meant for labour supply and labour conflict. Perhaps, for tropical
colonies, higher colonial population density, beyond promoting plunder and extraction,
had significant implications for labour relations, whereas in other colonies the reversal
of fortune hypothesis may be more salient.
The two graphs in Figure 4.3 support this idea. In this figure, we graph the rela-
15Data retrieved from Acemoglu et al. (2001).
16We remove two outliers (one country with a flexibility score above 6 and another with a flexibility
score below 3). Inclusion of the outliers does not change the result. In fact, the slope becomes even
closer to 0.
17The corresponding correlations for other colonies and non-colonised countries are 0.64 (significant
at the 1-percent level) and 0.31 (significant a the 10-percent level).
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(a) Tropical Dependencies (b) Other Colonies
Figure 4.3: Reversal Hypothesis Revisited
tionship between colonial population density and the protection against expropriation
index used in Acemoglu et al. (2001). The first of these graphs (4.3a) illustrates this
relationship for tropical dependencies. The slope is flat and the r-square is 0.009, indi-
cating that there is no significant association between colonial population density and
present day property rights institutions. Thus, we do not see the reversal for tropical
colonies. However, when we consider other colonies (Figure 4.3b), we see evidence of the
reversal as proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2002). The slope is negative and the r-square
for the simple relationship is 0.45. There is, therefore, a negative and significant (at the
1-percent level) correlation between population density on the eve of colonisation and
the quality of property rights institutions today for other colonies (in line with the rever-
sal of fortune hypothesis), but not for our tropical dependencies. There was a different
mechanism at play in the tropics. Higher population meant more available labour, lower
levels of colonial repression, better historical labour relationships, and a higher quality
labour institutions today. The reversal of fortunes hypothesis and our own hypothesis
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is possible that tropical dependencies
could simultaneously experience both weak property rights institutions and high quality
labour institutions. As it turns out, we do not see the reversal in tropical colonies. This
may be attributable to the fact that territories with greater labour supply and less labour
conflict were more politically stable, and were also, therefore, less likely to perpetuate
extractive colonial policy. Thus, the positives of greater labour supply may have helped
to mitigate the institutional reversal, resulting in a 0 slope between colonial population
density and property rights institutions where it would otherwise be negative. Alterna-
tively, it could be that greater agricultural cash-crop production required a longer term
engagement with the colonies on the part of the colonist, which was incompatible with
the aggressively extractive institutions seen in other colonies.18
Using some descriptive plots, we may assess whether historical population density had
any relation with labour institutions outside for our sample and outside of the tropical
region. Figure 4.4 depicts a scatter plot illustrating the relationship between histor-
18Further analysis of this idea would take us beyond the scope of this chapter and is left to future
research.
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ical population density and labour market flexibility (conversely, rigidity) for tropical
dependencies and the rest of the world (ROTW), respectively.
(a) Tropical Dependencies (b) ROTW
Figure 4.4: Flexibility and Historic Population Density
The plot reveals a clear upward-sloping relationship between historical population
density and the level of labour market flexibility today among the colonised countries
within the tropical region. Turning to the rest of the world, there appears to be no sys-
tematic relationship with flexibility. At best, Figure 4.4 reports a negative relationship
between colonial population density and flexibility for countries outside of the tropical
region.19
The sample can be further split for a more detailed comparison across different
historical backgrounds. This is seen in Figure 4.5 below. We compare the plots of three
different categories of countries, (i) Tropical Dependencies (in Figure 4.4a), (ii) Other
Former Colonies and (iii) Never Colonised, and look at how historical population density
relates to present day labour market flexibility.
(a) Other Former Colonies (b) Never Colonised
Figure 4.5: Flexibility and Historic Population Density (Continued)
There again, the evidence points to a different relationship between colonial labour
supply (colonial population density) and labour institutions today across the different
19At this time it is important to recall that population density is recorder as at 1500 for countries that
were never colonised.
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categories of countries. Different to the observed positive relationship when we consider
tropical dependencies, the scatter plot relating colonial population density and flexibility
for other former colonies reveals no apparent relationship. This closely resembles the
relationship seen in countries depicted in Figure 4.5b; that of countries which were never
colonised. This confirms that the positive (upward-sloping) relationship between colonial
labour availability, as measured by population density at the time of colonisation, and
labour market flexibility today is uniquely observable among tropical dependencies. It
is left to be tested whether the observed relationships are significant. We turn now to a
closer look at data on labour conflict in the region.
Table 4.3: Post Colonial Labour Conflict
Country Year # of Strikes Country Year # of Strikes Country Year # of Strikes Country Year # of Strikes
Bolivia 1982 301 Colombia 1988 251 Ghana 1978 65 Nigeria 1975 394
1984 500 1990 283 1981 58 1992 187
1997 22 1992 638 2006 189
Brazil 1985 843 Ecuador 1983 97 Guyana 1983 731 Haiti 1979 1751
1986 1494 1988 126 1985 718 1980 2946
1987 6369 1989 169 1987 497 1981 2728
1989 4189 1990 140 1994 468 1983 2162
1996 1258 2004 229 1985 1845
Notes: Data on the year and number of strikes in the year is from the ILO Statistical Database: https://www.ilo.org/. See Data Appendix for full reference.
In Table 4.3 we present details of some of the incidences of labour conflict observed
in the tropical colonies during the post-colonial period. These data are not exhaustive.
The data provide a glance at some of the more active years in a sub-sample of tropical
colonies.20 These strikes were often militant in nature, and often exacerbated the prob-
lem of weak social dialogue between workers and business interests in these territories. In
Bolivia, for example, the 1980s strikes were, in part, fuelled by workers’ union demands
for “a majority of workers voices across governing bodies” against the idea of “equal rep-
resentation between workers, labour representatives, government officials, and private
businessmen... because of the fundamental role they [the workers’ union] played in the
President’s election” (O’Niel, 2010, p.4). In Ecuador, as well, unions sought to settle
disputes through government power rather than dialogue. Strikes in 1988-1990 came
against the backdrop of the new president Rodrigo Borka promising to “harmonise the
government and labour objectives” (Alexander and Parker, 2007, p.205). When this did
not materialise, a general strike in 1988 resulted in violent clashes. Writing on the strikes
listed for Nigeria, Salawu et al. (2013, p.63) concludes, “it can be seen that practically,
every major demand on the part of workers for wage increase or review before and after
independence in Nigeria has been settled not through collective industrial machinery,
but by special commissions or tribunals.” This underscores our point that a history of
antagonism between labour market factions has led to the settlement of disputes through
means that by-pass dialogue and cooperation. Some of the most extensive of the strikes
listed in Table 4.3 occurred in Brazil. Estimates suggest that up to 3 million workers
20Furthermore, an individual strike may involve millions of individuals, so a smaller total number of
strikes may not always mean a lower level of conflict intensity.
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took part in the 1986 and 1987 strikes, but by 1989 the number was 22 million on the
first day of the strike. Up to 37 percent of the urban wage-labour force was involved in
strikes for social change (French and Fortes, 2005).
In the next section, we test the significance of the relationships described above, and
empirically examine the role of labour conflict in the quality of labour institutions today.
We employ both OLS and two-stage least square techniques to ensure that we are able
to make causal inference on the proposed relationships.
4.6.3 Empirical Approach
Here, we investigate the historical origins of present day rigidities in labour institutions.
First, to examine the differential impact of colonial labour supply on the tropical colonies
versus the rest of the world, we specify a dummy variable regression for a combined
sample consisting of tropical dependencies and the rest of the world:
flexi = β0 + β1LPDi + β2TDi + β3TDLPDi +X ′iβ4 + %i (4.13)
where flexi is the average flexibility score (over the years 2008 to 2016) of country i from
the WEF GCI. β0 is the regression intercept, Xi is a vector of covariates, which include
controls for legal origin and income. β1, the coefficient on log of population density on the
eve of colonisation (LPD), captures the effect of historical labour availability on labour
market flexibility for the ROTW. TD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country i was a
tropical dependency, while TDLPD is an interaction between TD and LPD. The main
coefficient of interest is β3 which measures the differential impact of colonial population
density on labour institutions between tropical dependencies and the rest of the world.
Consistent with our theory, we expect β2 to be negative (tropical dependencies have
lower flexibility scores), but expect β3 to be positive (tropical dependencies with higher
colonial population density have higher scores for quality of labour institutions).
However, while a regression of the form in (4.13) reveals useful information about this
differential effect, it does not serve to confirm whether population density significantly
impacted the flexibility of labour markets within the sample of tropical dependencies,
and had no such effect for the rest of the world, as proposed by the theory in section
4.1. For this purpose, a category-wise regression as seen in equation (4.14) below is more
suitable.
flexi =
{
γ0 + γ1LPDi +X ′iγ2 + νi if TDi = 1
δ0 + δ1LPDi +X ′iδ2 + ιi if TDi = 0
(4.14)
where νi and ιi are the error terms of the respective regression equations. Effectively,
this amounts to running a separate regression for each of the two samples, Tropical
Dependencies and the Rest of the World. Furthermore, conducting the regression in
this way allows for simpler interpretation of the coefficients and nullifies the need for the
assumption of homogeneous error variances across groups.
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4.7 Results
In this section we present the results of our regressions. As highlighted by the causal
chain in Chapter 2, which we continue to propose here, there may be endogeneity in the
relationships between the nodes in the chain described in Figure 2.2. To ensure that
our results are robust and inferences are valid, we test the relationship between colo-
nial labour availability and present day labour institutions using OLS and instrumental
variable regressions.
4.7.1 Determinants of Labour Insitutions
The theory presented in Section 4.1 predicts that historical population density had a
differential impact on labour institutions between former tropical colonies and the rest
of the world. As a test of this hypothesis, it is sufficient to run the regression described
by (4.13) and ascertain that β3 > 0. Table 4.4 reports the results from this exercise.
t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
From first column of Table 4.4, β2 is −0.378. This suggests that tropical depen-
dencies have, on average, significantly higher levels of labour institution rigidity (lower
flexibility scores) than the rest of the world. The coefficient of interest (β3) is the one
on the interaction term. This is observed from the third row of table 4.4. The reported
coefficient is a positive 0.183 with an associated t-statistic of 2.93. This result is con-
sistent with the hypothesis presented in the introduction. It supports the view that
historical population density has a stronger positive effect on the level of flexibility of
labour markets in tropical dependencies, compared with the rest of the world.
In columns (2)-(4), we control for various factors by including variables that may
influence the quality of labour institutions, as well as continent dummies. Botero et al.
(2004) found that a country’s legal origin was a significant determinant of the level of
rigidity in its labour institutions. In column (2), we introduce a dummy variable (Legal
Origins) which captures whether a country is of French legal origin. Consistent with the
result from Botero et al. (2004), the coefficient on the legal origins is −0.378, implying
that countries of French legal origin tend to have more rigid labour institutions. It is
interesting to note that the authors used de jure measures in construction of their index,
while the GCI indicator is in large part constructed from de facto measures (perception
surveys) of rigidity. Yet the results remain consistent. The coefficient concerning the
differential effect of population density for tropical dependencies, compared with the rest
of world, remains significant at the conventional 5-percent level. The significance of this
differential impact improves when we control for country income levels in column (3),
with the coefficient increasing from 0.154 to 0.23. The inclusion of continent dummies
does not affect the significance of this result.
The above results offer support to the notion that historical population density had a
different effect on colonised countries from the tropical belt compared with the rest of the
world. We attribute this to the labour problem which emerged as these colonies offered
great opportunity for large-scale, labour-intensive extraction. Where population was
scarce relative to available land, more extreme measures, such as slavery and other rigid
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Table 4.4: The Differential Effect of Colonial Labour Supply on Flexibility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flexibility Flexibility Flexibility Flexibility
Log Population Density -0.0463 -0.0379 -0.0508 -0.0501
(-1.23) (-1.09) (-1.65) (-1.65)
Tropical Dependency -0.378∗∗ -0.220 -0.0504 -0.0124
(-2.27) (-1.32) (-0.29) (-0.07)
TropDep*Pop. Density 0.183∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(2.93) (2.55) (3.81) (3.26)
French Legal Origin -0.378∗∗∗ -0.390∗∗∗ -0.382∗∗∗
(-3.56) (-3.77) (-3.66)
GDP per Capita 0.347∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(3.68) (3.27)
Asia 0.178
(1.25)
Africa 0.0246
(0.17)
Constant 4.625∗∗∗ 4.734∗∗∗ 3.360∗∗∗ 3.243∗∗∗
(36.93) (40.72) (8.47) (6.50)
Observations 127 127 125 125
R2 0.07 0.16 0.26 0.27
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions are OLS
cross-section regressions. The dependent variable is flexibility score from the GCI on a scale
of 1-7 (2008-16). Higher scores indicate better (more flexible) labour markets. The sample
consists of 127 countries around the globe for which data on the variables were available.
More details on each variable (definitions and source) are available in the Data Appendix.
forms of forced labour, proved necessary for sustaining a reliable workforce. Over time,
this led to the underdevelopment of flexible labour institutions and antagonistic indus-
trial relations between agents in the labour market. This gave rise to, and perpetuated,
a conflict culture in labour relations. Political power interacted with labour movements
to embed this antagonism into labour law. In this way, colonial labour scarcity was a
major determinant of the level of rigidity of present day labour institutions among trop-
ical colonies. To the extent that other countries have higher average flexibility scores
than former tropical colonies, this result implies that tropical dependencies with higher
population densities have flexibility closer to that of the rest of the world.
To test Proposition 4.1, we estimate the relationship from the category-wise regres-
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sion described by equation (4.14). If the proposed theory is correct, we should observe
that population density on the eve of colonisation is a positive significant predictor of the
level of rigidity when we consider just the sample of tropical dependencies (the TDi = 1
case). That is, γi > 0 from the regression in (4.14). Conversely, the theory predicts
that population density will not be a significant determinant of institutional flexibility
for countries outside of the tropical region, because the previously mentioned conditions
were absent. Therefore, the expectation is that δi = 0 from equation (4.14). we consider
three samples for the TDi = 0 case. In the first instance, we restrict the sample to
consider only former colonies outside the tropical belt for a more nuanced comparison.
Secondly, we will consider a sample of countries never colonised. Finally, we combine the
other colonies and never colonised samples to make up the rest of the world (all countries
outside the tropical belt) to ascertain whether this unique relationship between colonial
labour and institutions is only significant for the sample of tropical dependencies. This
process simply amounts to running four separate regressions, one for each of the samples,
tropical dependencies, other former colonies, the sample of countries never colonised, and
the rest of the world. Table 4.5 reports the results of these regressions.
Table 4.5: Determinants of Labour Institutions
DV is GCI Flexibility Score TropicalDep (A)
Tropical
Dep (B)
Other
Colonies
(A)
Other
Colonies
(B)
Never
Colonised
(A)
Never
Colonised
(B)
ROTW
(A)
ROTW
(B)
Log Pop Density 0.125∗∗ 0.133∗∗ -0.0878∗ 0.0178 -0.0341 -0.0541 -0.0448 -0.0546∗
(2.63) (2.68) (-1.83) (0.32) (-0.68) (-0.79) (-1.21) (-1.77)
Legal Origin -0.305∗∗ -0.275 -0.73∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗
(-2.03) (-1.13) (-4.94) (-2.92)
Log GDP per Capita 0.256 0.915∗∗∗ 0.207 0.429∗∗∗
(1.08) (4.22) (0.81) (3.49)
Asia 0.0802 0.529∗∗ -0.108 0.291∗
(0.26) (2.26) (-0.52) (1.85)
Africa 0.100 0.252 -0.105
(0.42) (0.90) (-0.51)
Constant 4.269∗∗∗ 3.559∗∗∗ 4.579∗∗∗ 0.802 4.654∗∗∗ 4.035∗∗∗ 4.632∗∗∗ 3.001∗∗∗
(40.76) (4.04) (30.23) (0.84) (27.14) (4.46) (37.35) (5.41)
Observations 54 53 32 31 43 42 79 76
R2 0.10 0.21 0.09 0.60 0.01 0.34 0.03 0.32
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions are OLS cross-section regressions. The dependent variable
for all regressions is flexibility score from the GCI on a scale of 1-7. Higher scores indicate better (more flexible) labour markets. The sample
for which the regression is run is listed at the top of each column. Tropical Dep are previously colonised tropical countries, Other Colonies are
previously colonised countries outside the tropical region. Never Colonised are countries not previously colonised and ROTW is a combined
sample of all countries that are not tropical dependencies. More details on each variable (definitions and source) are available in the Data
Appendix.
Column (A) of each regression presents the results of a simple linear regression when
labour institution flexibility scores from the GCI are regressed against log of population
density for the indicated sample. These results indicate that, of all the samples for which
the regression was conducted, colonial population density turned out to be a significant
predictor of labour market flexibility only for our sample of tropical dependencies. The
CHAPTER 4. COLONIAL LABOUR & CURRENT LABOUR INSTITUTIONS 139
coefficient of 0.125 is positive and significant at 5-percent level with a t-statistic of 2.63.
Whether we consider other colonies specifically, or the rest of the world as a whole, the
evidence suggests that this relationship between colonial population density and rigid
labour institutions is unique to those countries that are situated within the tropical belt,
where there was extensive scope for large-scale, labour-intensive cash-crop agriculture
and mineral extraction.
In the columns labelled (B), we control for the main determinants of labour institu-
tions coming out of the literature by running the full regression described by equation
(4.14). The second column, Tropical Dep (B), reports the case for the sample of tropical
dependencies (TDi = 1). The results indicate that γ1, the coefficient on colonial popu-
lation density, when the sample of tropical dependencies is considered, is equal to 0.133
and remains significant at the 5-percent level when legal origins and per capita income
is controlled for. This suggests that, for tropical dependencies, 1 percent higher colonial
population density is associated with a score for present day labour institution flexibil-
ity which is 0.03 percent higher, relative to the mean score (0.133/4.4). Consistent with
Botero et al. (2004), the negative sign on legal origins suggests that countries of French
legal origin tend to have lower levels of flexibility (more rigid labour institutions). The
inclusion of continent dummies leaves this result unchanged. Similarly, the addition of
controls when other colonies (B), countries never colonised (B), and a combined sample
of the two as the rest of the world (B) are considered, does not reverse the results of
the simple regression. Historic population density, in each of these samples, remains
consistently insignificant (at the 5-percent level) as a predictor of flexibility today, while
legal origin comes out with the expected sign and significance.
The robustness of this relationship’s uniqueness to the tropical region is again strong
evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the colonial labour scarcity, in a region where
labour was central to the very formation of society (i.e. tropical colonies), have had
a lasting impact on the level of rigidity observed in today’s labour institutions. This
impact, we propose, works through the historical relationship that developed between
the owners of capital and the labour force, and is captured by the de facto workings of
the labour market. For tropical colonies in which labour was sufficiently plentiful, there
was a tendency for cooperation and more amicable dialogue towards the development
of labour institutions. Where labour was scarce and had to be repressed, the reverse
occurred.
4.7.2 Additional Controls
In order to rule out competing explanations for the relationship between colonial labour
supply and the quality of labour institutions today, in this subsection, we introduce
additional controls informed by the existing literature.
Population density has, by many scholars, been thought to be a proxy for the wealth
of regions. The idea is that, historically, only wealthy societies could sustain dense pop-
ulations. In light of this, it may be argued that our measure of colonial labour supply
is capturing the effect of historical wealth on present day labour institutions. To shows
that this is not the case, we control for hitorical wealth at the time of colonisation,
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Table 4.6: Additional Controls and Labour Institutions
Flexibility (1) Flexibility (2)
Expropriation
Protection (Trop.
Dep.)
Exprop.
Protection
(Other Colonies)
Log Col. Pop. Den. 0.149∗∗∗ 0.089∗ 0.0442 -0.337∗∗∗
(2.93) (1.80) (0.29) (-3.49)
French Legal Origin -0.278 -0.230
(-1.79) (-1.47)
Log GDP per Cap. 0.133 0.040
(0.50) (0.25)
Log Urbanisation 1500 0.0287 0.024
(0.68) (0.52)
Log Pop Den 2005 0.0841
(1.12)
Constant 4.129∗∗∗ 4.067∗∗∗ 6.174∗∗∗ 7.578∗∗∗
(4.10) (4.25) (26.99) (34.81)
Observations 51 51 51 28
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions are OLS cross-section regressions. The
dependent variable in regressions (1) and (2) is flexibility score from the GCI on a scale of 1-7. Higher score indicate better
(more flexible) labour markets. The dependent variable for the regressions in the third and fourth columns is the average
protection against risk of expropriation scores reported in Acemoglu et al. (2001). The sample for these regressions is tropical
dependencies in the first three regressions and other colonies in the final column. More details on each variable (definitions and
source) are available in the Data Appendix.
using urbanisation data from Fink-Jensen (2005). Substantial scholarly work, includ-
ing Acemoglu et al. (2002), has demonstrated a robust association between historical
urbanisation rates and economic prosperity. Studying the link between historical urban-
isation rates and income, the authors found that countries with 10 percentage points
higher urbanization, enjoyed, on average, 46 percent greater income per capita. We,
therefore, introduce urbanisation data into the regression for the determinants of labour
institutions to rule out the possibility that population density is acting as a proxy for the
effect of historical wealth on present day labour institutions. The results are reported
in column (1) of Table 4.6.
The qualitative results of our regression of labour institutions on colonial population
density remain unchanged, and the coefficient on log of colonial population density is now
0.149. It, therefore, remains that tropical dependencies with higher colonial population
densities have significantly — at the 1−percent level — better (more flexible) labour
institutions. Specifically, in the presence of these controls, 1 percent higher colonial
population density is associated with a 0.034 percent higher score for present day labour
institution quality, relative to the mean score for these tropical colonies. Furthermore,
log of urbanisation rate in 1500 (which, we have argued, is a proxy for historical wealth)
has no effect on the quality of labour institutions today. The coefficient is small (at
0.029) and statistically insignificant. This suggests that, controlling for historical wealth,
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population density on the eve of colonisation has a significant positive effect on the
quality of labour institutions today. This latest result rejects the idea that population
density is measuring the effect of wealth on labour institutions, and is in favour of the
theory that it captures the effect of historic labour availability on present day labour
institutions in the sample of tropical colonies.
The central thesis of this chapter is that, because of the unique circumstances that
existed at the time, colonial labour availability determined the nature of land-labour
relationships and ultimately, the quality of labour institutions that developed through
time and remain in effect today. In column (2), we introduce modern day population
density into the regression to show that this relationship is uniquely shared with his-
torical and not modern-day population. The result is as expected. The coefficients
on colonial population density (0.089) and current population density (0.841) are both
positive, however, the t-statistics for these two variables are 1.80 and 1.12, respectively.
That the introduction of modern-day population density reduces the magnitude and
significance of our colonial population density variable is not surprising due to the high
level of correlation between the two. Nevertheless, there exists a positive and significant
relationship between historical population density and flexible labour institutions that
is absent between institutions and current population density. This accords with the
proposed theory. The result suggests that it is colonial labour availability, and not just
population density generally, that matters for present day labour institutions. It rein-
forces the idea that historical labour availability, in what turned out to be the formative
years of industrial production in many of these tropical countries, was crucial for the
type of labour institutions that developed.
In the third and fourth columns, we test the association between colonial population
density and capital institutions as measured by the protection against expropriation
risk variable from Acemoglu et al. (2001). Again, the results are as expected, colonial
population density (colonial labour availability) does not influence variation in protection
from risk of expropriation. The coefficient on population density in the third column
is 0.044 and the t-statistic is small at 0.29. Consequently, where tropical colonies are
concerned, we fail to see evidence of the reversal of fortune hypothesis which promotes
the view that in high density (and thus wealthier) areas, Europeans introduced worse
property rights institutions, leading to a reversal of fortune. The strikingly different
relationship between population density and labour institutions supports the idea that,
for these former tropical colonies, population density was a factor for the development
of labour institutions through what it meant for available labour supply. Interestingly,
the OLS regression in the final column confirms that for other former colonies outside
the tropical belt, the reversal holds.
4.7.3 Colonial Labour Availability and Post-Colonial Labour Conflict
In Section 4.5, one of the main results of the theoretical model was the idea that colonies
with lower population densities (and therefore, insufficient labour) experienced higher
levels of persistent labour conflict. This is pivotal to the hypothesis that links a lack
of colonial labour to rigid labour institutions today. In this section, we use a series of
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regressions to provide formal evidence that this was the case.
This requires a variable that captures the state of labour relations in the immediate
post-colonisation period for each country in the sample. For an overwhelming majority
of countries in the sample, the post-colonisation period began between the years 1945
and 1975, at independence. To create the required variable, we collect data on lost days
of work due to strikes and lockouts from the van der Velden (2016),21 and divide this by
the total population to arrive at the number of lost days of work per person due to strikes
and lockout. The data are averaged over the immediate twenty-year period following
the end of colonisation for which data are available. Hence, this variable captures the
intensity of labour conflict in the early post-colonisation era and can be used to directly
test the previously stated hypothesis. We introduce the natural log of this variable as
the dependent variable in regression on colonial labour supply (population density) and
other controls. Due to data availability and trimming of some outliers in our dependent
variable, we lose a few observations. The results are reported in column (1) of Table 4.7.
The results strongly support the theory outlined in the previous sections. The coef-
ficient on colonial population density (the measure of colonial labour supply) is negative
and highly significant. The implication here is that, controlling for other variables in-
cluded in the regression, a 1 percent increase in colonial labour supply is associated with
a 0.78 percent reduction in the number of work days lost, on average, for our sample of
tropical dependencies. The magnitude of this effect is large and firmly establishes that
in countries with lower colonial labour supply, there existed a culture of conflict-ridden
labour relations, as previously proposed by the theory in Section 4.5. This relationship
is robust to the inclusion of legal origins and continental controls.
We have also argued that it was the suitability of the tropical dependencies for cash
crop production that made them particularly vulnerable to the associations highlighted
in the theory. In the subsequent regressions, we provide evidence of this by showing
that even within the sample of tropical dependencies, those territories which enjoyed
favourable climatic conditions coupled with low population density, had significantly
higher levels of labour conflict than other dependencies. To do this, we collect historical
rainfall data for over 30 years from the World Bank database, starting from the earliest
year where monthly data on rainfall is available. This was generally for 1900-1930, but
since the 30-year average level of rainfall scarcely varies, we can expect that this level of
rainfall accurately reflects the average level of rainfall for much of the colonial period.
We use rainfall data because it is a very simple indicator of the varying suitability of
tropical areas to cash crops.22 This approach is particularly viable as cash crops generally
included coffee, cocoa, bananas, oranges, cotton and jute; production of all of which is
highly positively correlated with rainfall. Sillah (2014) used panel data to analyse the
impact of rainfall and rainfall variability on cash crop production and found that rainfall
was a dominant and significant factor in determining cash crop output. In fact, their
21This variable is self-explanatory. It counts the total number of days lost due to industrial action
across all sectors.
22Other influential papers, including Bobonis and Morrow (2014), have taken this approach.
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Table 4.7: Labour Supply and Labour Conflict
Labour
Conflict
(1)
Labour
Conflict
(2)
Labour
Conflict
(3)
Labour
Conflict
(4)
Labour
Conflict
(5)
Labour
Conflict
(6)
Labour
Conflict
(7)
Log Pre-col. Pop. Den. -0.780∗∗∗ 4.77∗ -0.519∗∗
(-5.40) (1.90) (-2.41)
French Legal Origin -1.405∗∗∗ -1.31∗∗∗ -1.063∗∗ -0.805 -0.747 -0.859 -1.022∗
(-3.47) (-3.46) (-2.06) (-1.48) (-1.35) (-1.60) (-1.76)
Asia -0.142 -0.778 -0.820 -1.224 -0.846 -1.092 -0.983
(-0.26) (-1.18) (-1.19) (-1.63) (-1.10) (-1.57) (-1.30)
Log Rainfall 2.616∗∗∗
(4.44)
Rainfall x Pop. Den. -1.101∗∗
(-2.11)
H.Rain L.Pop. Den. 1.805∗∗∗
(3.53)
L.Rain H.Pop. Den. 1.252
(1.68)
H.Rain H.Pop. Den. -1.244
(-1.53)
L.Rain L.Pop. Den. -0.474
(-0.43)
Constant 4.183∗∗∗ -8.79∗∗∗ 3.160∗∗∗ 3.311∗∗∗ 3.274∗∗∗ 3.374∗∗∗ -5.433∗∗∗
(16.88) (-2.93) (8.68) (8.13) (7.96) (7.99) (-10.64)
Observations 42 42 41 41 41 41 35
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions are OLS cross-section regressions. The dependent variable in
regressions (1)-(6) is the natural log of the per person number of days of work lost due to strikes or lockouts (averaged over the first 20-year period
following independence). In regression (7), the dependent variable is the log of per capita involvement in strikes and lockouts. Rainfall is in mm
and averaged over the period 1900-1930. The sample for these regressions is tropical dependencies. More details on each variable (definitions and
source) are available in the Data Appendix.
results indicate that a 1 percent increase in the annual rainfall was associated with a
0.55 percent increase in the short-run, and an even larger (0.782 percent) increase in
crop production in the long-run.
The idea that the combination of low population density and high cash crop suit-
ability led to more intense labour conflict suggests that the effect of colonial labour
supply on labour conflict is moderated by the relative suitability of territories for cash
crop production. When land is highly suitable for cash-crop production, labour supply
will have a significant negative relationship with labour conflict. However, when crop
suitability is low, the influence of colonial labour supply on early post-colonial labour
conflict is diminished. Thus, crop suitability (as measured by natural log of rainfall)
acts as a moderator variable. To test this idea, in column (2), we introduce a con-
tinuous by continuous interaction — the product of log of colonial population density
and log of average rainfall. The resulting coefficient is negative (−1.10) and significant
at the 5−percent level. This represents the number of units that the slope of labour
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conflict on colonial labour supply changes, given a one unit increase in rainfall. The
result implies that at higher levels of rainfall, the slope of post-colonial labour conflict
on colonial labour supply gets more negative. In the context of the present analysis, this
means that at greater levels of rainfall, decreases in population density are associated
with higher levels of conflict. This strongly supports the proposed hypothesis that it is
the unique combination of cash crop suitability and low labour supply which acted as
the catalyst for greater labour conflict in post-colonial territories. This notion is further
confirmed by the average marginal effects estimation presented in Table C1 in the ap-
pendix. The coefficients under dydx in the marginal effects table give the amount of change
in labour conflict with a one unit change in log colonial population density while holding
the log of rainfall constant at various values (the simple slopes). From the table, it is
clear that at lower levels of rainfall the slope of labour conflict with respect to colonial
labour supply is statistically insignificant, but this changes dramatically at higher levels
of rainfall (log rainfall≥ 4.8 in the table) where it is significant and negative. This result
draws the same qualitative conclusion as that suggested by the coefficient on Rainfall
x Pop.Den.. Here again, this offers more support for the hypothesis that the effect
of colonial population density is moderated by suitable climatological conditions, and
lends weight to the idea that the significant relationship between population density and
labour conflict measures the effect of colonial agricultural labour supply on post-colonial
institutions. Specifically, at higher levels of cash crop suitability, the slope of labour
conflict on colonial labour availability is significantly negative; that is, where climatic
conditions are such that it favours agricultural mass production, lower availability of
labour is associated with higher levels of conflict.
As further evidence of this, columns (3)-(5) test the hypothesis by means of a series of
dummy variable regressions which categorise our colonies into four groups. We construct
the dummy variables in the following way: we determine the four quartiles of each of
the two variables (rainfall and population density) and categorise the countries into two
groups, depending on which quartile they fall into for the respective variable. Next, we
create a dummy variable to represent each group so that the dummy variables H.Rain
and L.Rain represent territories with rainfall levels in the 4th and 1st quartile ranges,
respectively. We do the same for population density to generate the dummies H.Pop.
Den and L.Pop. Den. for high and low population density territories, depending on
whether they fall into the 4th or 1st quartile. Finally, we interact the two sets of dummies
to generate the following categories of territories: H.Rain L.Pop. Den. to represent
countries with high rainfall and low population density (that is in the 4th quartile when
it comes to rainfall and in the 1st quartile when it comes to colonial population density);
L.Rain H.Pop. Den. for countries with low rainfall and high colonial population density,
H.Rain H.Pop. Den. for countries with high rainfall and high population density; and
L.Rain L.Pop. Den. for countries with low rainfall and low population density.
In column (3), we introduce the dummy variable H.Rain L.Pop. Den. to capture
the differential effect — among tropical dependencies— of being a territory with highly
suitable climatic conditions for cash-crop production, coupled with insufficient colonial
labour supply. The coefficient is 1.81 and is significant at the 1−percent level. The
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implication here is that low population density territories with climatic conditions more
suitable for cash-crop production had, on average, 1.81 percent higher number of lost
days of work due to labour disputes than the other tropical dependencies in the imme-
diate post-colonial period. The result offers compelling empirical evidence support the
assertion that it was low labour supply in highly crop-suitable environments that led
to poor labour relations and institutions. This shows that not only do tropical depen-
dencies differ from the rest of the world in that they have the unique environment and
relative factor endowments which ultimately affected the development of labour rela-
tions and institutions, but also that, even within the group of dependencies, territories
blessed with a fertile land resource but cursed with a low labour supply on the eve of
colonisation suffered from worse labour relations.
In columns (4)-(6), to show that the result in column (3) is specific to territories with
relative high rainfall but low colonial labour supply, the regression from column (3) is re-
run with the dummies representing each of the remaining categories of tropical colonies.
A dummy variable for tropical dependencies with relatively high colonial population
density but relatively low rainfall is introduced in column (4). The results indicate
that the there is no difference between this category of tropical colonies and the rest of
the tropical dependencies as a whole. In column (5), the dummy variable representing
the category of relatively high population density tropical colonies with higher levels
of rainfall is introduced. Here again, the results suggest that there is no significant
difference between this category and the rest of the tropical dependencies as a whole.
The case is similar when the category of tropical dependencies with relatively low rainfall
and population density is tested in column (6). We can conclude, therefore, that while
higher levels of colonial labour supply generally led to better labour institutions among
tropical dependencies, the tropical colonies with suitable climatic conditions but low
colonial labour supply uniquely suffered from more intense labour conflicts than other
tropical colonies. This highlights the importance of the colonial cash-crop production
incentive, in the face of labour shortages, for the determination of the quality of labour
institutions in tropical colonies. In column (7), to test the robustness of the result from
column (1), a different measure of the dependent variable (labour conflict) is used. In
place of the log of number of days lost due to labour disputes, the log of average number
of workers (per 1000) involved in strikes and lockouts, relative to the total population,
is used. Here again, the results confirm that which we observed in column (1). Among
former tropical colonies, higher levels of colonial labour supply led to significantly less
labour conflict in the immediate post-emancipation period. In fact, a 1 percent increase
in population density is associated with a 0.52 percent decrease in the number of workers
involved in strikes and lockouts.
4.7.4 An Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach
In the previous subsection, our analysis relied on OLS estimates to assess the significance
of the relationships between colonial labour supply, labour conflict, and labour institu-
tions. In this subsection, we test the robustness of these relationships by controlling for
potential endogeneity between our measure of labour supply and outcome variables. In
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Chapter 2, we discussed the sources of endogeneity in regressions of the form we are
studying here. Much of the reasoning highlighted in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2 applies
here. We will, therefore, not repeat the discussion, but proceed to an introduction of
an instrumental variable approach and repeat our core regressions to ensure that our
conclusions are free from endogeneity bias. For this approach to work, we need a suitable
instrument that is exogenous, correlated with our measure of labour supply, and (con-
ditional on the controls included in the regression) has no significant direct relationship
with our dependent variable.
One such variable is population density in the year 1000. According to Acemoglu
et al. (2002, p.1252)23, “instrumenting population density in the year 1500 with popula-
tion density in [the year] 1000 isolates the long-run component in 1500 that is correlated
with population density in 1000.” Following the method of Acemoglu et al. (2002), we
use population density in the year 1000 as our instrument. This instrument works as
population density in 1000 is at least 500 years prior to the colonisation of any of the
countries in our sample, and is, therefore, orthogonal to any European colonial policy
and institutions which might have affected the supply of labour. The second reason why
this serves as valid instrument is that it compellingly satisfies the exclusion restriction.
As suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2002), we fully expect that any effect of population
density in 1000 on colonial labour supply necessarily goes through colonial population
density.
Our first two-stage instrumental variable regression repeats the regressions in the
B-labelled columns of Table 4.524, and is of the following form:
The First Stage: the regression of colonial labour supply on the log of population density
in the year 1000.
LPDi = µ+ λLPD1000i + ηi (4.15)
The Second Stage: the regression of labour institutions today on instrumented colonial
labour supply.
flexi = γ′0 + γ′1LPDi +X ′iγ′2 + ν ′i (4.16)
where LPD is log population density on the eve of colonisation, LPD1000 is log pop-
ulation density in 1000, η is an error term, flex is our measure of present day labour
institutions, and X ′ is a vector of covariates. We expect that higher population density
in 1000 is associated with higher colonial population density so that λ > 0. The results
of this two-stage least square regression are presented in Table 4.8.
The table presents the two-stage least square regressions using the log of population
density in 1000 to instrument log population density on the eve of colonisation for four
23Acemoglu et al. (2002) use population density in the year 1000 to instrument population density in
1500 in their famous reversal of fortune paper. See Table V on page 1250 of their article.
24We also conduct an instrumental variable regression counterpart to the OLS regression with all the
controls as in Column (4) of Table 4.4, but we do not discuss it at length here as the following regressions
more fully examines the differential relationship between colonial labour and labour institutions today
in the different samples. Nevertheless, the results (similar to the OLS) are presented in Table C1 in the
appendix to this chapter.
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Table 4.8: IV Regression: Labour Institutions and Colonial Labour Supply
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Square Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable is Flexibility Score
Tropical
Dependencies Other Colonies Never Colonised Rest of the World
Tropical
Dependencies
Log Col. Pop.
Density
0.187**
(2.47)
0.003
(0.04)
-0.095
(-1.19)
-0.052
(-1.50)
0.186**
(2.44)
Legal Origin -0.260*(-1.95)
-0.141
(-0.58)
-0.831***
(-6.25)
-0.458***
(-3.00)
-0.252*
(-1.88)
Log GDP per
Capita
0.045
(0.20)
0.840***
(3.51)
0.350
(1.45)
0.409***
(3.40)
0.042
(0.18)
Asia -0.330(-1.28)
0.548*
(1.80)
-0.116
(-0.59)
0.259*
(1.65)
-0.319
(-1.20)
Africa -0.143(-0.70)
0.220
(0.66)
-0.037
(-0.17)
-0.123
(-0.56)
Pop. Change -0.025(-0.18)
R2 0.15 0.61 0.41 0.32 0.15
Panel B: First Stage for Log. Population Density
LPD1000 0.816***(10.35)
0.878***
(16.75)
0.757***
(5.65)
1.062***
(22.67)
0.817***
(9.99)
Legal Origin -0.039(-0.17)
-0.621***
(-3.03)
-0.335
(-1.23)
-0.703***
(-3.60)
-0.056
(-0.27)
Log GDP per
Capita
-0.461**
(-2.34)
-0.414**
(2.19)
0.951***
(3.05)
0.207
(1.15)
-0.455**
(-2.18)
Asia 1.278***(5.46)
0.072
(0.22)
-0.435
(-1.03)
-0.825***
(-3.93)
1.256***
(6.86)
Africa 0.791***(3.37)
0.248
(0.84)
-0.456*
(-1.83)
0.746***
(4.06)
Pop. Change 0.058(0.23)
N 51 24 39 65 51
Notes: N is the number of countries in each regression. We lose a few observations as we do not have data on population
density in the year 1000 for all countries. All regressions are estimated as two-stage least square regressions. The relevant
test-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficients. The measure of labour institutions is the labour market flexibility
score (average 2008-2016) from the World Economic Forum’s GCI, which is measured on a scale of 1 to 7. A higher
score indicates better institutional quality. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. All regressions were ran with constants,
though they are not reported here to keep the table brief. The second-stage constants are 4.29, 1.03, 3.61, 3.11, and 4.35
respectively. The control for population change is the average of annual growth rate between 1960 and 2010.
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samples of countries: our tropical dependencies, other colonies outside the tropical belt,
countries never colonied, and a combined sample of all countries not in our tropical
dependency sample (i.e. the ROTW). The first stage regression is reported in Panel
B (corresponding to Equation (4.15)) while the second stage is reported in Panel A
(Equation (4.16)). For all regressions we see a highly significant, positive first-stage
relationship between the log of population density in 1000 and log population density
on the eve of colonisation (colonial population density), supporting our assertion that
population density in 1000 serves as a valid instrument. In the first column (for example),
the coefficient on log population density in 1000 is 0.816 and the t-statistic is 10.35.
As further evidence of the validity of our instrument, we present the first stage post-
estimation tests of instrument validity. The test results in Table 4.9 include the first-stage
adjusted r-square, Shea’s partial r-square, and the F -statistics and their significance,
which we can compare against the Stock et al. (2002) recommended threshold for a
strong instrument.25 The F -test statistics are always comfortably over 10 (107, 280,
31, and 513) and significant at all levels for all our first-stage regressions. The adjusted
Shae’s partial r-square and the standard adjusted r-square are always above 50, which
suggests that we do indeed have a very strong instrument. Furthermore, in all first-
stage regressions in Table 4.8, the log of colonial population density in 1000 is with the
expected positive sign.
In the first column of Table 4.8, the two-stage least square regression is for the
sample of countries which we have referred to as tropical dependencies. The coefficient
on the log of population density on the eve of colonisation is 0.187 and significant at the
5-percent level. The result suggests that 1 percent higher colonial population density
is associated with a score for labour institution quality which is 0.042 percent higher,
relative to the average score for tropical colonies. This estimate supports our theory that
as far as tropical dependencies are concerned, areas with stronger supplies of labour, as
measured by colonial population density, enjoy significantly better labour institutions
today. The coefficient of the two-stage least square regression is noticeably larger in
magnitude (0.187) than that of the OLS regression (0.133) in Table 4.5. This leads us
to believe that attenuation bias from measurement error, rather than upward bias from
the omitted relationship between colonial institutions, colonial labour supply and labour
institutions today, was the dominant form of bias in the OLS estimates. Legal origin
as a determinant of labour institutions today is still significant (at the 10-percent level)
among tropical dependencies. As it was in the OLS, countries with French legal origin
experience more rigid (less flexible) labour institutions today. The magnitude of the
coefficient has changed little from the OLS result. Furthermore, as we observed from
the OLS regressions, the relationship between colonial labour supply and the quality of
labour institutions today is unique to our sample of tropical dependencies.
We observe no such relationship for the sample of ‘Other Colonies’ (colonised coun-
tries outside of the tropical region), nor do we observe this relationship for countries that
were not colonised. When we perform the regression for the rest of the world (all coun-
tries falling outside our tropical dependencies sample altogether, as seen in the fourth
25Stock et al. (2002) recommend that the F -test statistic exceeds 10 for an instrument.
CHAPTER 4. COLONIAL LABOUR & CURRENT LABOUR INSTITUTIONS 149
Table 4.9: Weak Instrument Tests
Weak Instrument Test Statistics
Sample Adj. R2 Shea’s Adj.Partial R2
Robust
F-Statistic Prob>F
Tropical
Dependency 0.81 0.61 107 0.000
Other
Colonies 0.97 0.87 280 0.000
Never
Colonised 0.79 0.53 31 0.000
ROTW 0.89 0.89 513 0.000
Notes: Each of these statistics are for the excluded instrument and assess
the strength of the instrument. In addition to the significance of the instru-
ment in the first stage regression, Stock et al. (2002) recommend that the
F -statistic exceed 10. A high r-square is also evidence of a strong instru-
ment. This test was implemented using STATA’s estat firststage command.
regression in Table 4.8), we see that the relationship between colonial population density
and labour institutions today remains unique to our sample of tropical dependencies.
The coefficients on colonial labour supply are 0.003, −0.095, and −0.052, respectively,
and are never significant for the other samples. This lends further support to our asser-
tion that it is colonial population density as a rough measure of colonial labour supply,
rather than an indicator of other factors (such as income), that is being captured here.
Nevertheless, we include a control for income (log GDP per capita, average 2000-2010)
to control for the effect of income on labour institutions, and continental dummies to
root out continent-specific effects in all our regressions. The results of the IV regression
mirror that of the OLS in every instance. In the final column of Table 4.8, we introduce
a control for population change into our main regression (from Column (1)). The vari-
able Pop. Change is the average annual growth rate of population from 1960 to 2010,
as reported by the World Bank. The introduction of a control for population change
does not alter our findings. The coefficient on colonial population density is 0.186 and
significant at the 5-percent level, indicating that the effects of colonial labour availability
on labour institutions today persist even when we control for population change.
The second set of regressions which we repeat using instrumental variables to control
for potential endogeneity are the key relationships from Table 4.7. The main regression
in this table (Column (1)) estimates the relationship between colonial labour supply and
post-colonial labour conflict. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 report the result of the instrumental
variable regression counter part to this OLS regression.
In Column (1) of Table 4.11, we see the results of the first-stage regression of colo-
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Table 4.10: Post Colonial Labour Conflict and Colonial Labour Supply
Two-Stage Least Square Dependent Regression
Labour
Conflict (1)
Labour
Conflict (2)
Labour
Conflict (3)
Log Col. Pop.
Density
-0.639**
(-2.31)
-0.519*
(-1.65)
-0.612**
(-2.06)
Legal Origin -1.038**(-2.53)
-0.759*
(-1.87)
-0.828*
(-1.82)
Asia -0.980*(-1.68)
-1.156*
(-1.65)
Pop. Change -0.718**(-2.35)
-0.366
(-1.22)
Log Rainfall 0.927*(1.87)
Constant 3.948***(10.78)
5.326***
(11.04)
-0.019
(-0.01)
R2 0.38 0.43 0.45
N 38 38 38
Notes: All regressions are estimated as cross-sectional two-stage least
square regressions for our sample of tropical dependencies. The above
results are the second-stage estimates. N is the number of observations
in each regression. We lose a few observations as we do not have
data on population density in the year 1000 for all countries. The
z-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficients. The measure of
labour conflict is the log of the number of work days lost due to strikes
and lockouts. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. The control for
population change is the average of annual growth rate between 1960
and 2010.
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Table 4.11: First Stage Regression: Labour Conflict and Colonial Labour Supply
First-Stage Dependent Variable: Log Col. Pop. Density
(1) (2) (3)
LPD1000 1.014***(7.96)
0.926***
(7.18)
0.972***
(6.40)
Legal Origin -0.102(-0.38)
-0.295
(-1.25)
-0.336
(-1.20)
Asia 0.874***(5.01)
0.925***
(4.66)
Pop. Change 0.522**(2.41)
0.417*
(1.75)
Log Rainfall -0.274(-0.99)
Constant 0.799***(3.44)
-0.272
(-0.41)
1.444
(0.91)
Notes: All regressions are estimated as cross-sectional two-stage least
square regressions for our sample of tropical dependencies. The above
results are the first-stage estimates. The dependent variable is popu-
lation density on the eve of colonisation. The t-statistics are in paren-
theses below the coefficients. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. The
control for population change is the average of annual growth rate
between 1960 and 2010.
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nial population density on the natural log of population density in 1000. The estimate is
1.01 with a t-statistic of 7.96, confirming the required first-stage significant relationship
between our instrument and colonial population density.26 Our coefficient of interest is
that on the log of colonial population density in Column (1) of the second-stage results
in Table 4.10. It captures the relationship between colonial labour supply (measured by
instrumented population density on the eve of colonisation) and labour conflict (mea-
sured by the natural log of the number of days of work per capita lost due to strikes and
lockouts). The estimate is −0.64, with an associated z-statistic of −2.31, significant at
the 5-percent level. The absolute value of the coefficient is smaller than that of the OLS
(−0.78), but reaffirms our finding in Column (1) of Table 4.7. That is, for our sample of
tropical dependencies, territories with a larger supply of colonial labour had significantly
less post-colonial labour conflict. In fact, according to our IV estimates, a 1 percent in-
crease in colonial labour availability was associated with a 0.64 percent reduction in the
number of days of work lost due to strikes and lockouts in the post-colonial period.
In the regression (2), we introduce our control for population change into the re-
gression. The first-stage relationship remains highly significant. As for our second-stage
regression, the absolute value of the coefficient on our measure of colonial labour avail-
ability falls to 0.52, but remains significant at the 10-percent level and keeps its negative
sign. Legal origin is also now significant at the 10-percent level. Thus, even in the
presence of a control for population change, we see that higher colonial labour availabil-
ity was associated with lower levels of post-colonial labour conflict. In Column (3), we
introduce rainfall into the regression.27 The coefficient on this variable is 0.93, and its
positive sign accords with what we observed in the OLS regression in Table 4.7. That
is, higher suitability for cash-crop production is associated with increaseed post-colonial
labour conflict.
The OLS regressions (2) and (3) from Table 4.7 estimated the relationship between
colonial labour availability and post-colonial labour conflict conditional on the suitabil-
ity of the country for cash-crop production. This suitability is measured by the 30-year
average rainfall from 1900-1930. We attempted to repeat these regressions using the
log population density in 1000 as our instrument for colonial population density. To do
this, we needed an instrument for the interaction terms in regressions (2) and (3) as well.
One potentially suitable instrument is an interaction between rainfall and the population
density in 1000.28 Unfortunately, this interaction does not yield the required first-stage
relationship and we are unable to test the rainfall-moderated relationship between colo-
nial population density and labour conflict with instrumental variables.29 In the absence
26The corresponding F -statistic is 63, well above the recommended 10 and is significant at the 1-percent
level.
27We have already shown that the literature (for example Sillah (2014)) finds that cash-crop production
is directly dependent on rainfall levels.
28See Wooldridge (2010, p.143-145) which shows that interacting the exogenous regressor (which forms
part of the interaction) with the instrument and including it as an instrument for the interaction term
is a viable approach, provided the instrument is strong enough.
29The first-stage coefficient on the interaction term between the log population density in 1000 and
rainfall is 2.61 and the t-statistic is 1.30 and, therefore, insignificant. We were unable to find a different
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Table 4.12: Endogeneity Test
Test of Endogeneity
Ho: variables are exogenous
Robust score χ2(1) 1.974 p = 0.160
Robust regression
F(1, 38) 1.893 p = 0.178
Notes: The table details the results of the Durbin and Wu-
Hausman endogeneity test. Yhe null hypothesis is that colonial
population density is exogenous to post-colonial labour conflict.
of a suitable instrument to reproduce the instrumental variable counterparts of regres-
sions (2) and (3) from Table 4.7, we sought to determine whether we can rely on the
OLS results in Table 4.7 for these two regression. Colonial population is the potentially
endogenous variable in question. We therefore test whether colonial population density
(taken at the latest available date before colonisation) can be treated as exogenous in
the post-colonial labour conflict regression. If it is exogenous, then we can accept the
results of the OLS for these two regressions as the OLS would be more efficient in such
a case. The process involves running the regression as specified in Column (1) of Table
4.10 and using STATA’s estat endogenous command. This command implements the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p.183). Table 4.12 reports the
results of the test for endogeneity of colonial population density to labour conflict.
The null hypothesis is that the log of colonial population density is exogenous in the
post-colonial labour conflict regression. From the results, we see that both test statistics
are insignificant (p = 0.16 and p = 0.18). Thus, we cannot reject the null of exogeneity.
This suggests that we can rely on the OLS estimations in Column (2) and (3) from Table
4.7, which concluded that the effect of colonial population density is moderated by cash-
crop suitability. That is, in areas more suited for cash-crop production, having lower
levels of available colonial labour is associated with significantly more labour conflict in
the post-colonial period.
The above instrumental variable approaches act as an effective check on the robust-
ness of our OLS results to potential endogeneity problems. Both approaches produce
evidence to support our hypothesis, which assigns a crucial role to the impact of colonial
labour issues on the outcome of labour institutions today.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter posits an alternative theory regarding the determinants of the quality of
labour institutions. It assigns a crucial role to the historical and socio-economic context
in which labour relations and institutions evolved. The notion that colonial labour rela-
tions had a role to play in the development of labour institutions is strongly supported
suitable instrument for the interaction term.
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by the results. We have seen a persistent and significant positive relationship between
the quality of labour institutions today and colonial labour availability. That this re-
lationship is unique to the former tropical colonies — where labour-intensive colonial
exploits existed — serves as further evidence in support of the theory. Consequently,
the work presented here links the relationship between labour relations and colonial
labour availability to the incentives generated by the agricultural production opportuni-
ties present during the colonial period. It is useful to borrow from the natural resource
curse literature to better understand this idea. The abundance of suitable agricultural
land motivated an interest in cultivation which could not be readily satisfied, at any
wage, by the available labour force. This led to the development of restrictive, often
repressive labour institutions and the erosion of amicable labour relations over time.
This is the state of relations which still characterises the labour market in ex-colonies
today.
The results presented above make a meaningful contribution to the arguments sur-
rounding the discussion around the determinants of labour institutions. The fact that
historical labour problems are evidently linked to labour institutions today suggests
that we must consider the historical settings in which labour institutions developed
when considering labour policy. It is not incidental that the relationship between the
colonial labour problem and present day labour institutions is unique to the tropical
region, where labour-intensive colonial production made the availability of labour of
paramount relevance to the development of society. Economists must therefore consider
that the factors which determine institutional outcomes are not homogeneous across all
countries. Treating them as such leads to naive cross-country comparisons which mask
important effects and yield misleading conclusions. In a region such as the Caribbean,
where the plantation society, still in existence, is a by-product of the forced relationship
between land, labour and capital, historical labour problems and labour institutions are
inextricably linked. This may not prove to be the case in societies that developed in a
more ‘natural’ way.
Further research into this idea would prove rewarding. Despite the novel attempt of
the present work, certain difficulties remain for this and future work. The unavailability
of data for several of the countries in the sample of tropical dependencies means that the
analysis relies on a relatively small sample size. In addition, the analysis would benefit
from a suitable measure of early labour institutions. Unfortunately, such an objective
measure is not available. Moreover, future research ought to look into seeking remedies
to the difficulties posed by the state of current labour relations in these countries and how
these solutions can be feasibly applied. With more comprehensive data and more suitable
measures, this research agenda may develop significantly. Nevertheless, the results of
this chapter, which uses both two-stage least square and OLS techniques, are plausibly
robust and stand as a contribution to the existing literature on the determinants of
labour institution.
Concluding Remarks and Further
Research
Throughout its chapters, this thesis has connected institutional development to present
day outcomes taking a closer look at the interests and motivations of institutional ar-
chitects over a country’s history. This work has focused on the colonial period due to
the widely recognized relevance of this era for the institutional development of many
countries. By using contemporaneous and recent evidence from the history literature
and supplementing it with empirical analysis, the work presented in this thesis offers
compelling evidence of a systematic relationship between colonial factors and present-
day outcomes. The literature surveyed and the unique data gathered from original
manuscripts help draw evidenced-backed conclusions on colonial era institutional choices
and the heterogenous development paths we observe today. The chapters of this thesis
each contribute to our understanding in a unique way.
Chapter 1 contributes answers to questions regarding the underdevelopment of Ja-
maica. It provides evidence which improves our understanding of the consequences of
a political and economic system where private entrepreneurs hold a disproportionate
amount of power, and economic interests that are at odds with the welfare of the mass
of the population. By looking at public investment under two differently forms of gov-
ernment, the chapter offers empirical evidence that economic policy is, to a significant
extent, determined by the institutional environment from which it originates. Chapter
2 offers a unique contribution to the scarce literature on the economic divergence of the
former sugar colonies in the West Indies. In it, a comprehensive explanation is offered
for the puzzling reversal in economic fortunes of Jamaica and Guyana, relative to the
other British Caribbean sugar colonies. There has not yet, until now, been a rigor-
ous systematic examination of this divergence, and no previous work, to this author’s
knowledge, has offered an econometric investigation of the origins and causes of this
divergence. Chapter 3, with its survey of the African literature, is able to connect the
theory with the experiences in other colonies. In so doing, it enhances the credibility of
our arguments and shows that the relationships described in this thesis were pervasive
and systematic. Chapter 4 contributes to both the historical economics literature and
research on the political economy of labour institutions in post-colonial tropical states.
By connecting the legacy of colonial labour relations to the nature of labour institutions
today, this chapter deepens our understanding of the persistence and consequences of
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a culture of conflict between economic agents. The evidence presented that colonial
labour problems had repercussions for the long-term development of labour institutions
through what they meant for labour relations is a novel contribution of this work.
As with all research, there are a few limitations to this thesis. Three limitations
worth mentioning in the present work concern the availability of data, measurement
issues and the dearth of previous research into several of the areas of focus in this
thesis. Where data availability is concerned, the poor record keeping and statistical
infrastructure of many developing countries, in addition to the fact that historical records
are often rare and inconsistent, have made compiling a complete dataset for analysis very
challenging. As such, the samples under consideration in these chapters have at times
been small. This raises questions as to the validity of inferences made from the results.
To ensure that the samples remained representative, every effort was made to gather as
much data as possible, and meticulous and, at times, tedious work went into generating
sample sizes that were as large as possible. In light of this, we are confident that the
results and inferences from these essays are valid where they apply. With respect to
the second limitation that has been identified, because this work is concerned with the
concept of institutions, a concept that is difficult to restrict to a concise definition,
it has been difficult to obtain indicators that comprehensively and precisely measure
institutions or institutional quality. As much as was possible, this work relied on the
existing literature for these indicators, and several different measures were used in order
to ensure that this concept was effectively captured. To the limitations created by the
lack of existing research; while there is a lot of literature in historical and institutional
economics, theoretical and empirical work focusing on the institutional variation and
economic divergence among post-colonial states is still quite rare. As a result, the
present work could not draw on a wide range of theories and/or established ideas to aid
in explaining some of the results of this thesis. Nevertheless, as much as possible, the
findings in this work have been discussed with due consideration of the current literature,
and a multidisciplinary approach was adopted to connect this thesis to as much of the
scholarly work as appropriate.
This approach charts one of the possible paths forward for future research into the
ideas tackled in these four essays. More collaboration with the history and sociology
literature would go a long way towards understanding how institutions are affected by
historical and cultural factors and how these, in turn, affect economic development.
Post-colonial societies, like the ones studied in this research, still largely reflect the
structures put in place during the colonial period. A deeper understanding of how their
sociological characteristics interact with the economic realities offers a possible avenue to
be explored with econometric rigour. Furthermore, future research should seek to carry
out deeper microeconometric analysis of some of the questions raised in this research.
A more disaggregated approach would offer more specific answers to how history and
culture, working through institutions, continue to affect economic development. The
difficulty in acquiring such disaggregated data from existing sources notwithstanding,
such a project may yet be worthwhile. On that note, another avenue through which
the research presented in these essays may be taken forward is in establishing a digital
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database from the rare data uncovered in the course of this project. Having collected
copies of the original manuscript of the colonial Blue Books for over one hundred years
for several British West Indian colonies, digitizing and making this data available to
persons interested in work in this field of economics will certainly contribute to this
body of research. There is still much of the data collected during this research that is
yet to be analysed. Doing so is expected to uncover many more interesting findings.

Data Appendix
Data For Chapter 1
Daily Agriculture Wage Rates are (sterling) wages as reported in the colonial Blue
Books of the respective countries for the years as reported. Where wages were reported
weekly, we divided it by 5 working days to arrive at the daily wages. Colonial Blue
Books of all British West Indian territories for the years 1838-1915 (with some gaps
for a few territories) are available at the Cambridge University Library and the British
Online Archives.
Hurricane as used in the text in Chapter 1 is a dummy variable = 1 if the country
experienced a hurricane in the year in question and 0 otherwise. Hurricane data are
from Dippel et al. (2015).
Order - Resource Ratio (ORRatio in the text) is the ratio of policing expenditure to
public investment in health and education. It is calculated by dividing policing expen-
diture by the sum of expenditure on human resources (i.e. health and education).
Policing Share of Expenditure (Police shr. in the text) is the sum of the share of to-
tal expenditure accruing to expenditure on police and prisons. Data on this is collected
from the Colonial Blue Books of each Jamaica and Antigua for the years 1838-1915
available at the Cambridge University Library and the British Online Archives.
Public Debt is government debt of the territories as reported in the Statistical Abstract
for the Several Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom for various years.
Retrieved from: https://parlipapers.proquest.com.
Public Investment is the sum of the expenditure shares of health, education and
infrastructure out of total expenditure, unless otherwise noted in the text. Data on
these expenditures are collected from the Colonial Blue Books of Jamaica and Antigua
for the years 1838-1915, available at the Cambridge University Library and the British
Online Archives.
Real Revenue is total revenue collected by the island government for the fiscal year.
It is converted to real terms using CPI data from the Bank of England’s collection of
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Three Centuries of Data, retrieved from:
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/research-datasets
Sugar Price is the sterling price (in shillings (s)) per c.w.t of sugar on the London
Market for the year reported. It is retrieved from Eisner (1961, p. 244-266).
Sugar Share of Export (sugshr in the text) is taken from the Colonial Blue Books
of Jamaica and Antigua for the years 1838-1915, available at the Cambridge University
Library and the British Online Archives. It is calculated as the total value of sugar
exports divided by value of total exports.
Data for Chapter 2
Natural Increase is calculated as the birth rates minus death rates averaged over the
period 1850-1900. Data on birth and death rates is from Bulmer-Thomas (2012).
Pop. Density 1834 is the number of slaves per square kilometre in 1834. These data
are from Higman (1986, p.608).
Real GDP per Capita in Table 2.8 is the log of GDP per capita (constant 2010
US$) in 2013, retrieved from FRED Economic Data. For the OLS regressions, GDP per
capita is log of average GDP per capita for 1977- 2014, retried from the World Bank.
See https://fred.stlouisfed.org and https://data.worldbank.org/.
Slave Holdings Data are from Higman (1995) as used by Nunn (2008). It measures
the fraction of slaves in the territory who reside on holdings of a particular size.
Sugar Price Index and Agriculture Wage Index are, as the names suggest, a price
index of sugar and an index of wages spanning various years. The data for these variables
are from Bulmer-Thomas (2012), which features an online appendix of supplementary
material at https://cambridge.org.
Sugar Suitability data measures the suitability of soil to sugar cane production based
on geographical variables. Data for this variable comes from Dippel et al. (2015).
The following are definitions of institutional measures according to the World Bank
Governance Indicators Website: info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi. Data for these
measures are the collected as the average score for the period 1996 to 2013.
Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well
as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
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Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the govern-
ment’s commitment to such policies.
Political Stability and Absence of Violence measures perceptions of the likelihood
of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism.
Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector
development.
Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of ex-
pression, freedom of association, and a free media.
Data for Chapter 4
Flexibility is from the World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Index and is aver-
aged over the years 2008-2016. It is measured by aggregating five subcomponents which
include: (i) Cooperation in labour-employer relations, (ii) Flexibility of wage determi-
nation, (iii) Hiring and firing practices (iv) Redundancy costs, and (v) Effect of taxation
on incentives to work. The indicator is measured on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 being the
lowest. Retrieved from www.weforum.org.
Informality is measured as the size of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP in
2004. Data on this variable comes from Botero et al. (2004).
Labour Conflict is measured as the number of days of work (per capita) lost due
to strikes and lockouts and alternatively, the fraction of the population involved in
strikes and lockouts. This data is collected from van der Velden (2016) and aver-
aged over the first twenty years of each country’s independence. Data on the num-
ber of strikes (as show in Table 4.3) comes from the International Labour Organisation
database: https://www.ilo.org/global/statistics-and-databases/statistics-overview-and-
topics/social-dialogue/lang–en/index.htm
Legal Origins is a dummy variable = 1 if the country is of French legal origin and 0
otherwise. Data on this variable is taken from La Porta et al. (1999).
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Log GDP per capita: is in constant 2005 US dollars, averaged over the years 2000-
2010, as available from the World Bank. See data.worldbank.org
Population Change is the average of annual population growth from 1960 to 2010,
retrieved from the World Bank website: See data.worldbank.org
Population Density on the Eve of Colonisation measures the number of persons
per square kilometre of arable land on the eve of colonisation (the latest year before the
arrival of the first governor or colonisation onset as identified by Lange et al. (2006).
Data for this variable is taken from Acemoglu et al. (2002) and McEvedy et al. (1978).
Population Density in 1000 measures the number of persons per square kilometre of
arable land in the year 1000. Data for this variable is taken from Acemoglu et al. (2002)
and McEvedy et al. (1978).
Rainfall is from the World Bank Data gathered in Mitchell et al. (2004) and It is mea-
sured in mm for the period 1900-1930.
Tropical Dependency Is a dummy variable = 1 if the country is an ex-colony and falls
between the Tropic of Cancer in the Northern Hemisphere at 23.43678 degrees North,
and the Tropic of Capricorn in the Southern Hemisphere at 23.43678 degrees South.
Urbanisation is the Bairoch equivalent urbanisation rate in 1500 from Fink-Jensen
(2005).
Sources for other data points used in the text are listed under their respective tables and figures.
Appendices to Chapter 1
Figure A1: Public Investment Share of Expenditure
Source: Colonial Blue Books of Antigua (1838-1916), Jamaica (1838-1916), and Barbados (1838-1916).
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Figure A2: Jamaica Blue Book Data: Expenditure Shares & Sugar Share
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The Comparative Approach
From (1.19), consider the effect of the strength of the plantation economy on public
investment for Jamaica and Antigua before the pre-constitutional change. That is:
for Jamaica, we set Post = 0 and Jam = 1 and differentiate PI with respect to
Sugshr:
∂PI
∂Sugshr
= µ′′1 + µ′′3 (A1)
for Antigua, we set Post = 0 and Jam = 0 and differentiate PI with respect to
Sugshr:
∂PI
∂Sugshr
= µ′′1 (A2)
Thus, the difference in the slope (effect of the strength of the plantation economy)
between Jamaica and Antigua during planter rule is given by (A1)−(A2)= µ′′3.
Similarly, we can derive the effect of the plantation economy on public investment in
the post-constitutional change period as:
for Jamaica, we set Post = 1 and Jam = 1 and differentiate PI with respect to
Sugshr:
∂PI
∂Sugshr
= µ′′1 + µ′′3 + µ′′5 + µ′′7 (A3)
for Antigua, we set Post = 1 and Jam = 0 and differentiate PI with respect to
Sugshr:
∂PI
∂Sugshr
= µ′′1 + µ′′5 (A4)
thus, the difference in the slopes for the two countries in the post-planter rule period
is given by (A3)−(A4)= µ′′3 + µ′′7.
And so, finally, we have the difference in the differential effect between post-constitutional
change slopes and pre-constitutional change slopes as:
µ′′3 + µ′′7 − µ′′3 = µ′′7 (A5)
We see, therefore, that µ′′7 measures the difference in the differential effect of the strength
of the plantation economy on public investment, between Jamaica and Antigua, between
periods. If, in fact, µ′′3 < 0 and µ′′7 > 0, then the differential effect of the presence of
the plantation economy between Jamaica and Antigua before the constitutional change
of 1866 has shrunk in the post-1866 era. In other words, compared with Antigua, a
stronger plantation economy had a more positive effect on public investment in Jamaica
after the constitutional change than it did before the constitutional change.
Appendices to Chapter 2
Table B1: Correlation Between Population Density and Institutional Quality Measures
Regulatory Quality Corruption Control Accountability Political Stability Government Effectiveness Rule of Law
Pop. Density 0.8530∗∗∗ 0.7594∗∗∗ 0.5663∗ 0.6963∗∗ 0.8055∗∗∗ 0.7314∗∗
*, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table B2: Percentage of Slaves Held by Holding Size
Holding Size
Country 1 to 10 11 to 200 201 or more
ATG 9.1 54.7 36.2
BDS 19 61.6 19.4
BLZ 47.5 40.2 12.3
DOM 14.9 75 10.1
GND 10.4 62.9 26.7
GUY 6.1 63.6 30.3
JAM 8.7 55.4 35.9
SKN 11 66.2 22.8
SLU 17.5 73.4 9.1
SVG 8.7 53.4 37.4
TTO 26.1 70.3 3.6
Numbers in the cells are the percentage of total slave population in 1830. Source: Higman (1995).
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In the presences of endogeneity caused by correlation between the independent vari-
able and the error term, the OLS regression of institutions today on population density
in the colonial period would be biased in the following way:
E(βˆI) = E
[
βI + κI
∑
i(Si − S¯)ξi∑
i(Si − S¯)Si
+
∑
i(Si − S¯)φIi∑
i(Si − S¯)Si
]
= E(βˆI) = βI + κIE
[∑
i(Si − S¯)ξi∑
i(Si − S¯)Si
]
E(βˆI) = βI + κIρ (B1)
where κI is the coefficient on the omitted variable ξ in the regression (2.1) and
ρ = E
[∑
i
(Si−S¯)ξi∑
i
(Si−S¯)Si
]
. The bias is thus ≡ κIρ.
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Table B3: Government Effectiveness and Colonial Labour Supply
Dependent Variable is
Government Effectiveness (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Pop. Density (1834) 0.155∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.161∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.224∗∗
(4.08) (3.07) (2.53) (2.70) (3.11) (2.95 ) (2.48)
Log GDP Per capita 0.0497 0.0318 0.0488 0.0288
(1.38) (0.71) (1.28) (0.69)
% of Slaves on Holdings of:
1 to 10 0.00823
(0.73)
11 to 200 0.00362
(0.37)
201 or more -0.00864
(-0.98)
Pop %∆1850 0.609 0.517
(0.97) (1.00)
Pop %∆1900 -0.049
(-0.37)
Natural Increase -0.004
(-0.26)
Constant -0.00211 -0.168 -0.309 -0.374 0.0556 -0.787 -0.827
(-0.02) (-0.95) (-1.16) (-0.64) (0.19) (-1.11) (-1.03)
Observations 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
R-square 0.649 0.645 0.623 0.603 0.644 0.578 0.572
Notes N = 11 for all cross-section regressions. The sample consist of 11 former British West Indian territories. A full list of
the countries is presented in Table B10 in the appendix. All regressions are OLS cross-section regressions. t-statistics are in
parentheses. The measure of institutional quality is the mean score 1996-2013 for Government Effectiveness, obtained from
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators. A higher score indicates better quality institutions. Slave holding data is
from Nunn (2008). * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table B4: Regulatory Quality and Colonial Labour Supply
Dependent Variable is
Regulatory Quality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Pop. Density (1834) 0.150∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(4.90) (4.49) (3.73) (4.17) (6.38) (4.86) (5.57)
Log GDP Per capita 0.0675∗∗ 0.0533∗ 0.0658∗∗ 0.0420∗
(3.12) (2.04) (3.16) (2.19)
% of Slaves on Holdings of:
1 to 10 0.00652
(0.98)
11 to 200 0.00682
(1.29)
201 or more -0.0105∗∗
(-2.61)
Pop %∆1850 0.037 0.882∗∗
(0.09) (2.95)
Pop %∆1900 0.117
(1.27)
Natural Increase -0.022∗
(-2.29)
Constant -0.101 -0.326∗∗ -0.438∗∗ -0.714∗ -0.0537 -0.681 -1.417∗∗
(-0.92) (-3.06) (-2.81) (-2.25) (-0.41) (-1.40) (-3.05)
Observations 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
R-square 0.697 0.846 0.845 0.858 0.910 0.751 0.830
Notes N = 11 for all cross-section regressions. The sample consist of 11 former British West Indian territories. A full list of
the countries is presented in Table B10 in the appendix. All regressions are OLS cross-section regressions. t-statistics are in
parentheses. The measure of institutional quality is the mean score 1996-2013 for Regulatory Quality, obtained from the World
Bank’s World Governance Indicators. A higher score indicates better quality institutions. Slave holding data is from Nunn (2008).
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table B5: Rule of Law and Colonial Labour Supply
Dependent Variable is
Rule of Law (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Pop. Density (1834) 0.181∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.148∗ 0.180∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.334∗∗
(3.22) (2.31) (2.43) (2.10) (2.34) (2.86) (2.70)
Log GDP Per capita 0.0605 0.0191 0.0608 0.0334
(1.09) (0.29) (1.02) (0.51)
% of Slaves on Holdings of:
1 to 10 0.0190
(1.15)
11 to 200 -0.00107
(-0.07)
201 or more -0.0112
(-0.81)
Pop %∆1850 1.590∗ 1.090
(1.99) (1.54)
Pop %∆1900 -0.211
(-1.22)
Natural Increase -0.013
(-0.57)
Constant -0.109 -0.311 -0.637 -0.250 -0.0216 -1.800∗ -1.830
(-0.54) (-1.14) (-1.63) (-0.28) (-0.05) (-1.99) (-1.66)
Observations 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
R-square 0.534 0.494 0.513 0.422 0.471 0.580 0.516
Notes N = 11 for all cross-section regressions. The sample consist of 11 former British West Indian territories. A full list
of the countries is presented in Table B10 in the appendix. All regressions are OLS cross-section regressions. t-statistics
are in parentheses. The measure of institutional quality is the mean score 1996-2013 for Rule of Law, obtained from the
World Bank’s World Governance Indicators. A higher score indicates better quality institutions. Slave holding data is
from Nunn (2008). * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table B6: Corruption Control and Colonial Labour Supply
Dependent Variable is
Control of Corruption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Pop. Density (1834) 0.211∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.181∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.370∗∗
(3.50) (2.60) (2.71) (2.33) (2.76) (3.34) (2.86)
Log GDP Per capita 0.0512 0.00278 0.0509 0.0140
(0.84) (0.04) (0.78) (0.20)
Percentage of Slaves on Holdings of:
1 to 10 0.0223
(1.23)
11 to 200 0.00121
(0.07)
201 or more -0.0154
(-1.04)
Pop %∆1850 1.844∗ 1.189
(2.27) (1.60)
Pop %∆1900 -0.236
(-1.36)
Natural Increase -0.010
(-0.41)
Constant -0.0762 -0.247 -0.629 -0.316 0.151 -2.06∗ -1.972
(-0.35) (-0.83) (-1.48) (-0.32) (0.31) (-2.26) (-1.71)
Observations 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
R-square 0.576 0.513 0.543 0.444 0.518 0.661 0.581
Notes N = 11 for all cross-section regressions. The sample consist of 11 former British West Indian territories. A full list of the
countries is presented in Table B10 in the appendix. All regressions are OLS cross-section regressions. t-statistics are in parentheses.
The measure of institutional quality is the mean score 1996-2013 for Control of Corruption, obtained from the World Bank’s World
Governance Indicators. A higher score indicates better quality institutions. Slave holding data is from Nunn (2008). * p < .10, **
p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table B7: Accountability and Colonial Labour Supply
Dependent Variable is
Voice & Accountability (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Pop. Density (1834) 0.0814∗ 0.0792 0.196∗∗∗ 0.0760 0.139∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.131∗
(2.06) (1.65) (4.04) (1.44) (3.23) (3.48) (2.05)
Log GDP Per capita 0.00400 -0.0567 0.00337 -0.0451
(0.10) (-1.68) (0.08) (-1.22)
% of Slaves on Holdings of:
1 to 10 0.0279∗∗
(3.24)
11 to 200 0.00258
(0.23)
201 or more -0.0203∗∗
(-2.62)
Pop %∆1850 1.309∗∗ 0.588
(2.95) (1.60)
Pop %∆1900 -0.122
(-1.29)
Natural Increase 0.0151
(1.23)
Constant 0.582∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗ 0.0906 0.422 1.094∗∗∗ -1.032∗ -0.473
(4.11) (2.78) (0.45) (0.62) (4.31) (-2.06) (-0.83)
Observations 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
R-square 0.320 0.151 0.612 0.037 0.510 0.621 0.615
Notes N = 11 for all cross-section regressions. The sample consist of 11 former British West Indian territories. A full list of
the countries is presented in Table B10 in the appendix. All regressions are OLS cross-section regressions. t-statistics are in
parentheses. The measure of institutional quality is the mean score 1996-2013 for Voice & Accountability, obtained from the
World Bank’s World Governance Indicators. A higher score indicates better quality institutions. Slave holding data is from
Nunn (2008). * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table B8: Political Stability and Colonial Labour Supply
Dependent Variable is
Political Stability (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Pop. Density (1834) 0.160∗∗ 0.146∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.147∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.225∗∗ 0.267∗
(2.91) (2.22) (3.08) (2.01) (2.66) (3.32) (2.29)
Log GDP Per capita 0.0242 -0.0379 0.0244 -0.0184
(0.42) (-0.63) (0.40) (-0.29)
% of Slaves on Holdings of:
1 to 10 0.0286
(1.86)
11 to 200 -0.000744
(-0.05)
201 or more -0.0176
(-1.31)
Pop %∆1850 1.998∗∗ 0.907
(3.17) (1.35)
Pop %∆1900 -0.291∗
(-2.15)
Natural Increase 0.002
(0.12)
Constant 0.0674 -0.0134 -0.503 0.0289 0.443 -1.93∗∗ -1.441
(0.34) (-0.05) (-1.40) (0.03) (1.00) (-2.72) (-1.38)
Observations 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
R-square 0.484 0.370 0.519 0.280 0.421 0.700 0.502
Notes N = 11 for all cross-section regressions. The sample consist of 11 former British West Indian territories. A full list
of the countries is presented in Table B10 in the appendix. All regressions are OLS cross-section regressions. t-statistics
are in parentheses. The measure of institutional quality is the mean score 1996-2013 for Political Stability, obtained from
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators. A higher score indicates better quality institutions. Slave holding data is
from Nunn (2008). * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table B9: World Governance Indicators
Indicator World Bank’s Description (All Indicators are measured on a scale from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong))
Voice and Accountability
Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom
of association, and a free media.
Political Stability and Absence of Violence
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures
perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically
motivated violence, including terrorism.
Government Effectiveness
Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation,
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
Regulatory Quality
Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and
promote private sector development.
Rule of Law
Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts,
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of Corruption
Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms
of corruption, as well as ”capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
Table B10: The Former British West Indies Colonies in Our Sample
Country Code Country
ATG Antigua and Barbuda
BDS Barbados
BLZ Belize
DOM Dominica
GND Grenada
GUY Guyana
JAM Jamaica
SKN St. Kitts and Nevis
SLU Saint Lucia
SVG Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
TTO Trinidad and Tobago
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Figure B1: Birth Rates in the Five Sugar Colonies
Source: Bulmer-Thomas (2012).
Figure B2: Death Rates in the Five Sugar Colonies
Source: Bulmer-Thomas (2012).
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Figure B3: Population in the Five Sugar Colonies
Source: Bulmer-Thomas (2012).
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Table C1: Marginal Effect of Population Density at Various Values of Log Rainfall
dy
dxw.r.t.
Log Pop.
Den.)
dy
dxw.r.t.
Log Pop.
Den.)
dy
dxw.r.t.
Log Pop.
Den.)
dy
dxw.r.t.
Log Pop.
Den.)
dy
dxw.r.t.
Log Pop.
Den.)
dy
dxw.r.t.
Log Pop.
Den.)
1) at 2.2 2.349 2) at 2.4 2.129 3) at 2.6 1.909 4) at 2.8 1.688 5) at 3 1.468 6) at 3.2 1.248
(1.72) (1.69) (1.65) (1.60) (1.54) (1.47)
7) at 3.4 1.028 8) at 3.6 0.807 9) at 3.8 0.587 10) at 4 0.367 11) at 4.4 0.146 12) at 4.4 -0.0741
(1.38) (1.25) (1.08) (0.82) (0.42) (-0.28)
13) at 4.6 -0.294 14) at 4.8 -0.515∗∗ 15) at 5 -0.735∗∗∗ 16 at 5.2 -0.955∗∗ 17) at 5.4 -1.176∗∗ 18) at 5.6 -1.396∗∗
(-1.54) (-3.17) (-3.77) (-3.57) (-3.30) (-3.09)
N = 42
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Log Rainfall is from the World Bank Data gathered in Mitchell et al. (2004) and is measured in mm for the period 1900-1930.
Data for population density on the even of colonisation (or in 1500) is taken from Acemoglu et al. (2002) and McEvedy et al. (1978).
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Table C2: IV: The Differential Effect of Colonial Labour Supply on Flexibility
Flexibility
Log Col. Pop. Density -0.0568*
(-1.84)
TropDep*Pop.Density 0.245***
(2.94)
Tropical Dependency -0.188
(-1.19)
Legal Origin -0.365***
(-3.63)
GDP per Capita 0.282***
(2.62)
Asia 0.0677
(0.51)
Africa 0.0163
(0.11)
Constant 3.648***
(7.80)
Observations 113
R2 0.25
z statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, **p <
0.01, ***p < 0.001. The regression represents
the IV counter-part to the regression in Col-
umn (4) of Table 4.4. The coefficient con-
cerning the differential effect of population
density for tropical dependencies, compared
with the rest of world, is 0.245, larger than
that of the OLS (0.219), and remains signif-
icant at the 1-percent level. This suggests
that for tropical dependencies, higher colo-
nial labour supply has a positive and signifi-
cant differential effect on labour institutions
today compared with the rest of the world.
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Figure C1: Former Tropical Colonies
Primary Sources
1. Caribbean colonial statistics from the British Empire, 1824-1950, the British On-
line Archives: https://microform.digital/boa/collections/73/caribbean-co lonial-
statistics-from-the-british-empire-1824-1950.
We made use of the following Volumes from this collection
—Blue Books of Antigua, 1828-1887.
—Blue Books of Barbados, 1839-1947.
—Blue Books of British Guiana (Guyana), 1868-1938.
—Blue Books of Jamaica, 1836-1945.
—Blue Books of Leeward Islands, 1889-1945.
—Blue Books of Saint Christopher (St. Kitts), 1828-1886.
Where a year was missing, we retrieved original copies from the Cambridge Univer-
sity Library under the Royal Commonwealth Society Collection. Copies can also
be found at the National Archives, Kew Colonial office under reference number:
CO 323/1683
2. Colonial Reports. These are annual surveys from the Governors of the various
colonial territories beginning in 1845. Other names for these surveys include:
Governor’s Report (1845-1850); Past and Present State of Her Majesty’s Colonies
(1851-1866); Report Transmitted With the Blue Book (1867-1880) and there-
after, Colonial Reports. They are Parliamentary Papers and retrievable from:
https://parlipapers.proquest.com.
3. Statistical Abstracts for the Colonies, (1850-1945). These were alternatively called:
Statistical Abstract for the Several Colonial and Other Possessions of the U.K.;
Abstracts for the Protectorates; and Abstracts for the Several British Overseas
Dominions and Protectorates. Produced annually, these abstracts cover area, pop-
ulation, revenue, expenditure, public debt, shipping, imports, exports, duties and
other miscellaneous data. These are also available at: https://parlipapers.proquest.com.
4. Statistical Tables Relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the U.K. (1850-
1910). These were produced annually but covered data on three years (the year
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in which it was produced and the two previous years). As Parliamentary Papers,
they are also retrievable from:
https://parlipapers.proquest.com.
5. Dr. Underhill’s Letter: A Letter Addressed to the Rt. Honourable E. Cardwell,
with Illustrative Documents on the Condition of Jamaica and an Explanatory
Statement. Arthur Miall. Underhill, E. B. (1865). Retrieved from:
https://archive.org/details/oates71079453/page/n15
6. Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Treatment of Immi-
grants in British Guiana. 1871 Command Papers. C.393 C.393-I C.393-II. XX.483,
691, 751. Retrieved from: https://parlipapers.proquest.com.
7. Reports from Committees. Eighteen Volumes. Part II. Sugar and Coffee Planting.
Session 18 November 1847-1855 September 1848. Vol. XXIII. House of Commons
Papers. British Online Archives.
8. Great Britain. West India Royal Commission, 1. (1897). Report of the West India
Royal Commission ... London: Printed for Her Majesty’s Stationery Office by Eyre
and Spottiswoode.
9. Moyne papers on West India Royal Commission, 1938-1945. Institute of Common-
wealth Studies Library, University of London. GB 101 ICS 56
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